51. |
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52. |
- Alvesson, Mats, et al.
(författare)
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Varför upphöja till universitet?
- 2016
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Ingår i: Svenska Dagbladet, Brännpunkt. - 1101-2412.
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Tidskriftsartikel (populärvet., debatt m.m.)
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53. |
- Alvesson, Mats, et al.
(författare)
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Varning för professorstiteln!
- 2016
-
Ingår i: Svenska Dagbladet, Brännpunkt. - 1101-2412.
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Tidskriftsartikel (populärvet., debatt m.m.)
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54. |
- Alvesson, Mats, et al.
(författare)
-
Varning för professorstiteln!
- 2017
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Ingår i: Lundagård. - 0345-7338.
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Tidskriftsartikel (populärvet., debatt m.m.)
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55. |
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56. |
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57. |
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58. |
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59. |
- Angere, Staffan, et al.
(författare)
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Inquiry and deliberation in judicial systems : The problem of jury size
- 2016
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Ingår i: Perspectives on Interrogative Models of Inquiry : Developments in Inquiry and Questions - Developments in Inquiry and Questions. - Cham : Springer International Publishing. - 9783319207612 - 9783319207629 ; , s. 35-56
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We raise the question whether there is a rigorous argument favoring one jury system over another. We provide a Bayesian model of deliberating juries that allows for computer simulation for the purpose of studying the effect of jury size and required majority on the quality of jury decision making. We introduce the idea of jury value (J-value), a kind of epistemic value which takes into account the unique characteristics and asymmetries involved in jury voting. Our computer simulations indicate that requiring more than a > 50 % majority should be avoided. Moreover, while it is in principle always better to have a larger jury, given a > 50 % required majority, the value of having more than 12–15 jurors is likely to be negligible. Finally, we provide a formula for calculating the optimal jury size given the cost, economic or otherwise, of adding another juror.
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60. |
- Angere, Staffan, et al.
(författare)
-
Publish Late, Publish Rarely! : Network Density and Group Performance in Scientific Communication
- 2017
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Ingår i: Scientific Collaboration and Collective Knowledge. - : Oxford University Press. - 9780190680534 ; , s. 34-62
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Bokkapitel (refereegranskat)abstract
- Research programs regularly compete to achieve the same goal, such as the discovery of the structure of DNA or the construction of a TEA laser. The more the competing programs share information, the faster the goal is likely to be reached, to society’s benefit. But the “priority rule”-the scientific norm according to which the first program to reach the goal in question must receive all the credit for the achievement-provides a powerful disincentive for programs to share information. How, then, is the clash between social and individual interest resolved in scientific practice? This chapter investigates what Robert Merton called science’s “communist” norm, which mandates universal sharing of knowledge, and uses mathematical models of discovery to argue that a communist regime may be on the whole advantageous and fair to all parties, and so might be implemented by a social contract that all scientists would be willing to sign.
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