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- Zugic, Ognjen, 1991-
(author)
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Labor market segmentation and the politics of investment and compensation
- 2024
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Doctoral thesis (other academic/artistic)abstract
- This dissertation investigates patterns of policy reform that relate to labor market segmentation. It does so through two interrelated research questions. The first question aims to understand what policies are theoretically relevant for a regime-based model of labor market segmentation and how these policy regimes have empirically evolved over time in rich European democracies. The theoretical approach argues that previous studies have a narrow policy focus. Previous literature studies policy-based dualization primarily through how governments regulate the labor market status of standard and atypical workers through employment regulations. Some literature also incorporates active labor market policy (ALMP) or unemployment compensation as a way to include pro-outsider policy into models of policy-based segmentation. This thesis argues that current policy models of segmentation fall short of capturing the full scope of how government economic strategy approaches segmentation. Primarily, they do not represent governments’ efforts to either avoid segmentation by investing in a skilled insider workforce or compensating the effects of segmentation through outsider-targeted welfare tools. To integrate investment and compensation as policy dimensions alongside the literature’s focus on regulation, the dissertation incorporates tertiary education and minimum income benefits alongside employment regulations and labor market policy in a labor market policy regime. The second research question addresses the politics of these reform trajectories, asking why reforms were undertaken and what made them successful. Because the beneficiaries of higher education and minimum income benefits are politically diffuse, it develops an explanatory account of reform based on the role of political coalition-building in broader political processes that help secure reform coalitions for policies where beneficiaries are not concentrated labor market constituencies. The dissertation contrasts this theoretical account against two influential explanatory theories, one based on electoral politics and the other on economic interests. In the second and third chapters, the dissertation uses a descriptive strategy to investigate the first research question by investigating policy developments in sixteen rich European democracies combined with a deeper investigation into policy changes in Sweden, Germany, and the Netherlands. It shows that a focus on regulations and labor market policy underestimates the variety of strategies governments take to intervene in the balance and outcomes of typical and atypical labor market participants. The chapters identify two empirical policy trajectories. One invests more in a skilled insider workforce but compensates outsider employment less; another invests less but uses more targeted welfare benefits to compensate for atypical employment outcomes. This variation occurs within similar trajectories of employment regulation and labor market policy.This dissertation’s fourth and fifth chapters use qualitative material to investigate influential reform processes in tertiary education and minimum income benefits in Sweden, Germany, and the Netherlands. These chapters show that decisions are made in the context of labor market concerns and that where they benefitted diffuse constituencies, decisions to invest in insiders or compensate outsiders were a part of broader reform processes. The findings illustrate patterns of party and economic coalitions that deviate from predictions made by other explanatory accounts.
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- Bäck, Hanna, et al.
(author)
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Pre-electoral coalitions, familiarity, and delays in government formation
- 2024
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In: West European Politics. - : Routledge. - 0140-2382 .- 1743-9655. ; 47:1, s. 88-112
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- During the past decade, many parliamentary democracies have experienced bargaining delays when forming governments. The previous literature has attributed protracted government formation processes to a high degree of preference uncertainty among the political parties and a high level of bargaining complexity. The article draws on such theories, but also adds a third theoretical mechanism, commitment problems, and highlights two explanatory variables that have not received much attention so far. The first is pre-electoral coalitions, which are declarations by parties stating that they intend to collaborate with each other after the election. The second is familiarity, which is the mutual trust between parties that comes from having worked together in the past. By combining a large-N study of government formation processes in 17 West European parliamentary democracies (1945-2019) with an in-depth case study of the prolonged Swedish government formation process in 2018-2019, it is shown that pre-electoral coalitions that fail to win a majority can sometimes delay, not speed up, government formation. In addition, a lack of familiarity may sometimes lead to a breakdown of negotiations and drawn-out government formation processes.
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- Lindvall, Johannes, 1975
(author)
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Lagstiftningsmakten
- 2023
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In: Svensk författningspolitik. - Lund : Studentlitteratur.
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Book chapter (other academic/artistic)
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| 7. |
- Andersson, Per F., et al.
(author)
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Crises, investments, and political institutions
- 2018
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In: Journal of Theoretical Politics. - : SAGE Publications. - 0951-6298 .- 1460-3667. ; 30:4, s. 410-430
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- On the basis of a game-theoretic model, this paper argues that governments typically manage crises more effectively in systems where political power is concentrated in a single party, but they are more likely to make investments in future welfare in systems where political power is shared among several parties. The paper makes two contributions. First of all, it shows that both crisis-management failures and investment failures can be explained by a common mechanism: an inter-temporal commitment problem that arises from the inability of political agents to commit to future policy choices. Second, it shows that power-sharing institutions are often associated with more effective government than power-concentration institutions, in contrast to much of the normative literature in comparative politics, in which power-sharing institutions are often justified on other grounds, such as representativeness, responsiveness, or social cohesion. In a world where crises dominate, power-concentration institutions typically perform better; in a world where investment problems dominate, power-sharing institutions typically perform better.
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- Brambor, Thomas, et al.
(author)
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The Lay of the Land: Information Capacity and the Modern State
- 2016
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Other publication (other academic/artistic)abstract
- Relying on three new indicators of the information capacity of states, this paper provides new evidence on the ability of states to collect and process information about the territories and populations that they govern. The three indicators are (a) the availability of a reliable census, (b) the establishment of a permanent government agency tasked with processing statistical information about the territory and the population, and (c) the regular release of statistical yearbooks. We find, as expected, that there has been a secular increase in information capacity over time. We also investigate salient differences among countries from the early 1800s onward.
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