| 1. |
- Blomquist, Sören, et al.
(författare)
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The Case Against JIVE: A Comment
- 2006
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Ingår i: Journal of Applied Econometrics. ; 21, s. 839-841
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
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| 2. |
- Dahlberg, Matz, 1966-, et al.
(författare)
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Aktivering av socialbidragstagare i Sverige
- 2008
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Ingår i: Søkelys på arbeidsmarkedet. - Oslo : Institutt for samfunnsforskning. - 0800-6199 .- 1504-7970. ; 25:2, s. 277-289
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Tidskriftsartikel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 3. |
- Dahlberg, Matz, et al.
(författare)
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Antidepressants and the Suicide Rate : Is There Really a Connection?
- 2005
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Recent research claims that the major part of the observed reduction in suicide rates during the 1990’s can be explained by the increase in the prescription of antidepressants. This conclusion is however based on research that only looks at raw correlations; confounding effects from other variables are not controlled for. Using a rich data set, we reinvestigate the issue. After controlling for other covariates, observed as well as unobserved, that might affect the suicide rate, we find, overall, no statistically significant effects from antidepressants on the suicide rate; when we do get significant effects, they are positive for young persons. Regarding the latter result, more research is needed before any firm policy conclusion can be made.
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| 8. |
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| 10. |
- Dahlberg, Matz, et al.
(författare)
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Inequality and Crime : Separating the Effects of Permanent andTransitory Income
- 2005
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Earlier studies on income inequality and crime have typically used total income or total earnings. However, it is quite likely that it is changes in permanent rather than in transitory income that affects crime rates. The purpose of this paper is therefore to disentangle the two effects by, first, estimating region-specific inequality in permanent and transitory income and, second, estimating crime equations with the two separate income components as explanatory variables. The results indicate that it is important to separate the two effects; while an increase in the inequality in permanent income yields a positive and significant effect on total crimes and three different property crimes, an increase in the inequality in transitory income has no significant effect on any type of crime. Using a traditional, aggregate, measure of income yields mainly insignificant effects on crime.
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| 11. |
- Dahlberg, Matz, 1966-, et al.
(författare)
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Inequality and Crime : Separating the Effects of Permanent and Transitory Income
- 2008
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Ingår i: Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics. - : Wiley. - 0305-9049 .- 1468-0084. ; 70:2, s. 129-153
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Earlier studies on income inequality and crime have typically used total income or total earnings. However, it is quite likely that it is changes in permanent rather than in transitory income that affects crime rates. The purpose of this paper is therefore to disentangle the two effects by, first, estimating region-specific inequality in permanent and transitory income and, second, estimating crime equations with the two separate income components as explanatory variables. The results indicate that it is important to separate the two effects; while an increase in the inequality in permanent income yields a positive and significant effect on total crimes and three different property crimes, an increase in the inequality in transitory income has no significant effect. Using a traditional, aggregate, measure of income yields insignificant effects on crime.
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| 12. |
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| 13. |
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| 14. |
- Dahlberg, Matz, et al.
(författare)
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Intergovernmental Grants and Bureaucratic Power
- 2008
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- In their role as agenda setters and implementers of political decisions, bureaucrats potentially have the power to influence decisions in their own favor. It is however difficult to empirically test whether bureaucrats actually are involved in such actions. In this paper we suggest and apply a new way of testing the hypothesis that bureaucrats can and do in fact affect policy to their own benefit. Making use of a discontinuity in the Swedish grant system, we estimate causal effects of intergovernmental grants on different types of personnel employed by the local governments. On the margin, we find a large, positive effect of grants on the number of bureaucrats in the central administration, but no effects on the number of personnel in other important sectors runby the local government (child care, schools and elderly care). These results support theview that bureaucrats are able to, and do indeed, affect the allocation of grants withinmunicipalities to support own goals.
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| 15. |
- Dahlberg, Matz, et al.
(författare)
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Is There a "Race-to-the-Bottom" in the Setting of Welfare Benefit Levels? : Evidence from a Policy Intervention
- 2008
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Ingår i: Journal of Public Economics. - : Elsevier BV. - 0047-2727 .- 1879-2316. ; 92:5-6, s. 1193-1209
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- In this paper we investigate whether local governments react on the welfare benefit levels in neighboring jurisdictions when setting their own benefit levels. We solve the simultaneity problem arising from the welfare game by utilizing a policy intervention; more specifically, we use a centrally geared exogenous placement of a highly welfare prone group (refugees) among Swedish municipalities as an instrument. The IV estimates indicate that there exists a "race-to-the-bottom" and that the effect is economically as well as statistically significant; if the neighboring municipalities decrease their welfare benefit level by 100 SEK, a municipality decreases its benefit level with approximately 41 SEK. This result is robust to several alternative model specifications.
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| 16. |
- Dahlberg, Matz, et al.
(författare)
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Is there an election cycle in public employment? Separating time effects from election year effects
- 2008
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Rapport (populärvet., debatt m.m.)abstract
- Do governments increase public employment in election years? This paper investigates this question by using data from Sweden and Finland, two coun¬tries that are similar in many respects but in which local elections are held at different points in time. We can thereby separate an election effect from other time effects. Our results indicate that there is a statistically significant election year effect in local public employment, a production factor that is highly visi¬ble in the welfare services provided by the local governments in the Scandina¬vian countries. The effect also seems to be economically significant; the municipalities employ 0.6 more full-time employees per 1,000 capita in election years than in other years (which correspond to an increase by approximately 1 percent).
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| 17. |
- Dahlberg, Matz, et al.
(författare)
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Kommunanställda byråkraters dubbla roll
- 2005
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Ingår i: Arbetsmarknad & Arbetsliv. - 1400-9692 .- 2002-343X. ; 11:3, s. 171-177
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Tidskriftsartikel (populärvet., debatt m.m.)
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| 18. |
- Dahlberg, Matz, et al.
(författare)
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On mandatory activation of welfare receivers
- 2008
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This paper investigates whether mandatory activation programs for welfare receivers have effects on welfare participation, employment and disposable income. In contrast to earlier studies we are able to capture both entry and exit effects. The empirical analysis makes use of a Swedish welfare reform in which the city districts in Stockholm gradually implemented mandatory activation programs for individuals on welfare. The reform is well suited for investigating effects of such programs for several reasons. First, the reform was not combined with any other policy instruments, like time limits or tax credits, making sure that we will capture effects of mandatory activation policies and nothing else. Second, the reform was initiated at different points of time in different city districts, which ease identification. Third, using data from city districts within a single local labor market we can control for confounding macro economic shocks. Overall, we find that mandatory activation of welfare receivers reduce overall welfare participation and increases employment. We also find that mandatory activation programs appear to work best for young people and for people born in non-Western countries. For disposable income, we do not find a statistically significant effect.
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| 19. |
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| 21. |
- Dahlberg, Matz, 1966-, et al.
(författare)
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Power Properties of the Sargan Test in the Presence of Measurement Errors in Dynamic Panels
- 2008
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Ingår i: Applied Economics Letters. - : Informa UK Limited. - 1350-4851 .- 1466-4291. ; 15:5, s. 349-353
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper investigates the power properties of the Sargan test in the presence of measurement errors in dynamic panel data models. The conclusion from Monte Carlo simulations, and an application on the data used by Arellano and Bond (1991), is that in the very likely case of measurement errors in either the dependent or any of the independent variables, we will, if we rely on the Sargan test, quite likely accept a mis-specified model and end up with biased results.
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| 22. |
- Dahlberg, Matz, et al.
(författare)
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Public Employment and the Double Role of Bureaucrats
- 2005
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Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Bureaucrats in the government sector have a double role since they are both suppliers and demanders of public employment; they are publicly employed (supply labor) and they have an important say in deciding the size of the municipal employment (demand labor). In this paper we present and estimate a theoretical model that focuses on this double role of bureaucrats. The predictions from the theoretical model are supported by our empirical results: The estimates, based on data from Swedish municipalities 1990–2002, show that wages have smaller effects on the demand for bureaucrats than on the demand for other types of public employees. Actually, wages have no significant effect on the number of bureaucrats the municipality employs.
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| 23. |
- Dahlberg, Matz, et al.
(författare)
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Public Employment and the Double Role of Bureaucrats
- 2006
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Ingår i: Public Choice. - 0048-5829 .- 1573-7101. ; 126, s. 387-404
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Bureaucrats in the government sector have a double role since they are both suppliers and demanders of public employment; they are publicly employed (supply labor) and they have an important say in deciding the size of the municipal employment (demand labor). In this paper we present and estimate a theoretical model that focuses on this double role of bureaucrats. The predictions from the theoretical model are supported by our empirical results: The estimates, based on data from Swedish municipalities 1990–2002, show that wages have smaller effects on the demand for bureaucrats than on the demand for other types of public employees. Actually, wages have no significant effect on the number of bureaucrats the municipality employs.
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| 24. |
- Dahlberg, Matz, et al.
(författare)
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Swedish Economic National Report
- 2005
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Ingår i: Yearbook for Nordic Tax Research 2005: Local Taxation. - : Universitetsforlaget, Oslo.
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Bokkapitel (populärvet., debatt m.m.)
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| 25. |
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| 26. |
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| 27. |
- Dahlberg, Matz, et al.
(författare)
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Using a discontinuous grant rule to identify the effect of grants on local taxes and spending
- 2006
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Rapport (populärvet., debatt m.m.)abstract
- When investigating the effects of federal grants on the behavior of lower-level governments, it is hard to defend the handling of grants as an exogenous factor affecting local governments; federal governments often set grants based on characteristics and performance of local governments. In this paper we make use of a discontinuity in the Swedish grant system in order to estimate the causal effects of general intergovernmental grants on local spending and local tax rates. The formula for the distribution of funds is used as an exclusion restriction in an IV-estimation. We find evidence of crowding-in, where federal grants are shifted to more local spending, but not to reduced local tax rates. Our results thus confirm a flypaper effect for Sweden.
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| 28. |
- Dahlberg, Matz, 1966-, et al.
(författare)
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Using a discontinuous grant rule to identify the effect of grants on local taxes and spending
- 2008
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Ingår i: Journal of Public Economics. - : Elsevier. - 0047-2727 .- 1879-2316. ; 92:12, s. 2320-2335
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- When investigating the effects of federal grants on the behavior of lower-level governments, it is hard to defend the handling of grants as an exogenous factor. Federal governments often set grants based on characteristics and performance of decentralized governments. In this paper we make use of a discontinuity in the Swedish grant system in order to estimate the causal effects of general intergovernmental grants on local spending and local tax rates. The formula for the distribution of funds is used as an exclusion restriction in an IV-estimation. We find evidence of crowding-in, where federal grants are shifted to more local spending, but not to reduced local tax rates.
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| 29. |
- Dahlberg, Matz, 1966-, et al.
(författare)
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Valår och den kommunala politiken
- 2008
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Ingår i: Ekonomisk Debatt. - 0345-2646. ; 36:5, s. 6-13
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)
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| 30. |
- Dahlberg, Matz
(författare)
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Vem bestämmer i kommunerna?
- 2008
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Ingår i: Ekonomisk debatt. - 0345-2646. ; 36:7, s. 3-4
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Tidskriftsartikel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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| 31. |
- Edmark, Karin, 1977-
(författare)
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Strategic Interactions among Swedish Local Governments
- 2007
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Essay 1 (with Matz Dahlberg) investigates if local governments react on the welfare benefit levels in neighbouring jurisdictions when setting their own benefit levels. The IV estimates indicate that there exists a "race-to-the-bottom" and that the effect is economically as well as statistically significant.Essay 2 tests for strategic competition in public spending on childcare and primary education, and care for the elderly, in Swedish municipalities. The study is not limited to interactions in the same type of expenditure, but also allows for effects across expenditures. The results give no robust support for the hypothesis that municipalities react on the spending policy of neighbouring municipalities in the decision on own spending on care of the elderly, childcare and education.Essay 3 (with Hanna Ågren) uses data on Swedish local governments to test for strategic interaction in local tax setting. We make use of a number of indirect predictions from the theories of tax competition and yardstick competition in order to test for the presence of strategic interaction in these forms. The analysis provides strong evidence for spatial correlation in tax rates among Swedish local governments. Moreover, we find weak evidence of tax competition effects in the setting of tax rates.Essay 4 tests for a migration response to the implementation of stricter rules for welfare benefit receipt in Stockholm town districts. The hypothesis is that welfare benefit prone individuals will choose to live in a town district that has no program if they dislike the loss of leisure due to program participation more than they value the contents of the program, and vice versa. The results give weak indications of a negative effect of the program on the outmigration of welfare prone individuals.
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| 32. |
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| 33. |
- Ågren, Hanna, et al.
(författare)
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Do Politicians’ Preferences Correspond to those of the Voters? : An Investigation of Political Representation
- 2007
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Ingår i: Public Choice. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0048-5829 .- 1573-7101. ; 130:1-2, s. 137-162
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper investigates political representation by exploring the relationship between citizens' preferences and the preferences of their elected representatives. Using Swedish survey data, the empirical analysis shows that voters and politicians have significantly different preferences for local welfare services, implying that voters do not elect representatives with the same preferences as their own. The results show that when comparing a politician of a certain age, gender, educational level and marital status, with a voter with identical characteristics, the politician still has preferences for a significantly higher level of spending on the locally provided services. Hence our results indicate that the representation of different socio-economic groups does not necessarily lead to a larger degree of representation of these groups' agendas. Moreover, we find the observed difference to be largest for the least salient expenditure item. We do, however, not find any evidence for differences in preferences between the two groups being associated with a decline in trust for politicians among voters
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| 34. |
- Ågren, Hanna, 1975-
(författare)
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Essays on Political Representation, Electoral Accountability and Strategic Interactions
- 2005
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Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- This thesis consists of an introduction and four self-contained essays.Essay 1 (with Matz Dahlberg and Eva Mörk) investigates political representation by exploring the relationship between citizens' preferences and the preferences of their elected representatives. Using Swedish survey data, the empirical analysis shows that voters and politicians have significantly different preferences for local welfare services, implying that voters do not elect representatives with the same preferences as their own. The results show that when comparing a politician of a certain age, gender, educational level and marital status, with a voter with identical characteristics, the politician still has preferences for a significantly higher level of spending on the locally provided services. Hence, our results indicate that the representation of different socio-economic groups does not necessarily lead to a larger degree of representation of these groups' agendas. Moreover, we find the observed difference to be largest for the least salient expenditure item. We do, however, not find any evidence for differences in preferences between the two groups being associated with a decline in trust for politicians among voters.Essay 2 examines the role of politicians' and voters' preferences in determining policy choices. The paper uses survey data to construct observable measures of actual policy preferences of both voters and their elected representatives, for local public services. The empirical analysis suggests the preferences of politicians and voters to have a significant impact on spending patterns during the election period. The impact of preferences depends on the spending category. The results show voters' preferences not to be expressed by politicians for the least salient issue, whereas for the most salient category, schooling, the growth in spending is determined by the preferred level of the electorate. The results suggest that the electoral cost of not implementing the policy choice of voters at large, is higher for the more salient public service.Essay 3 (with Karin Edmark) tests for strategic interaction in tax setting using panel data on Swedish local governments. Due to the existence of competing theoretical models, we make no a priori assumptions regarding the underlying behaviour of individuals, but instead test for the presence and type of underlying spatial process. The paper uses a number of additional, indirect predictions from the theories of tax and yardstick competition to test for the presence of strategic interaction. The analysis provides strong evidence of spatial dependence in tax rates among Swedish local governments. Moreover, we find evidence of both tax competition and yardstick competition effects in the setting of tax rates.Essay 4 investigates the idea that voters hold their local politicians accountable for the fiscal performance in their own jurisdiction, relative to neighbouring jurisdictions. The analysis is carried out using data on Swedish local governments. The approach used in the paper rests on the idea of yardstick competition theory, which formalizes the link between tax setting and voting behaviour. The results suggests that voters evaluate the incumbent party coalition based on relative fiscal policy, and provide evidence of yardstick competition effects. Moreover, unexpectedly, voters make performance comparisons of fiscal policies across municipalities with a different ideological position from that of their own municipality, suggesting there to be heterogeneity in the response of voters with respect to ideology.
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