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- Blomberg, Johan, et al.
(författare)
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Metalinguistic relativity : Does one's ontology determine one's view on linguistic relativity?
- 2021
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Ingår i: Language and Communication. - : Elsevier BV. - 0271-5309. ; 76, s. 35-46
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Linguistic relativity is a notion that has been met with both praise and scorn. We argue that there is correlation between theorists’ general conceptions of the nature of language, and their stance toward linguistic relativity. Starting with the proponents of the thesis, we distinguish between the relativists of the early days (Boas, Whorf) and modern neo-Whofians (Levinson, Slobin), showing that the first but not the latter are committed to a view of language as a monolithic semiotic system contrasting “arbitrarily” with other such systems. Critics of the thesis also come from two diametrically opposed views of language. While universalists see the most significant part of language as pan-human cognitive structure (insulated from thought in general), socio-cultural theorists emphasize the nature of language as contextually situated activity. In both cases the potential for locally sedimented linguistic structures to influence thought is excluded or at best marginalized. In response, we propose that a synthetic ontology of language as an experientially grounded semiotic system for meaning making in actual social contexts allows for the possibility for language to influence thought, though in different ways. These depend on whether we consider language as situated use, as sedimented conventions or as ultimately prelinguistic motivations for “universal” properties like predication. We argue that all three of these perspectives need to be considered. With the help of the Motivation & Sedimentation Model, which is based on such a linguistic ontology, and inspired by the integral linguistics and phenomenology, we show how the deadlock in the debate over linguistic relativity can be resolved, and the possibility for discussion to proceed in less antagonistic manner.
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| 2. |
- Li, Wenjing, et al.
(författare)
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Intersemiotic translation from fairy tale to sculpture : An exploration of secondary narrativity
- 2022
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Ingår i: Sign Systems Studies. - 1406-4243. ; 50:2-3, s. 317-345
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We present a cognitive semiotic case study of the narrative potential of the statue Den lille Havfrue (‘the little mermaid’) by Edvard Eriksen in Copenhagen. On the basis of theoretical analysis and a survey in which 20 European and 19 Chinese participants replied to questions concerning this statue we argue that it, and similar statues, may be considered as products of intersemiotic translation, but only if we dispense with any requirements of “equivalence” between source and target, since statues are necessarily semiotically highly reduced. While the source narratives constitute cases of primary narrativity, with narrations providing the audiences with stories, statues may partake only of secondary narrativity, where a prior story is needed for the statue to be understood as narration. In our study, this was reflected by correlations between reported prior knowledge and narrative (and possibly even non-narrative) interpretations of Den lille Havfrue. Finally, we relate the discussion to present-day cultural and political “settings”, where many statues, including Den lille Havfrue, have become part of a global anti-racism narrative.
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| 3. |
- Mendoza-Collazos, Juan, et al.
(författare)
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A Cognitive-Semiotic Approach to Agency : Assessing Ideas from Cognitive Science and Neuroscience
- 2022
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Ingår i: Biosemiotics. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1875-1342 .- 1875-1350. ; 15:1, s. 141-170
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Following the levels of intentionality and semiosis distinguished by the Semiotic Hierarchy (a layered model of semiosis/intentionality), and the distinction between original agency (without the use of artefacts) and enhanced agency (the prosthetic incorporation of artefacts), we propose a model of an agency hierarchy, consisting of six layers. Consistent with the phenomenological orientation of cognitive semiotics, a central claim is that agency and subjectivity are complementary aspects of intentionality. Hence, there is no agency without at least the minimal sense/feeling of agency. This perspective rules out all artefacts as genuine agents, as well as simple organisms, since it is highly unlikely that e.g. bacteria have any first-person perspective. Using this model, we review and assess recent proposals on the nature of agency from cognitive science, and neuroscience, and draw conclusions on how toincorporate aspects of them within a synthetic cognitive-semiotic framework.
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| 4. |
- Mendoza-Collazos, Juan, et al.
(författare)
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The Origins and Evolution of Design : A Stage-Based Model
- 2021
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Ingår i: Biosemiotics and Evolution : The Natural Foundations of Meaning and Symbolism - The Natural Foundations of Meaning and Symbolism. - Cham : Springer International Publishing. - 2199-3076 .- 2199-3068. - 9783030852641 - 9783030852672 - 9783030852658 ; 6, s. 161-173
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Within a broader definition of design, as the conception and planning of everything that is artificial, the place of tools is central. With the help of cognitive semiotics in general and Donald’s theory of the evolution of the human mind in particular, we propose a stage model for the evolution of design, consisting of four stages: Proto-design, Simple design, Complex design, and Advanced design, some of which are further divided into substages. We argue that nonhuman animals are capable of Proto-design, but it is only with the advent of stone tool technology in hominins that we witness Simple design. The stages are individuated based on evidence from archaeology and cognitive science, but also on the particular semiotic resources that are novel for each stage: mimesis-based gestures, speech, drawings, and polysemiotic communication. The model suggests both continuities and relative discontinuities in the evolution of design, and more generally, in human bio-cultural evolution.
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| 5. |
- Moskaluk, Kalina, et al.
(författare)
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“Dizziness of Freedom” : Anxiety Disorders and Metaphorical Meaning-making
- 2022
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Ingår i: Metaphor and Symbol. - : Informa UK Limited. - 1092-6488 .- 1532-7868. ; 37:4, s. 303-322
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Would metaphors used in the context of psychotherapy by people who experience various forms of anxiety disorders differ from those used by people who experience stress? We investigated this question with the help of the Motivation & Sedimentation Model (MSM), a theory of meaning-making developed within the synthetic new discipline of cognitive semiotics. The analysis of a sample of ten transcripts of psychotherapy sessions concerning the topic of anxiety, and a comparable sample concerning stress, showed a significantly stronger proportion of conventionalized metaphors in the stress sample, and a marginally significant difference in the number of innovative metaphors in the anxiety sample. These results suggest that lived experience of an anxiety disorder or another form of maladaptive anxiety affects metaphorical meaning-making, and manifests itself in spontaneous metaphor use. Furthermore, as a result of the conceptual and the empirical investigations of the topic, we propose novel theoretical and operational definitions of the notion of metaphoricity.
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| 9. |
- Mouratidou, Alexandra, et al.
(författare)
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How much do we really care what we pick? : Pre-verbal and verbal investment in choices concerning faces and figures
- 2022
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Ingår i: Topoi. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0167-7411 .- 1572-8749. ; 41:4, s. 695-713
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Every day we make choices, but our degree of investment in them differs, both in terms of pre-verbal experience and verbal justification. In an earlier experimental study, participants were asked to pick the more attractive one among two human faces, and among two abstract figures, and later to provide verbal motivations for these choices. They did not know that in some of the cases their choices were manipulated (i.e., they were asked to motivate the item they had not chosen). Against claims about our unreliability as conscious agents (Nisbett et al. in Psychol Rev 84:231–259, 2013; Johansson et al. in Science 310:116–119, 2005), the study found that in about half the cases the manipulations were detected. In the present study, we investigated whether varying degrees of choice investment could be an explanatory factor for such findings. We analysed the verbal justifications of the participants along a set of semantic categories, based on theoretical ideas from phenomenology and cognitive linguistics, and formulated a matrix of eleven markers of choice investment. We predicted a greater degree of investment when motivating (a) choices of faces than figures, (b) manipulated than actual choices, and (c) detected than non-detected manipulations. These predictions were confirmed, but with various strength. This allows us to argue for both consilience and differences between pre-verbal choice investment and the corresponding verbal motivations of the choices made, and thus for (degrees of) conscious awareness of choice making.
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