| 1. |
- Andersson, Ola, et al.
(författare)
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Deciding for Others Reduces Loss Aversion
- 2016
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Ingår i: Management Science. - : Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS). - 0025-1909 .- 1526-5501. ; 62:1, s. 29-36
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We study risk taking on behalf of others, both when choices involve losses and when they do not. A large-scale incentivized experiment with subjects randomly drawn from the Danish population is conducted. We find that deciding for others reduces loss aversion. When choosing between risky prospects for which losses are ruled out by design, subjects make the same choices for themselves as for others. In contrast, when losses are possible, we find that the two types of choices differ. In particular, we find that subjects who make choices for themselves take less risk than those who decide for others when losses loom. This finding is consistent with an interpretation of loss aversion as a bias in decision making driven by emotions and that these emotions are reduced when making decisions for others.
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| 2. |
- Andersson, Ola, et al.
(författare)
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Differences Attract: An Experimental Study of Focusing in Economic Choice
- 2016
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Several recent models of choice build on the idea that decision makers are more likely to choose an option if its attributes stand out compared to the attributes of the available alternatives. One example is the model of focusing by Köszegi and Szeidl (2013) where decision makers focus disproportionally on the attributes in which the available options differ more, implying that some attributes will be overweighted. We test this prediction in a controlled experiment. We find that subjects are more likely to make inconsistent choices when we manipulate the choice set by adding new options that are unchosen, but affect the maximal difference in attributes among the options. Hence, our results suggest that there exists a focusing effect.
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| 3. |
- Andersson, Ola, et al.
(författare)
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Grind or Gamble? : An Experimental Analysis of Effort and Spread Seeking in Contests
- 2016
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- We conduct a contest experiment where participants can invest in increasing both the mean and the spread of an uncertain performance variable. Subjects are treated with different prize schemes and in accordance with theory we observe substantial investments in spread. We find that both types of investments can be controlled with a three level prize scheme. However, the control is imperfect and behavior is characterized by inertia. The winner-take-all prize scheme has many disadvantages including high spread and heterogeneous behavior. The scheme where only one loser is punished appears superior; it generates high mean, low spread and is most popular.
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| 4. |
- Andersson, Ola, et al.
(författare)
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RISK AVERSION RELATES TO COGNITIVE ABILITY: PREFERENCES OR NOISE?
- 2016
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Ingår i: Journal of the European Economic Association. - : Oxford University Press (OUP). - 1542-4766 .- 1542-4774. ; 14, s. 1129-1154
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Recent experimental studies suggest that risk aversion is negatively related to cognitive ability. In this paper we report evidence that this relation may be spurious. We recruit a large subject pool drawn from the general Danish population for our experiment. By presenting subjects with choice tasks that vary the bias induced by random choices, we are able to generate both negative and positive correlations between risk aversion and cognitive ability. Our results suggest that cognitive ability is related to random decision making rather than to risk preferences.
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| 5. |
- Bouwmeester, Sjoerd, et al.
(författare)
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Registered Replication Report : Rand, Greene, and Nowak (2012)
- 2017
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Ingår i: Perspectives on Psychological Science. - : SAGE Publications. - 1745-6916 .- 1745-6924. ; 12:3, s. 527-542
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In an anonymous 4-person economic game, participants contributed more money to a common project (i.e., cooperated) when required to decide quickly than when forced to delay their decision (Rand, Greene & Nowak, 2012), a pattern consistent with the social heuristics hypothesis proposed by Rand and colleagues. The results of studies using time pressure have been mixed, with some replication attempts observing similar patterns (e.g., Rand et al., 2014) and others observing null effects (e.g., Tinghög et al., 2013; Verkoeijen & Bouwmeester, 2014). This Registered Replication Report (RRR) assessed the size and variability of the effect of time pressure on cooperative decisions by combining 21 separate, preregistered replications of the critical conditions from Study 7 of the original article (Rand et al., 2012). The primary planned analysis used data from all participants who were randomly assigned to conditions and who met the protocol inclusion criteria (an intent-to-treat approach that included the 65.9% of participants in the time-pressure condition and 7.5% in the forced-delay condition who did not adhere to the time constraints), and we observed a difference in contributions of −0.37 percentage points compared with an 8.6 percentage point difference calculated from the original data. Analyzing the data as the original article did, including data only for participants who complied with the time constraints, the RRR observed a 10.37 percentage point difference in contributions compared with a 15.31 percentage point difference in the original study. In combination, the results of the intent-to-treat analysis and the compliant-only analysis are consistent with the presence of selection biases and the absence of a causal effect of time pressure on cooperation.
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| 6. |
- Cappelen, Alexander W., et al.
(författare)
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Fairness is intuitive
- 2016
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Ingår i: Experimental Economics. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1573-6938 .- 1386-4157. ; 19:4, s. 727-740
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In this paper we provide new evidence showing that fair behavior is intuitive to most people. We find a strong association between a short response time and fair behavior in the dictator game. This association is robust to controls that take account of the fact that response time might be affected by the decision-maker’s cognitive ability and swiftness. The experiment was conducted with a large and heterogeneous sample recruited from the general population in Denmark. We find a striking similarity in the association between response time and fair behavior across groups in the society, which suggests that the predisposition to act fairly is a general human trait.
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| 7. |
- Døssing, Felix, et al.
(författare)
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Cognitive Load and Cooperation
- 2017
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Ingår i: Review of Behavioral Economics. - : Now Publishers. - 2326-6198 .- 2326-6201. ; 4:1, s. 69-92
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We study the effect of intuitive and reflective processes on cooperation using cognitive load. Compared with time constraint, which has been used in the previous literature, cognitive load is a more direct way to block reflective processes, and thus a more suitable way to study the link between intuition and cooperation. Using a repeated public goods game, we study the effect of different levels of cognitive load on contributions. We show that a higher cognitive load increases the initial level of cooperation. In particular, subjects are significantly less likely to fully free ride under high cognitive load.
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| 8. |
- Ellingsen, Tore, et al.
(författare)
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How does communication affect beliefs in one-shot games with complete information?
- 2018
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Ingår i: Games and Economic Behavior. - : Elsevier BV. - 0899-8256 .- 1090-2473. ; 107, s. 153-181
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper experimentally studies unilateral communication of intentions in eight different two-player one-shot normal form games with complete information. We find that communication is used both to coordinate and to deceive, and that messages have a significant impact on beliefs and behavior even in dominance solvable games. Nash equilibrium and cognitive hierarchy jointly account for many regularities, but not all of the evidence. Sophisticated sender behavior is especially difficult to reconcile with existing models.
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| 9. |
- Fosgaard, Toke Reinholt, et al.
(författare)
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Cooperation, Framing and Political Attitudes
- 2017
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper shows that political attitudes are linked to cooperative behavior in an incentivized experiment with a large sample randomly drawn from the Danish population. However, this relationship depends on the way the experiment is framed. In the standard game in which subjects give to a public good, contributions are the same regardless of political attitudes. In an economically equivalent version, in which subjects take from a public good, left-wingers cooperate significantly more than subjects in the middle or to the right of the political spectrum. Through simulation techniques we find that this difference in the framing effect across political point of views is to some extent explained by differences in beliefs and basic cooperation preferences.
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| 10. |
- Fosgaard, Toke R., et al.
(författare)
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Cooperation, framing, and political attitudes
- 2019
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Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-2681. ; 158, s. 416-427
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper shows that political attitudes are linked to cooperative behavior in an incentivized experiment with a large sample randomly drawn from the Danish population. However, this relationship depends on the way the experiment is framed. In the standard game in which subjects give to a public good, contributions are not linked to political attitudes. In an economically equivalent version, in which subjects take from a public good, left-wingers cooperate significantly more than subjects to the right of the political spectrum. This difference is to some extent caused by differences in beliefs and cooperation preferences but a substantial part is left unexplained, indicating that left wingers find cooperating under this institution more attractive than right wingers do.
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