| 1. |
- Andersson, Ola, et al.
(författare)
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Costly Renegotiation in Repeated Bertrand Games
- 2010
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Ingår i: Journal of Theoretical Economics. - : Walter de Gruyter GmbH. - 1935-1704. ; 10:1, Article 51
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper extends the concept of weak renegotiation-proof equilibrium (WRP) to allow for costly renegotiation and shows that even small renegotiation costs can have dramatic effects on the set of equilibria. More specifically, the paper analyzes the infinitely repeated Bertrand game. It is shown that for every level of renegotiation cost, there exists a discount factor such that any collusive profit can be supported as an equilibrium outcome. Hence, any arbitrary small renegotiation cost will suffice to facilitate collusive outcomes for sufficiently patient firms. This result stands in stark contrast to the unique pure strategy WRP equilibrium without renegotiation costs, which implies marginal-cost pricing in every period. Moreover, in comparison to the findings of Mc-Cutcheon (1997), who states that renegotiation costs have to be substantial to facilitate collusion, this result points to a quite different conclusion.
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| 2. |
- Andersson, Ola, et al.
(författare)
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Credible communication and cooperation: Experimental evidence from multi-stage Games
- 2012
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-2681 .- 1879-1751. ; 81:1, s. 207-219
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- It is well known that communication often serves as a facilitator for cooperation in static games. Yet, communication can serve entirely different purposes in dynamic settings as communication during the game may work as a means for renegotiation, potentially undermining the credibility of cooperative strategies. To explore this issue, this paper experimentally investigates cooperation and non-binding communication in a two-stage game. More specifically, two treatments are considered: one with only pre-play communication and one where subjects can also communicate intra-play between the stages of the game. The results highlight a nontrivial difference concerning the effects of pre-play communication between the two treatments. Sending or receiving pre-play messages has a positive and significant effect on cooperation if there is no possibility of intra-play communication. However, this effect is significantly reduced when when intra-play communication is allowed. The results suggest that the credibility of pre-play messages may depend crucially on future communication opportunities.
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| 3. |
- Andersson, Ola, et al.
(författare)
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Persuasion in experimental ultimatum games
- 2010
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Ingår i: Economics Letters. - : Elsevier BV. - 0165-1765 .- 1873-7374. ; 108:1, s. 16-18
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We study persuasion effects in experimental ultimatum games and find that Proposers' payoffs significantly increase if, along with offers, they can send messages which Responders read before deciding. Higher payoffs are driven by both lower offers and higher acceptance rates.
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| 4. |
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| 5. |
- Jiborn, Magnus, et al.
(författare)
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Har vi en klimatskuld?
- 2013
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Ingår i: Generationsmålet. - Stockholm : Dialogos Förlag. - 9789175042626 ; , s. 35-63
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Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 6. |
- Jiborn, Magnus, et al.
(författare)
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Har vi en klimatskuld?
- 2013
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Ingår i: Generationsmålet. - 9789175042626 ; , s. 35-63
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Bokkapitel (populärvet., debatt m.m.)
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| 7. |
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| 8. |
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| 9. |
- Nielsen, Ulrik H., et al.
(författare)
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Second Thoughts on Free Riding
- 2014
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Ingår i: Economics Letters. - : Elsevier BV. - 0165-1765. ; 122:2, s. 136-139
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We use the strategy method to classify subjects into cooperator types in a large-scale online Public Goods Game and find that free riders spend more time on making their decisions than conditional cooperators and other cooperator types. This result is robust to reversing the framing of the game and is not driven by free riders lacking cognitive ability, confusion, or natural swiftness in responding. Our results suggest that conditional cooperation serves as a norm and that free riders need time to resolve a moral dilemma.
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| 10. |
- Thöni, Christian, et al.
(författare)
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Microfoundations of Social Capital
- 2012
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Ingår i: Journal of Public Economics. - : Elsevier BV. - 0047-2727. ; 96:7-8, s. 635-643
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Abstract in UndeterminedResearch on social capital routinely relies on survey measures of trust which can be collected in large and heterogeneous samples at low cost. We validate such survey measures in an incentivized public good experiment and show that they are importantly related to cooperation behavior in a large and heterogeneous sample. We provide evidence on the microfoundation of this relation by use of an experimental design that enables us to disentangle preferences for cooperation from beliefs about others' cooperation. Our analysis suggests that the standard trust question used in the World Values Survey is a proxy for cooperation preferences rather than beliefs about others' cooperation. In contrast, the “fairness question”, a recently proposed alternative to the standard trust question, seems to operate through beliefs rather than preferences.
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