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- Bugge, Audun Nystad, et al.
(författare)
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Laser Damage Helps the Eavesdropper in Quantum Cryptography
- 2014
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Ingår i: Physical Review Letters. - 0031-9007 .- 1079-7114. ; 112:7, s. 070503-
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We propose a class of attacks on quantum key distribution (QKD) systems where an eavesdropper actively engineers new loopholes by using damaging laser illumination to permanently change properties of system components. This can turn a perfect QKD system into a completely insecure system. A proof-of-principle experiment performed on an avalanche photodiode-based detector shows that laser damage can be used to create loopholes. After similar to 1 W illumination, the detectors' dark count rate reduces 2-5 times, permanently improving single-photon counting performance. After similar to 1.5 W, the detectors switch permanently into the linear photodetection mode and become completely insecure for QKD applications.
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2. |
- Sauge, Sebastien, et al.
(författare)
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Controlling an actively-quenched single photon detector with bright light
- 2011
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Ingår i: Optics Express. - 1094-4087. ; 19:23, s. 23590-23600
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We control using bright light an actively-quenched avalanche single-photon detector. Actively-quenched detectors are commonly used for quantum key distribution (QKD) in the visible and near-infrared range. This study shows that these detectors are controllable by the same attack used to hack passively-quenched and gated detectors. This demonstrates the generality of our attack and its possible applicability to eavsdropping the full secret key of all QKD systems using avalanche photodiodes (APDs). Moreover, the commercial detector model we tested (Perkin-Elmer SPCM-AQR) exhibits two new blinding mechanisms in addition to the previously observed thermal blinding of the APD, namely: malfunctioning of the bias voltage control circuit, and overload of the DC/DC converter biasing the APD. These two new technical loopholes found just in one detector model suggest that this problem must be solved in general, by incorporating generally imperfect detectors into the security proof for QKD.
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