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- Dolev, Shlomi, et al.
(författare)
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Rationality authority for provable rational behavior
- 2011
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Ingår i: Proceedings of the Annual ACM Symposium on Principles of Distributed Computing. - New York, NY, USA : ACM. - 9781450307192 ; , s. 289-290
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Konferensbidrag (refereegranskat)abstract
- Players in a game are assumed to be totally rational and absolutely smart. However, in reality all players may act in non-rational ways and may fail to understand and find their best actions. In particular, participants in social interactions, such as lotteries and auctions, cannot be expected to always find by themselves the "best-reply" to any situation. Indeed, agents may consult with others about the possible outcome of their actions. It is then up to the counselee to assure the rationality of the consultant's advice. We present a distributed computer system infrastructure, named rationality authority, that allows safe consultation among (possibly biased) parties. The parties' advices are adapted only after verifying their feasibility and optimality by standard formal proof checkers. The rationality authority design considers computational constraints, as well as privacy and security issues, such as verification methods that do not reveal private preferences. Some of the techniques resembles zero-knowledge proofs. A non-cooperative game is presented by the game inventor along with its (possibly intractable) equilibrium. The game inventor advises playing by this equilibrium and offers a checkable proof for the equilibrium feasibility and optimality. Standard verification procedures, provided by trusted (according to their reputation) verification procedures, are used to verify the proof. Thus, the proposed rationality authority infrastructure facilitates the applications of game theory in several important real-life scenarios by the use of computing systems.
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- Dolev, Shlomi, et al.
(författare)
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Rationality authority for provable rational behavior
- 2015
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Ingår i: Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics). - Cham : Springer International Publishing. - 1611-3349 .- 0302-9743. - 9783319240237 ; 9295, s. 33-48
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Konferensbidrag (refereegranskat)abstract
- Players in a game are assumed to be totally rational and absolutely smart. However, in reality all players may act in non-rational ways and may fail to understand and find their best actions. In particular, participants in social interactions, such as lotteries and auctions, cannot be expected to always find by themselves the “best-reply” to any situation. Indeed, agents may consult with others about the possible outcome of their actions. It is then up to the counselee to assure the rationality of the consultant’s advice. We present a distributed computer system infrastructure, named rationality authority, that allows safe consultation among (possibly biased) parties. The parties’ advices are adapted only after verifying their feasibility and optimality by standard formal proof checkers. The rationality authority design considers computational constraints, as well as privacy and security issues, such as verification methods that do not reveal private preferences. Some of the techniques resembles zero-knowledge proofs. A non-cooperative game is presented by the game inventor along with its (possibly intractable) equilibrium. The game inventor advises playing by this equilibrium and offers a checkable proof for the equilibrium feasibility and optimality. Standard verification procedures, provided by trusted (according to their reputation) verification procedures, are used to verify the proof. Thus, the proposed rationality authority infrastructure facilitates the applications of game theory in several important real-life scenarios by the use of computing systems.
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- Field, M. H., et al.
(författare)
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A palaeoenvironmental reconstruction (based on palaeobotanical data and diatoms) of the Middle Pleistocene elephant (Palaeoloxodon antiquus) butchery site at Marathousa, Megalopolis, Greece
- 2018
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Ingår i: Quaternary International. - : Elsevier BV. - 1040-6182 .- 1873-4553. ; 497, s. 108-122
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Exposures of Middle Pleistocene lacustrine sediments at the margins of an open-cast lignite mine at Marathousa near Megalopolis, western Arcadia, Greece yielded the partial remains of a Palaeoloxodon antiquus skeleton which exhibited signs of being butchered. Sedimentation occurred between ca. 400 and 480 ka. Lithic artefacts were found in close spatial and stratigraphic association with the elephant remains. A palaeobotanical investigation (involving carpological, phytolith and wood remains) as well as diatom analysis led to a detailed reconstruction of the local environment at the time of sediment deposition. The results of this study enabled the environmental context of the butchering of the Palaeoloxodon antiquus carcass to be established. Palaeobotanical data show that sediment deposition at the Palaeoloxodon antiquus site occurred in shallow water in front of a reed swamp with trees in the immediate surroundings (particularly Alnus and Salix) on a flat plain where the water table was at or just below the ground surface. Warm conditions prevailed at the time of sediment deposition allowing aquatic plants typically recorded in the climatic optima of European interglacial assemblages to occur (e.g. Brasenia schreberi) and palms (Palmae) to live close-by. This suggests that the organic-rich sediments that contain the archaeological finds represent a transition between the underlying clastic sediments deposited during colder conditions and the overlying lignite that was deposited during warm climatic conditions as reported in previous studies.
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