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Numrering	Referens	Omslagsbild	Hitta
1.	Agnafors, Marcus (författare) Mixing Interest and Control? : Assessing Peter Vallentyne’s Hybrid Theory of Rights 2015 Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 43:4, s. 933-949 Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract The relationship between libertarianism and state is a contested one. Despite pressing full and strict ownership of one’s person and any justly acquired goods, many libertarians have suggested ways in which a state, albeit limited, can be regarded as just. Peter Vallentyne has proposed that all plausible versions of libertarianism are compatible with what he calls ‘private-law states’. His proposal is underpinned by a particular conception of rights, which brings Interest Theory of rights and Will Theory of rights together. If convincing, Vallentyne’s theory of rights enables libertarians to accommodate a limited but nevertheless coercive state that can act without the full consent of the affected citizen. In this paper, it is argued that Vallentyne’s hybrid theory of rights is implausible from a libertarian perspective as well as fails to align itself with common and deeply held moral intuitions. Hence the conflict between mainstream libertarianism and the state is not solved by Vallentyne’s proposal.
2.	Bülow, William (författare) Felon Disenfranchisement and the Argument from Democratic Self-Determination 2016 Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer Netherlands. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 44:3, s. 759-774 Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract This paper discusses an argument in defense of felon disenfranchisement originally proposed by Andrew Altman, which states that as a matter of democratic self-determination, members of a legitimate democratic community have a collective right to decide whether to disenfranchise felons. Although this argument-which is here referred to as the argument from democratic self-determination-is held to justify policies that are significantly broader in scope than many critics of existing disenfranchisement practices would allow for, it has received little attention from philosophers and political theorists. One exception is Claudio Lpez-Guerra, who recently raised several objections to the argument. In this paper, I argue that the argument from democratic self-determination can avoid Lpez-Guerra's objections. In responding to these, I explicate how and when it can be permissible for a legitimate democratic community to disenfranchise felons. I propose that this is the case only if the disenfranchisement of felons is not intended as a punishment, but as a way to express the view about citizenship one endorses as a democratic collective. I also discuss the implications of the argument in terms of offender reintegration.
3.	Båve, Arvid (författare) Truth-Predicates Still Not like Pronouns : a Reply to Salis 2019 Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 47:5, s. 1421-1429 Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract I here respond to Pietro Salis's objections against my original critique of the Prosentential Theory of Truth (PT). In addition, I clarify some points regarding the relationship between anaphoric relationships and general semantic notions like equivalence, consequence, and sameness of content, and make some further points about (PT)'s ability gto explain pragmatic and expressive features of true.
4.	Carlson, Erik, 1961- (författare) A Refutation of Spectrum Arguments for Nontransitive Betterness 2023 Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 51:4, s. 2147-2150 Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract This short paper states a new objection against "spectrum arguments" for nontransitive betterness. It is shown that defenders of such arguments must reject one of two very plausible principles.
5.	Carlson, Erik, 1961-, et al. (författare) Fischer on the Time of Death’s Badness 2024 Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract In a recent article in this journal, John Martin Fischer defends the view that death harms its victim after she dies. More specifically, he develops a “truthmaking” account in order to solve what he calls the Problem of Predication for this view. In this reply, we argue that Fischer’s proposed solution to this problem is unsuccessful.
6.	Coelho Mollo, Dimitri (författare) Being Clear on Content - Commentary on Hutto and Satne 2015 Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 43:3, s. 687-699 Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract In the target article Hutto and Satne propose a new approach to studying mental content. Although I believe there is much to commend in their proposal, I argue that it makes no space for a kind of content that is of central importance to cognitive science, and which need not be involved in beliefs and desires: I will use the expression ‘representational content’ to refer to it. Neglecting representational content leads to an undue limitation of the contribution that the neo-Cartesian approach can offer to the naturalising content project. I claim that neo-Cartesians can, on the one hand, help account for the nature of representational content and clarify what makes representational states contentful. On the other, besides explaining the natural origins of Ur-intentionality, neo-Cartesians should also take the role of accounting for the natural origins of contentful states that fall short of beliefs and desires. Finally, I argue that the only alternative for the authors is to embrace some form of non-representationalism, as Hutto elsewhere does. The success of the proposal thereby turns on the fate of the radical non-representationalist position that it accompanies.
7.	de Fine Licht, Karl, 1979, et al. (författare) On Defining "Reliance" and "Trust": Purposes, Conditions of Adequacy, and New Definitions 2021 Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 49, s. 1981-2001 Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract Trust is often perceived as having great value. For example, there is a strong belief that trust will bring different sorts of public goods and help us preserve common resources. A related concept which is just as important, but perhaps not explicitly discussed to the same extent as "trust", is "reliance" or "confidence". To be able to rely on some agent is often seen as a prerequisite for being able to trust this agent. Up to now, the conceptual discussion about the definition of trust and reliance has been rational in the sense that most people involved have offered arguments for their respective views, or against competing views. While these arguments rely on some criterion or other, these criteria are rarely explicitly stated, and to our knowledge, no systematic account of such criteria has been offered. In this paper we give an account of what criteria we should use to assess tentative definitions of "trust" and "reliance". We will also offer our own well-founded definitions of "trust" and "reliance". Trust should be regarded as a kind of reliance and we defend what we call "the accountability view" of trust, by appealing to the desiderata we identify in the first parts of the paper.
8.	Eriksson, John, 1973, et al. (författare) Moral Judgments, Cognitivism and the Dispositional Nature of Belief: Why Moral Peer Intransigence is Intelligible 2021 Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 49, s. 1753-1766 Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract Richard Rowland has recently argued that considerations based on moral disagreement between epistemic peers give us reason to think that cognitivism about moral judgments, i.e., the thesis that moral judgments are beliefs, is false. The novelty of Rowland's argument is to tweak the problem descriptively, i.e., not focusing on what one ought to do, but on what disputants actually do in the light of peer disagreement. The basic idea is that moral peer disagreement is intelligible. However, if moral judgments were beliefs, and beliefs track perceived evidence, then moral peer disagreement would not be intelligible. Hence, moral judgments are not beliefs. The argument is both novel and interesting, but this paper argues that it fails to establish the conclusion. Beliefs are plausibly analyzed as constituted by dispositions to respond to what is perceived as evidence, but dispositions can always be interfered with. Provided a background explanation of why the disposition is not manifested, peer intransigence is quite intelligible.
9.	Gamper, Johan (författare) On a Loophole in Causal Closure 2017 Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 45:2, s. 631-636 Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract Standard definitions of causal closure focus on where the causes in question are. In this paper, the focus is changed to where they are not. Causal closure is linked to the principle that no cause of another universe causes an event in a particular universe. This view permits the one universe to be affected by the other via an interface. An interface between universes can be seen as a domain that violates the suggested account of causal closure, suggesting a view in which universes are causally closed whereas interfaces are not. On this basis, universes are not affected by other universes directly but rather indirectly. © 2017 The Author(s)
10.	Garcia, Andrés G. (författare) The Finality and Instrumentality of Value in a Way 2019 Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 47:3, s. 681-692 Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract Final value accrues to objects that are good for their own sakes, while instrumental value accrues to objects that are good for the sake of their effects. The following paper aims to show that this distinction cuts across some surprising areas of the evaluative domain. This means that there may be some unexpected types of value that can come in a final or instrumental form. The argument proceeds by looking at two prominent types of value, namely kind-value and personal value. The former accrues to objects that are good as the kinds of things that they are, while the latter accrues to objects that are good for someone. Substantive examples are offered in support of the idea that these types of value can come in final or instrumental form. The substantive examples are then given additional support by considering the structure and behavior of fitting attitudes.
11.	Garcia, Andrés Gabriel, et al. (författare) Toward a Reasons-First View of Normative Background Conditions 2020 Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 48:3, s. 981-992 Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract Background conditions are thought to explain how objects can have value in virtue of certain features and how reasons can consist in certain facts. The following paper provides an account of what background conditions are and what effect they have on normative features. It defends the idea that if values depend on reasons, then there is nothing really surprising or mysterious about the presence of background conditions in normative explanations. Background conditions turn out to be a natural and predictable result of normative hierarchies that treat reasons as metaphysically fundamental relative to other normative features. The account is also shown to have advantages over competing accounts in that it is able to capture the functional criteria that characterize background conditions while remaining theoretically parsimonious.
12.	Green Werkmäster, Jakob (författare) Normative Transmission and Necessary Means 2019 Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 47:2, s. 555-568 Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract This paper focuses on the interaction of reasons and argues that reasons for an action may transmit to the necessary means of that action. Analyzing exactly how this phenomenon may be captured by principles governing normative transmission has proved an intricate task in recent years. In this paper, I assess three formulations focusing on normative transmission and necessary means: Ought Necessity, Strong Necessity, and Weak Necessity. My focus is on responding to two of the main objections raised against normative transmission for necessary means, in that they seem to give us reasons for buying tickets to plays we have no intention of seeing and that the principles give us the wrong result when the means are necessary but not sufficient. Even though these objections have been discussed previously, the counterarguments have so far relied on rejecting premises that the proponents of these objections are unlikely to concede. In this paper, I show how we may answer the objections in a way more likely to convince proponents of the objections. The result is an argument for a key aspect when it comes to understanding how reasons and ends-means normativity function. Normative transmission from ends to necessary means is not only interesting at the structural level, it is also possible to argue that it has implications for areas as diverse as philosophy of rationality, political philosophy and applied ethics.
13.	Gunnemyr, Mattias (författare) Sufficient Reasons to Act Wrongly : Making Parfit’s Kantian Contractualist Formula Consistent with Reasons 2017 Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 45:1, s. 227-246 Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract In On What Matters (2011) Derek Parfit advocates the Kantian Contractualist Formula as one of three supreme moral principles. In important cases, this formula entails that it is wrong for an agent to act in a way that would be partially best. In contrast, Parfit’s wide value-based objective view of reasons entails that the agent often have sufficient reasons to perform such acts. It seems then that agents might have sufficient reasons to act wrongly. In this paper I will argue that such reasons are a symptom of a fundamental inconsistency between the Kantian Contractualist Formula and Parfit’s view of reasons. The formula requires that we consider what everyone could rationally will, while a wide value-based objective view requires that we consider only what the agent has sufficient reasons for doing. The same inconsistency is particularly obvious in Parfit’s version of the Consent Principle, which share important features with the Kantian Contractualist Formula. Parfit accepts that moral principles might entail that we sometimes have sufficient reasons to act wrongly. However, to accept that supreme moral principles have such implications is objectionable if you, like Parfit, also hold that principles with such implications should be rejected or revised. I suggest that we could abandon the requirement that we have to consider the reasons of everyone. This would make the Kantian Contractualist Formula consistent with Parfit’s view of reasons, at least in this respect. I also argue that we can keep most implications of the Kantian Contractualist Formula that Parfit finds attractive.
14.	Gustafsson, Johan E. (författare) Phenomenal Continuity and the Bridge Problem 2011 Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 39:2, s. 289-296 Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract Any theory that analyses personal identity in terms of phenomenal continuity needs to deal with the ordinary interruptions of our consciousness that it is commonly thought that a person can survive. This is the bridge problem. The present paper offers a novel solution to the bridge problem based on the proposal that dreamless sleep need not interrupt phenomenal continuity. On this solution one can both hold that phenomenal continuity is necessary for personal identity and that persons can survive dreamless sleep.
15.	Hansson Wahlberg, Tobias (författare) Active Powers and Passive Powers - Do Causal Interactions Require Both? 2019 Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 47:5, s. 1603-1612 Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract Many powers metaphysicians postulate both active and passive powers, understood as distinct kinds of intrinsic causal properties of objects. I argue that the category of passive power is superfluous. I also offer a diagnosis of how philosophers are misled to postulate passive powers.
16.	Herlitz, Anders, 1981 (författare) Non-transitive Better than Relations and Rational Choice 2020 Ingår i: Philosophia (United States). - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 48, s. 179-189 Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract This paper argues that decision problems and money-pump arguments should not be a deciding factor against accepting non-transitive better than relations. If the reasons to accept normative standpoints that entail a non-transitive better than relation are compelling enough, we ought to revise our decision method rather than the normative standpoints. The paper introduces the most common argument in favor of non-transitive better than relations. It then illustrates that there are different ways to reconceptualize rational choice so that rational choice is possible also when the relevant better than relation is non-transitive.
17.	Häggqvist, Sören, 1962- (författare) Miscevic and the Stages Defence 2024 Ingår i: Philosophia. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract This contribution examines Miscevic’s defence against restrictionist X-phi, based on his view that thought experiments exhibit a large number of typical stages. On Miscevic’s view, the epistemic threats identified by proponents of the negative program in X-phi may be countered or ameliorated in various ways at various stages. I argue that the defence he offers is insufficient to counter the arguments by in particular Machery.
18.	Janvid, Mikael, 1968- (författare) Defeater Goes External 2017 Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 45:2, s. 701-715 Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract This paper proposes a new externalist account of defeaters, in terms of reliable indicators, as an integral part of a unified externalist account of warrant and defeat. It is argued that posing externalist conditions on warrant, but internalist conditions on defeat lead to undesirable tensions. The proposal is contrasted to some rival accounts and then tested on some widely discussed cases, like the airport case. Misleading defeaters, where Laurence BonJour's reliable clairvoyants serve as examples, also receive treatment, partly because they illustrate how internalist constraints are inserted into the set up of the problem and therefore unduly constrain the domain of satisfactory solutions. Lastly, the proposal is defended against some objections. Firstly, that by posing externalist conditions on defeat, the account becomes too open. Secondly, that an externalist account fails to take into account the epistemic assessments of our fellows in the epistemic practice of forming beliefs and making epistemic claims, which can be based on accessible warrant only.
19.	Janvid, Mikael, 1968- (författare) Understanding Understanding: An Epistemological Investigation 2014 Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer Science+Business Media B.V.. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 42:4, s. 971-985 Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract Understanding has received growing interest from epistemologists in recent years, but no consensus regarding its epistemic properties has yet been reached. This paper extracts, but also rejects, candidates of epistemic properties for construing an epistemological model of understanding from the writings of epistemologists participating in the current discussion surrounding that state. On the basis of these results, a suggestion is put forward according to which understanding is a non-basic epistemic state of warrant rather than knowledge. It is argued that this move provides a satisfactory conciliatory answer to the central question whether understanding is a factive epistemic state. Some differ- ences between understanding and knowledge are recorded along the way: for instance, that in contrast to knowledge, understanding does not require belief and that, even though neither knowledge nor understanding iterates, so that a subject can both know without knowing that she knows, as well as understanding without understanding that she understands, the reasons for the failure is different.
20.	Jeppsson, Sofia, 1977 (författare) Non-Elusive Freedom Contextualism 2016 Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 44:3, s. 793-808 Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract There are powerful arguments for free will scepticism. However, it seems obvious that some of our actions are done of our own free will. It has been argued that we can solve this puzzle by giving 'free' a contextualist analysis. In everyday contexts we are often allowed to ignore sceptical arguments, and can truly say that we acted freely. In the more demanding context of philosophy, it is true that we never do anything freely. Our freedom is elusive; it escapes us as soon as sceptical arguments are brought up. This kind of freedom contextualism has been criticized for conceding too much to the sceptic. Furthermore, it has problematic implications for moral responsibility. I develop an alternative contextualist analysis of 'free', according to which it is proper in certain contexts to ignore sceptical arguments even if they are brought up. Ignoring them is proper when doing so is necessary for engaging in an activity that is obviously justified. I argue that engaging in deliberation and inter-agential interaction with other people are obviously justified activities that require ignoring sceptical arguments. In these contexts, we do have a non-elusive kind of freedom.
21.	Johansson, Jens (författare) Constituted Simples? 2009 Ingår i: Philosophia. - Jerusalem. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 37:1, s. 87-89 Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
22.	Johansson, Jens (författare) Roache's Argument against the Cohabitation View 2011 Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 39:2, s. 309-310 Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract Rebecca Roache's recent critique of David Lewis's cohabitation view assumes that a person cannot be properly concerned about something that rules out that she ever exists. In this brief response, I argue against this assumption.
23.	Lo Presti, Patrizio Ulf Enrico (författare) Individual and Collective Intentionality : Elaborating the Fundamentality-Question 2022 Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 50:4, s. 1977-1997 Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract This is a contribution to the controversy which of individual or collective intentionality is more fundamental. I call it the fundamentality-question. In a first step, I argue that it is really two questions. One is about sense and one about reference. The first is: Can one grasp or understand the concept individual intentionality and, correspondingly, individuality, on the one hand, without grasping or understanding the concept collective intentionality and, correspondingly, collectivity, on the other? The second is: Can the concept individual intentionality and corresponding concept of individuality, on the one hand, refer to something without the concept of collective intentionality and corresponding concept of collectivity referring to something, on the other? Simplifying somewhat, this elaborated fundamentality-question admits of nine answers. In a second step, I pursue a tentative answer to the elaborated fundamentality-question. Given a disambiguation of individuality and, correspondingly, individual intentionality, the answer is the combination of claims that individuality and individual intentionality in one sense is fundamental in reference-dependence but that collectivity and collective intentionality is fundamental in reference-dependence in the other sense of individuality, while collectivity and collective intentionality is in both cases fundamental in sense-dependence.
24.	Lundgren, Björn (författare) Mistake is to Myth What Pretense is to Fiction : A Reply to Goodman 2017 Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer Netherlands. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 45:3, s. 1275-1282 Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
25.	Matheson, Benjamin (författare) Manipulators and Moral Standing 2019 Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 47:4, s. 1197-1214 Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract Manipulation arguments aim to show that compatibilism is false. Usually, they aim to undermine compatibilism by first eliciting the intuition that a manipulated agent is not morally responsible. Todd's (Philosophers' Imprint, 12(7): 1-18, 2012) Moral Standing Manipulation Argument instead aims to first elicit the intuition that a manipulator cannot blame her victim. Todd then argues that the best explanation for why a manipulator cannot blame her victim is that incompatibilism is true. In this paper, I present three lines of defence against this argument for those who agree a manipulator cannot blame her victim.
26.	Mickelson, Kristin, 1977 (författare) The Zygote Argument Is Still Invalid: So What? 2021 Ingår i: Philosophia (United States). - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 49, s. 705-722 Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract In "The Zygote Argument is Invalid: Now What?", Kristin Mickelson argues that Alfred Mele's original Zygote Argument is invalid: its two premises tell us merely that the truth of determinism is (perhaps spuriously) correlated with the absence of free human agents, but the argument nonetheless concludes with a specific explanation for that correlation, namely that deterministic laws (of the sort described by determinism) preclude-rule out, destroy, undermine, make impossible, rob us of-free will. In a recent essay, Gabriel De Marco grants that the original Zygote Argument is invalid for the reasons that Mickelson has identified, and claims that he has developed two new solutions to her invalidity objection. In this essay, I argue that both of his proposed solutions are nonstarters, the first fails as a "rescue" because it simply restates an extant solution in new jargon and the second fails because it consists in another invalid variant of the original Zygote Argument.
27.	Nilsson, Peter (författare) Butler's stone and ultimate psychological hedonism 2013 Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 41:2, s. 545-553 Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract This paper discusses psychological hedonism with special reference to the writings of Bishop Butler, and Elliott Sober and David Sloan Wilson. Contrary to philosophical orthodoxy, Sober and Wilson have argued that Butler failed to refute psychological hedonism. In this paper it is argued: (1) that there is a difference between reductive and ultimate psychological hedonism; (2) that Butler failed to refute ultimate psychological hedonism, but that he succeeded in refuting reductive psychological hedonism; and, finally and more importantly, (3) that Butler's criticism of reductive hedonism can be used as a stepping-stone in another argument showing the implausibility of ultimate psychological hedonism as well.
28.	Nilsson, Peter (författare) On the suffering of compassion 2011 Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 39:1, s. 125-144 Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract Compassion is often described in terms of suffering. This paper investigates the nature of this suffering. It is argued that compassion involves suffering of a particular kind. To begin with a case is made for the negative claim that compassion does not involve an ordinary, or afflictive, suffering over something. Secondly, it is argued that the suffering of compassion is a suffering for someone else’s sake: If you feel compassion for another person, P, then you suffer over P:s suffering for P:s sake, and if that is all you do, then you are not affected with an afflictive suffering over something. The final section identifies and addresses a problem concerning self-pity, and a suggestion is made on how to specify the proposed account so as to cover both self-directed and other-directed compassion.
29.	Olinder, Ragnar Francén (författare) Svavarsdottir's Burden 2012 Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 40:3, s. 577-589 Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract It is sometimes observed that the debate between internalists and externalists about moral motivation seems to have reached a deadlock. There are those who do, and those who don't, recognize the intuitive possibility of amoralists: i.e. people having moral opinions without being motivated to act accordingly. This makes Sigrun Svavarsdttir's methodological objection to internalism especially interesting, since it promises to break the deadlock through building a case against internalism (construed as a conceptual thesis), not on such intuitions, but on a methodological principle for empirical investigations. According to the objection, internalists incur the burden of argument, since they have to exclude certain explanations of the (verbal and non-verbal) behavior of apparent amoralists, while externalists don't. In this paper I argue that the objection fails: the principle for empirical investigations is plausible, but Svavarsdttir's application of it to internalism is not. Once we clearly distinguish between the conceptual and the empirical aspects of the internalist and externalist explanations of apparent amoralists, we see that these views incur an equal burden of explanation. I end the paper with a positive suggestion to the effect that there is a third alternative, a view that involves accepting neither internalism nor externalism, which does not incur an explanatory burden of the relevant sort.
30.	Orsi, Francesco, et al. (författare) The new explanatory objection against the fitting attitude account of value 2022 Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 50:4, s. 1845-1860 Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract The explanatory objection against the fitting attitude account of value states that if the properties of attitudes explain fittingness facts, but do not always explain value facts, then value facts cannot be identical with or reduced to fittingness facts. One reply to this objection is to claim that the constitutive properties of attitudes also explain value facts, for they are enablers for the value possessed by an object (the “enabling maneuver”). In this paper we argue that the enabling maneuver exposes FA to a new explanatory objection, to the extent that the explanatory role played by the constitutive properties of attitudes in value facts is assumed to be different from the explanatory role they play in fittingness facts.
31.	Parry, Jonathan (författare) Just War Theory, Legitimate Authority, and Irregular Belligerency 2015 Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 43:1, s. 175-196 Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract Since its earliest incarnations, just war theory has included the requirement that war must be initiated and waged by a legitimate authority. However, while recent years have witnessed a remarkable resurgence in interest in just war theory, the authority criterion is largely absent from contemporary discussions. In this paper I aim to show that this is an oversight worth rectifying, by arguing that the authority criterion plays a much more important role within just war theorising than is commonly supposed. As standardly understood, the authority criterion provides a necessary condition for the justification of the resort to war, but has no bearing on the question of permissible conduct in war. In opposition, I argue for an alternative interpretation of the criterion, which attributes to it a fundamental role in assessing this latter question. With this revised interpretation in place, I then demonstrate its advantages by applying it to the practical issue of armed conflicts that are initiated and fought by non-traditional belligerents. While several theorists have recognised that this common feature of modern armed conflict poses a challenge to mainstream just war theory in general-and to the authority criterion in particular-I argue that existing discussions frequently misconstrue the nature of the challenge, since they assume the standard interpretation of the authority requirement and its role within the theory. I then show that the revised interpretation provides a clearer account of both the challenge posed by non-traditional belligerency and the kind of response that it requires.
32.	Petersson, Björn (författare) Co-responsibility and Causal Involvement 2013 Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 41:3, s. 847-866 Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract In discussions of moral responsibility for collectively produced effects, it is not uncommon to assume that we have to abandon the view that causal involvement is a necessary condition for individual co-responsibility. In general, considerations of cases where there is "a mismatch between the wrong a group commits and the apparent causal contributions for which we can hold individuals responsible" motivate this move. According to Brian Lawson, "solving this problem requires an approach that deemphasizes the importance of causal contributions". Christopher Kutz's theory of complicitious accountability in Complicity from 2000 is probably the most wellknown approach of that kind. Standard examples are supposed to illustrate mismatches of three different kinds: an agent may be morally co-responsible for an event to a high degree even if her causal contribution to that event is a) very small, b) imperceptible, or c) non-existent (in overdetermination cases). From such examples, Kutz and others conclude that principles of complicitious accountability cannot include a condition of causal involvement. In the present paper, I defend the causal involvement condition for co-responsibility. These are my lines of argument: First, overdetermination cases can be accommodated within a theory of coresponsibility without giving up the causality condition. Kutz and others oversimplify the relation between counterfactual dependence and causation, and they overlook the possibility that causal relations other than marginal contribution could be morally relevant. Second, harmful effects are sometimes overdetermined by non-collective sets of acts. Over-farming, or the greenhouse effect, might be cases of that kind. In such cases, there need not be any formal organization, any unifying intentions, or any other noncausal criterion of membership available. If we give up the causal condition for coresponsibility it will be impossible to delimit the morally relevant set of acts related to those harms. Since we sometimes find it fair to blame people for such harms, we must question the argument from overdetermination. Third, although problems about imperceptible effects or aggregation of very small effects are morally important, e.g. when we consider degrees of blameworthiness or epistemic limitations in reasoning about how to assign responsibility for specific harms, they are irrelevant to the issue of whether causal involvement is necessary for complicity. Fourth, the costs of rejecting the causality condition for complicity are high. Causation is an explicit and essential element in most doctrines of legal liability and it is central in common sense views of moral responsibility. Giving up this condition could have radical and unwanted consequences for legal security and predictability. However, it is not only for pragmatic reasons and because it is a default position that we should require stronger arguments (than conflicting intuitions about "mismatches") before giving up the causality condition. An essential element in holding someone to account for an event is the assumption that her actions and intentions are part of the explanation of why that event occurred. If we give up that element, it is difficult to see which important function responsibility assignments could have.
33.	Ringmar, Erik (författare) Outline of a Non-Deliberative, Mood-Based, Theory of Action 2017 Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 45:4, s. 1527-1539 Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract In a series of famous experiments, Benjamin Libet claimed to have shown that there is no scientific basis for our commonsensical understanding of freedom of the will. The actions we are about to undertake register in our brains before they register in our conscious minds. And yet, all that Libet may have shown is that long-invoked notions such as “the will” and “freedom” are poor explanations of how actions are initiated. Actions take place as we respond to the call of the mood of the situation in which we find ourselves. Action is a way of attuning ourselves. Simple actions happen as long established habits kick in, and complex actions happen as the mood of a situation comes to correspond to the mood of a story we have been telling ourselves. When it feels right, we just act.
34.	Rönnedal, Daniel (författare) Contrary-to-Duty Paradoxes and Counterfactual Deontic Logic 2019 Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 47:4, s. 1247-1282 Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract In this paper, I will discuss some examples of the so-called contrary-to-duty (obligation) paradox, a well-known puzzle in deontic logic. A contrary-to-duty obligation is an obligation telling us what ought to be the case if something forbidden is true, for example: 'If she is guilty, she should confess'. Contrary-to-duty obligations are important in our moral and legal thinking. Therefore, we want to be able to find an adequate symbolisation of such obligations in some logical system, a task that has turned out to be difficult. This is shown by the so-called contrary-to-duty (obligation) paradox. I will investigate and evaluate one kind of solution to this problem that has been suggested in the literature, which I will call the 'counterfactual solution'. I will use some recent systems that combine not only counterfactual logic and deontic logic, but also temporal logic, in my analysis of the paradox. I will argue that the counterfactual solution has many attractive features and that it can give a fairly satisfactory answer to some examples of the contrary-to-duty paradox, but that it nevertheless has some serious problems. The conclusion is that, notwithstanding the many attractive features of the solution, there seem to be other approaches to the paradox that are more promising.
35.	Rönnedal, Daniel (författare) Transgressions Are Equal, and Right Actions Are Equal : some Philosophical Reflections on Paradox III in Cicero's Paradoxa Stoicorum 2017 Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 45:1, s. 317-334 Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract In Paradoxa Stoicorum, the Roman philosopher Cicero defends six important Stoic theses. Since these theses seem counterintuitive, and it is not likely that the average person would agree with them, they were generally called paradoxes. According to the third paradox, (P3), (all) transgressions (wrong actions) are equal and (all) right actions are equal. According to one interpretation of this principle, which I will call (P3'), it means that if it is forbidden that A and it is forbidden that B, then not-A is as good as not-B; and if it is permitted that A and it is permitted that B, then A is as good as B. In this paper, I show how it is possible to prove this thesis in dyadic deontic logic. I also try to defend (P3') against some philosophical counterarguments. Furthermore, I address the claim that (P3') is not a correct interpretation of Cicero's third paradox and the assertion that it does not matter whether (P3') is true or not. I argue that it does matter whether (P3') is true or not, but acknowledge that (P3') is perhaps a slightly different principle than Cicero's thesis. The upshot is that (P3') seems to be a plausible principle, and that at least one part of paradox III in Cicero's Paradoxa Stoicorum appears to be defensible.
36.	Rønnow-Rasmussen, Toni (författare) Normative Reasons and the Agent-neutral/Relative Dichotomy 2009 Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 37, s. 227-243 Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract The distinction between the agent-relative and the agent-neutral plays a prominent role in recent attempts to taxonomize normative theories. Its importance extends to most areas in practical philosophy, though. Despite its popularity, the distinction remains difficult to get a good grip on. In part this has to do with the fact that there is no consensus concerning the sort of objects to which we should apply the distinction. Thomas Nagel distinguishes between agent-neutral and agent-relative values, reasons, and principles; Derek Parfit focuses on normative theories (and the aims they provide to agents), David McNaughton and Piers Rawling focus on rules and reasons, Skorupski on predicates, and there are other suggestions too. Some writers suspect that we fundamentally talk about one and the same distinction. This work is about practical reasons for action rather than theoretical reasons for belief. Moreover, focus is on whether reasons do or do not essentially refer to particular agents. A challenge that undermines the dichotomy in this sense is posed. After having rejected different attempts to defend the distinction, it is argued that there is a possible defence that sets out from Jonathan Dancy’s recent distinction between enablers and favourers.
37.	Sandin, Per (författare) Supreme Emergencies Without the Bad Guys 2009 Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 37:1, s. 153-167 Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract This paper discusses the application of the supreme emergency doctrine from just-war theory to non-antagonistic threats. Two versions of the doctrine are considered: Michael Walzer's communitarian version and Brian Orend's prudential one. I investigate first whether the doctrines are applicable to non-antagonistic threats, and second whether they are defensible. I argue that a version of Walzer's doctrine seems to be applicable to non-antagonistic threats, but that it is very doubtful whether the doctrine is defensible. I also argue that Orend's version of the doctrine is applicable to non-antagonistic threats, but that his account is not defensible, regardless of whether the threats are antagonistic or not.
38.	Sjögren, Jörgen, et al. (författare) Concept Formation and Concept Grounding 2014 Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer Science+Business Media B.V.. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 42:3, s. 827-839 Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract Recently Carrie S. Jenkins formulated an epistemology of mathematics, or rather arithmetic, respecting apriorism, empiricism, and realism. Central is an idea of concept grounding. The adequacy of this idea has been questioned e.g. concerning the grounding of the mathematically central concept of set (or class), and of composite concepts. In this paper we present a view of concept formation in mathematics, based on ideas from Carnap, leading to modifications of Jenkins’s epistemology that may solve some problematic issues with her ideas. But we also present some further problems with her view, concerning the role of proof for mathematical knowledge.
39.	Sluys, Mark (författare) Getting the Message and Grasping it : the Give-and-Take of Discourse 2019 Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 47:1, s. 207-224 Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract Can one fully succeed in performing illocutionary acts addressed to others if they do not understand what one is purportedly saying? Can one, for example, tell others something if they do not understand what one supposedly said? It is not uncommon for speech act theorist to claim that one cannot. I, in contrast, will be arguing that it is possible for a speaker to fully succeed in performing interpersonal illocutionary acts even if addressee understanding of what is said is not produced, is not intended to be produced and is even intended not to be produced.
40.	Stephens, Andreas (författare) A Pluralist Account of Knowledge as a Natural Kind 2016 Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 44:3, s. 885-903 Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract In an attempt to address some long-standing issues of epistemology, Hilary Kornblith proposes that knowledge is a natural kind the identification of which is the unique responsibility of one particular science: cognitive ethology. As Kornblith sees it, the natural kind thus picked out is knowledge as construed by reliabilism. Yet the claim that cognitive ethology has this special role has not convinced all critics. The present article argues that knowledge plays a causal and explanatory role within many of our more fruitful current theories, diverging from the reliabilist conception even in disciplines that are closely related to cognitive ethology, and thus still dealing with knowledge as a natural as opposed to a social phenomenon, where special attention will be given to cognitive neuroscience. However, rather than discarding the natural kind approach altogether, it is argued that many of Kornblith’s insights can in fact be preserved within a framework that is both naturalist and pluralist.
41.	Strandberg, Caj, 1968, et al. (författare) Externalism and the Content of Moral Motivation 2007 Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 35:2, s. 249-260, s. 1-22 Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract In his fetishist argument, Michael Smith raises an important question: What is the content of the motivational states that constitute moral motivation? Although the argument has been widely discussed, this question has not received the attention it deserves. In the present paper, I use Smith’s argument as a point of departure for a discussion of how advocates of externalism as regards moral judgements can account for moral motivation. More precisely, I explore various explanations of moral motivation that externalists can employ to answer the question Smith poses.
42.	Søndergaard, Andreas (författare) Understanding as Usability and Context-Sensitivity to Interests 2023 Ingår i: Philosophia. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 51:5, s. 2603-2623 Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract Is understanding subject to a factivity constraint? That is, must the agent’s representation of some subject matter be accurate in order for her to understand that subject matter? ‘No’, I argue in this paper. As an alternative, I formulate a novel manipulationist account of understanding. Rather than correctly representing, understanding, on this account, is a matter of being able to manipulate a representation of the world to satisfy contextually salient interests. This account of understanding is preferable to factivism, I argue, mainly for simplicity reasons. While it explains the intuitive data about understanding as successfully as factivist accounts, it is simpler by virtue of reducing the value truth bestows on understanding to that of usability.
43.	Talbert, Matthew (författare) Psychopaths and Symmetry : A Reply to Nelkin 2021 Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 49:3, s. 1233-1245 Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract An agent is morally competent if she can respond to moral considerations. There is a debate about whether agents are open to moral blame only if they are morally competent, and Dana Nelkin’s “Psychopaths, Incorrigible Racists, and the Faces of Responsibility” is an important contribution to this debate. Like others involved in this dispute, Nelkin takes the case of the psychopath to be instructive. This is because psychopaths are similar to responsible agents insofar as they act deliberately and on judgments about reasons, and yet psychopaths lack moral competence. Nelkin argues that, because of their moral incompetence, vices such as cruelty are not attributable to psychopaths. It follows that psychopaths are not open to moral blame since their behavior is only seemingly vicious. I have three aims in this reply to Nelkin. First, I respond to her claim that psychopaths are not capable of cruelty. Second, I respond to the related proposal—embedded in Nelkin’s “symmetry argument”—that a “pro-social psychopath” would not be capable of kindness. My responses to these claims are unified: even if the psychopath is not capable of “cruelty,” and the pro-social psychopath is not capable of “kindness,” the actions of these agents can have a significance for us that properly engages our blaming and praising practices. Finally, I argue that Nelkin’s strategy for showing that moral competence is required for cruelty supports a stronger conclusion than she anticipates: it supports the conclusion that blameworthiness requires not just moral competence, but actual moral understanding.
44.	Tiozzo, Marco (författare) The Level-Splitting View and the Non-Akrasia Constraint 2019 Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0048-3893 .- 1574-9274. ; 47, s. 917-923 Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract Some philosophers have defended the idea that in cases of all-things-considered misleading higher-order evidence it is rational to take divergent doxastic attitudes to p and E supports p. In a recent paper, Sophie Horowitz has argued that such “Level-Splitting views” are implausible since they violate a rational requirement she calls the Non-Akrasia Constraint. In this paper, I argue that Horowitz’s objection is misguided since it conflates two distinct notions of epistemic rationality.
45.	Carlson, Erik (författare) “A New Time Travel Paradox Resolved" 2005 Ingår i: Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel. - 0048-3893. ; 33:1-4, s. 263-273 Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
46.	Carlson, Erik (författare) In Defence of the Mind Argument 2002 Ingår i: Philosophia (Israel). - : Bar-Ilan University. - 0048-3893. ; 29:1-4, s. 393-400 Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
47.	Carlson, Erik (författare) "On a New Argument for Incompatibilism" 2003 Ingår i: Philosophia. - : Ramat Gan, Israel: Bar-Ilan University. - 0048-3893. ; 30:1-2, s. 159-164 Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)

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