| 1. |
- Afsar, Atahan, et al.
(författare)
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Political Power in the Swedish Riksdag
- 2021
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Ingår i: SSRN Electronic Journal. - : SSRN. - 1556-5068 .- 1556-5068.
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- In recent years many parliaments have become fragmented and polarized, with difficulties to form government. Traditional party alliances have changed, new parties have been established, and some of these are shunned by the traditional parties. Fragile minority governments are formed and break up. We propose a game-theoretic framework for analysis of political power in parliaments for situations when party affilations change and new coalitions are formed. More speciffically, we use and modify tools from cooperative game theory, in particular Myerson (1977) and Alonso-Meijide and Carreras (2011). The analytical framework is applied to the current Swedish parliament
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| 2. |
- Alger, Ingela, et al.
(författare)
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Evolution and Kantian morality: a correction and addendum
- 2022
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Theorem 1 in Alger and Weibull (Games and Economic Behavior, 2016) consists of two statements. The first establishes that Homo moralis with the right degree of morality is evolutionarily stable. The second statement is a claim about sufficient conditions for other goal functions to be evolutionarily unstable. However, the proof given for that claim presumes that all relevant sets are non-empty, while the hypothesis of the theorem does not guarantee that. We here prove instability under a stronger hypothesis that guarantees existence, and we also establish a new and closely related result. As a by-product, we also obtain an extension of Theorem 1 in Alger and Weibull (Econometrica, 2013).
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| 3. |
- Alger, Ingela, et al.
(författare)
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Evolution and Kantian morality: A correction and addendum
- 2024
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Ingår i: Games and Economic Behavior. - : Elsevier Inc. - 1090-2473 .- 0899-8256. ; 140, s. 585-587
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Theorem 1 in Alger and Weibull (2016, Games and Economic Behavior) consists of two statements. The first establishes that Homo moralis with the right degree of morality is evolutionarily stable. The second statement is a claim about sufficient conditions for other goal functions to be evolutionarily unstable. However, the proof given for that claim presumes that all relevant sets are non-empty, while the hypothesis of the theorem does not guarantee that. We here prove instability under a stronger hypothesis that guarantees existence, and we also establish a new and closely related result. As a by-product, we also obtain an extension of Theorem 1 in Alger and Weibull (2013, Econometrica).
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| 4. |
- Alger, Ingela, et al.
(författare)
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Evolution of preferences in structured populations: Genes, guns, and culture
- 2020
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Theory. - : Elsevier. - 1095-7235 .- 0022-0531. ; 185
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- During human evolution, individuals interacted mostly within small groups that were connected by limited migration and sometimes by conflicts. Which preferences, if any, will prevail in such scenarios? Building on population biology models of spatially structured populations, and assuming individuals' preferences to be their private information, we characterize those preferences that, once established, cannot be displaced by alternative preferences. We represent such uninvadable preferences in terms of fitness and in terms of material payoffs. At the fitness level, individuals can be regarded to act as if driven by a mix of self-interest and a Kantian motive that evaluates own behavior in the light of the consequences for own fitness if others adopted this behavior. This Kantian motive is borne out from (genetic or cultural) kin selection. At the material-payoff level, individuals act as if driven in part by self-interest and a Kantian motive (in terms of material payoffs), but also in part by other-regarding preferences towards other group members. This latter motive is borne out of group resource constraints and the risk of conflict with other groups. We show how group size, the migration rate, the risk of group conflicts, and cultural loyalty shape the relative strengths of these motives.
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| 5. |
- Bomze, Immanuel, et al.
(författare)
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Does moral play equilibrate?
- 2021
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Ingår i: Economic Theory. - : Springer (part of Springer Nature): Springer Open Choice Hybrid Journals. - 1432-0479 .- 0938-2259. ; 71:1, s. 305-315
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Some finite and symmetric two-player games have no (pure or mixed) symmetric Nash equilibrium when played by partly morally motivated players.The reason is that the "right thing to do" may be not to randomize. We analyze this issue both under complete information between equally moral players and under incomplete information between players of arbitrary degrees of morality. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and illustrate the results with examples and counter examples.
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| 6. |
- Fosgerau, Mogens, et al.
(författare)
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Categorical Screening with Rational Inattention
- 2020
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Ingår i: SSRN Electronic Journal. - : Elsevier BV. - 1556-5068.
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- A rationally inattentive screener evaluates a heterogeneous pool of candidates, aiming to let only high-productivity candidates pass. Candidates belong to distinct and observable social categories. There is heterogenity across categories along multiple dimensions, including the costs of investment in skills, the costs of being screened, and the degree of bias faced in the screening process. Candidates choose how much effort to invest in skill development before being screened, with a payoff in a post-screening market that depends on the screening outcome. We characterize equilibrium behavior in this model, and use it to unify and extend several strands in the literature on categorical inequality, including statistical discrimination, prejudice, and social capital.
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| 7. |
- Fosgerau, Mogens, et al.
(författare)
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Costly Screening and Categorical Inequality
- 2020
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Ingår i: SSRN Electronic Journal. - : Elsevier BV. - 1556-5068.
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We consider a rationally inattentive screener who evaluates a pool of candidates composed of distinct and observable social categories. There is heterogeneity across categories in the costs of being screened, the degree of bias faced in the screening process, and the costs of investment in skills. Candidates choose how much effort to invest before being screened, with a payoff in a post-screening market that depends on the screening outcome. We characterize equilibrium in this model, and use it to unify and extend several strands in the literature on categorical inequality, including statistical discrimination, prejudice, and social capital.
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| 8. |
- Fosgerau, Mogens, et al.
(författare)
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Equilibrium Screening and Categorical Inequality
- 2023
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Ingår i: American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. - : American Economic Association. - 1945-7685 .- 1945-7669. ; 15:3, s. 201-242
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We analyze equilibrium outcomes under costly screening of candidates from distinct categories. Candidates choose how much effort to invest in skill acquisition, and the screener decides how carefully to screen each candidate. Typically, there are multiple equilibria, and ex ante identical individuals in different categories can receive different equilibrium treatment. The imposition of a quota for an initially disadvantaged group can result in increased screening intensity and skill investment by destabilizing the least active equilibrium. The endogeneity of screening enables powerful comparative statics, which we use to unify different strands in the literature on discrimination.
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| 9. |
- Gibaud, Sylvain, et al.
(författare)
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Accumulation of individual fitness or wealth as a population game
- 2021
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The accumulation of individual fitness or wealth is modelled as a population game in which pairs of individuals are recurrently and randomly matched to play a game over a resource. In addition, all individuals have random access to a constant background resource, and their fitness or wealth depreciates over time. For brevity we focus on the well-known Hawk-Dove game. In the base-line model, the probability of winning a fight (that is, when both play Hawk) is the same for both parties. In an extended version, the individual with higher current fitness or wealth has a higher probability of winning. Analytical results are given for the fitness/wealth distribution at any given time, for the evolution of average fitness/wealth over time, and for the asymptotics with respect to time and population size. Long-run average fitness/wealth is non-monotonic in the value of the resource, thus providing a potential explanation of the curse of the riches.
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| 10. |
- Gibaud, Sylvain, et al.
(författare)
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The dynamics of fitness and wealth distributions - a stochastic game-theoretic model
- 2022
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Ingår i: Journal of Dynamics and Games. - : American Institute of Mathematical Sciences. - 2164-6074 .- 2164-6066. ; 9:4, s. 405-432
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- A model of the dynamics of distributions of individual wealth, or of individual Darwinian fitness, is here developed. Pairs of individuals are recurrently and randomly matched to play a game over a resource. In addition, all individuals have random access to a constant background source, and their fitness or wealth depreciates over time. For brevity, we focus on the wellknown Hawk-Dove game. In the base-line model, the probability of winning a fight over a resource is the same for both parties. In an extended version, the individual with higher current fitness or wealth has a higher probability of winning. Analytical results are given for the fitness/wealth distribution at any given time, for the evolution of average fitness/wealth over time, and for the asymptotics with respect to both time and population size. Long-run average fitness/wealth is non-monotonic in the value of the resource, thus providing a potential explanation of the so-called curse of the riches.
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