| 1. |
- Bykvist, Krister, et al.
(författare)
-
Expressivism and Moral Certitude
- 2009
-
Ingår i: The Philosophical Quarterly. - : Oxford University Press (OUP). - 0031-8094 .- 1467-9213. ; 59:235, s. 202-215
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Michael Smith has recently argued that non-cognitivists are unable to accommodate crucialstructural features of moral belief, and in particular that non-cognitivists have trouble accounting forsubjects’ certitude with respect to their moral beliefs. James Lenman and Michael Ridge haveindependently constructed ‘ecumenical’ versions of non-cognitivism, intended to block this objection.We argue that these responses do not work. If ecumenical non-cognitivism, a hybrid view whichincorporates both non-cognitivist and cognitivist elements, fails to meet Smith’s challenge, it isunlikely that ‘purer’ and more familiar versions of non-cognitivism will succeed.
|
|
| 2. |
- Danielsson, Sven, et al.
(författare)
-
Brentano and the Buck-Passers
- 2007
-
Ingår i: Mind (Print). - : Oxford University Press (OUP). - 0026-4423 .- 1460-2113. ; 116:463, s. 511-522
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- According to T. M. Scanlon's 'buck-passing' analysis of value, x is good means that x has properties that provide reasons to take up positive attitudes vis-à-vis x. Some authors have claimed that this idea can be traced back to Franz Brentano, who said in 1889 that the judgement that x is good is the judgement that a positive attitude to x is correct ('richtig'). The most discussed problem in the recent literature on buck-passing is known as the 'wrong kind of reason' problem (the WKR problem): it seems quite possible that there is sometimes reason to favour an object although that object is not good and possibly very evil. The problem is to delineate exactly what distinguishes reasons of the right kind from reasons of the wrong kind. In this paper we offer a Brentano-style solution. We also note that one version of the WKR problem was put forward by G. E. Moore in his review of the English translation of Brentano's Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis. Before getting to how our Brentano-style approach might offer a way out for Brentano and the buck-passers, we briefly consider and reject an interesting attempt to solve the WKR problem recently proposed by John Skorupski.
|
|
| 3. |
- Olson, Jonas, 1978-
(författare)
-
Axiological Investigations
- 2005
-
Doktorsavhandling (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- The subject of this thesis is formal axiology, i.e., the discipline that deals with structural and conceptual questions about value. The main focus is on intrinsic or final value. The thesis consists of an introduction and six free-standing essays. The purpose of the introduction is to give a general background to the discussions in the essays. The introduction is divided into five sections. Section 1 outlines the subject matter and sketches the methodological framework. Section 2 discusses the supervenience of value, and how my use of that notion squares with the broader methodological framework. Section 3 defends the concept of intrinsic or final value. Section 4 discusses issues in value typology; particularly how intrinsic value relates to final value. Section 5 summarises the essays and provides some specific backgrounds to their respective themes.The six essays are thematically divided into four categories: The first two deal with specific issues concerning analyses of value. Essay 1 is a comparative discussion of competing approaches in this area. Essay 2 discusses, and proposes a solution to, a significant problem for the so called ‘buck-passing’ analysis of value. Essay 3 discusses the ontological nature of the bearers of final value, and defends the view that they are particularised properties, or tropes. Essay 4 defends conditionalism about final value, i.e., the idea that final value may vary according to context. The last two essays focus on some implications of the formal axiological discussion for normative theory: Essay 5 discusses the charge that the buck-passing analysis prematurely resolves the debate between consequentialism and deontology; essay 6 suggests that conditionalism makes possible a reconciliation between consequentialism and moral particularism.
|
|
| 4. |
- Olson, Jonas, 1978-
(författare)
-
Fitting Attitude Analyses of Value and the Partiality Challenge
- 2009
-
Ingår i: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1386-2820 .- 1572-8447. ; 12:4, s. 365-378
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- According to ‘Fitting Attitude’ (FA) analyses of value, for an object to be valuable isfor that object to have properties—other than its being valuable—that make it a fitting object ofcertain responses. In short, if an object is positively valuable it is fitting to favour it; if anobject is negatively valuable it is fitting to disfavour it. There are several variants of FAanalyses. Some hold that for an object to be valuable is for it to be such that it ought to befavoured; others hold that value is analyzable in terms of reasons or requirements to favour.All these variants of the FA analysis are subject to a partiality challenge: there arecircumstances in which some agents have reasons to favour or disfavour some object—due tothe personal relations in which they stand to the object—without this having any bearing onthe value of the object. A. C. Ewing was one of the first philosophers to draw attention to thepartiality challenge for FA analyses. In this paper I explain the challenge and considerEwing's responses, one of which is preferable to the other, but none of which is entirelysatisfactory. I go on to develop an alternative Brentano-inspired response that Ewing couldhave offered and that may well be preferable to the responses Ewing actually did offer.
|
|
| 5. |
- Olson, Jonas, 1978-
(författare)
-
G. E. Moore on Goodness and Reasons
- 2006
-
Ingår i: Australasian Journal of Philosophy. - : Informa UK Limited. - 0004-8402 .- 1471-6828. ; 84:4, s. 525-534
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Several proponents of the ‘buck-passing’ account of value have recently attributed to G. E. Moore the implausible view that goodness is reason-providing. I argue that this attribution is unjustified. In addition to its historical significance, the discussion has an important implication for the contemporary value-theoretical debate: the plausible observation that goodness is not reason-providing does not give decisive support to the buck-passing account over its Moorean rivals. The final section of the paper is a survey of what can be said for and against the buck-passing account and Moore's views about goodness and reasons.
|
|
| 6. |
|
|
| 7. |
- Olson, Jonas, 1978-
(författare)
-
Reasons and the New Non-Naturalism
- 2009
-
Ingår i: Spheres of Reason. - Oxford : Oxford University Press. - 9780199572939 ; , s. 164-182
-
Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This essay focuses on two recent trends in metaethics. One is the revival of non-naturalistic realism, or just non-naturalism for short. The other is the preoccupation with reasons. The two trends are not unconnected. The renewal of interest in non-naturalism seems to have gained fuel from the preoccupation with reasons. The essay distinguishes between old and new non-naturalism. Old non-naturalism places intrinsic goodness at the normative centre stage; new non-naturalism places the notion of a reason at the normative centre stage. There is a presentiment about, that new non-naturalism’s shift of focus from intrinsic goodness to reasons promises to make non-naturalism a more credible and viable metaethical position. This line of thinking involves a fallacy I propose to call the extensional fallacy. Unmasking the extensional fallacy reveals that the notion of a reason is no less problematic than the notion of intrinsic goodness, and that the supervenience of the normative on the natural is no less problematic for new non-naturalism than for old non-naturalism. Another currently popular view is this: On old non-naturalism goodness is reason-providing. But since it is intuitively incredible that goodness is reason-providing, old non-naturalism must be rejected in favour of new non-naturalism. The idea that goodness is not reason-providing is intuitively compelling and I argue that old non-naturalism is perfectly consistent with this idea; the contrary view is based on dubious readings of Moore.
|
|
| 8. |
- Olson, Jonas, 1978-, et al.
(författare)
-
Regimenting Reasons
- 2005
-
Ingår i: Theoria. - : Wiley. - 0040-5825 .- 1755-2567. ; 71:3, s. 203-214
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The Belief-Desire model (the B-D model) of reasons for action has been subject to much criticism lately. Two of the most elaborate and trenchant expositions of such criticisms are found in recent works by Jonathan Dancy (2000) and Fred Stoutland (2002). In this paper we set out to respond to the central pieces of their criticisms. For this purpose it is essential to sort out and regiment different senses in which the term ‘reason’ may be used. It is necessary to go beyond common philosophical practice and distinguish not merely between two such different uses but to make a tripartite distinction. Our aim is largely conciliatory: we grant the main parts of the points made by Stoutland and Dancy but argue that once the B-D model has been properly stated, and different uses of the term ‘reason’ sufficiently regimented, the B-D proponent is able to accommodate their respective criticisms within the framework of the B-D model and thereby undermine their case against the model.
|
|
| 9. |
|
|
| 10. |
|
|
| 11. |
- Olson, Jonas, 1978-
(författare)
-
The Freshman Objection to Expressivism and What to Make of It
- 2009
-
Ingår i: Logic, Ethics, and All That Jazz. - Uppsala : Uppsala universitet. - 9789150620788 ; , s. 203-214
-
Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Cognitivism is the view that the primary function of moral judgements is to express beliefs that purport to say how things are; expressivism is the contrasting view that their primary function is to express some desire-like state of mind. I shall consider what I call the freshman objection to expressivism. It is pretty uncontroversial that this objection rests on simple misunderstandings. There are nevertheless interesting metaethical lessons to learn from the fact that the freshman objection is prevalent among undergraduates and non-philosophers. It leaves for expressivists two awkward explanatory tasks. Number one is that of explaining why natural selection—which, by expressivism’s own lights, favoured moral thought and talk because of their socially useful regulative and coordinating functions—did not favour a stance that would make moral thought and talk more effective in fulfilling these functions. Number two is that of explaining how moral thought and talk survive in cultural evolution, despite the prevalence of the freshman objection and related worries. I conclude that expressivism as a theory of actual moral discourse rather than a revisionist theory is either false or committed to an implausible error theory, according to which ordinary speakers are systematically mistaken about what they are up to when they make moral judgements.
|
|
| 12. |
|
|
| 13. |
- Olson, Jonas, 1978-
(författare)
-
The Wrong Kind of Solution to the Wrong Kind of Reason Problem
- 2009
-
Ingår i: Utilitas. - 0953-8208 .- 1741-6183. ; 21, s. 225-232
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- The so called Wrong Kind of Reason (WKR) problem for Scanlon’s ‘buck-passing’ account of value has been much discussed recently. In a recent issue of Utilitas Gerald Lang provides a highly useful critique of extant solution proposals to the WKR problem and suggests a novel solution of his own. In this note I offer a critique of Lang’s solution and respond to some criticisms Lang directs at a Brentano-style approach suggested by Sven Danielsson and me.
|
|
| 14. |
|
|
| 15. |
- Shahabi, H Niazi, et al.
(författare)
-
Cytochrome P450 2E1 gene polymorphisms/haplotypes and Parkinson's disease in a Swedish population.
- 2009
-
Ingår i: Journal of neural transmission (Vienna, Austria : 1996). - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1435-1463 .- 0300-9564. ; 116:5, s. 567-73
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Cytochrome P450 2E1 (CYP2E1), which inter alia is located in dopamine containing neurons in the substantia nigra, has been hypothesized to be of importance for the pathophysiology of Parkinson's disease (PD), either by its production of reactive oxygen species (ROS) or by its capability to detoxify putative neurotoxins. Numerous polymorphisms in the coding and non-coding regions of the gene for this enzyme have been reported. Different variants may account for inter-individual differences in the activity of the enzyme or production of ROS. In this study, the CYP2E1 gene was examined in a control population (n = 272) and a population with PD (n = 347), using a tag-single nucleotide polymorphism (tSNP) approach founded on HapMap Data. Six tSNPs were used in the analysis and haplotype block data were obtained. In case of significance, the SNP was further examined regarding early/late age of disease onset and presence of relatives with PD. We found an association between allele and genotype frequencies of the C/G polymorphism at intron 7 (rs2070676) of this gene and PD (P value of 0.026 and 0.027, respectively). Furthermore, analysis of the rs2070676 polymorphism in subgroups of patients with age of disease onset higher than 50 years and those not having a relative with PD also demonstrated a significant difference with controls. This was seen in both genotype (corresponding to P value = 0.039 and 0.032) and allele (P = 0.027 and 0.017 respectively) frequency. As a representative of many polymorphisms or in possible linkage disequilibrium with other functional variants, it is possible that rs2070676 could influence the regulation of the enzyme. In conclusion, our results display an association between the rs2070676 polymorphism and PD. Additional investigations are needed to elucidate the importance of this polymorphism for the activity of CYP2E1 and PD susceptibility.
|
|
