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- Bäck, Hanna, et al.
(författare)
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Pre-electoral coalitions, familiarity, and delays in government formation
- 2024
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Ingår i: West European Politics. - : Routledge. - 0140-2382 .- 1743-9655. ; 47:1, s. 88-112
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- During the past decade, many parliamentary democracies have experienced bargaining delays when forming governments. The previous literature has attributed protracted government formation processes to a high degree of preference uncertainty among the political parties and a high level of bargaining complexity. The article draws on such theories, but also adds a third theoretical mechanism, commitment problems, and highlights two explanatory variables that have not received much attention so far. The first is pre-electoral coalitions, which are declarations by parties stating that they intend to collaborate with each other after the election. The second is familiarity, which is the mutual trust between parties that comes from having worked together in the past. By combining a large-N study of government formation processes in 17 West European parliamentary democracies (1945-2019) with an in-depth case study of the prolonged Swedish government formation process in 2018-2019, it is shown that pre-electoral coalitions that fail to win a majority can sometimes delay, not speed up, government formation. In addition, a lack of familiarity may sometimes lead to a breakdown of negotiations and drawn-out government formation processes.
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- Lindvall, Johannes, 1975
(författare)
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Lagstiftningsmakten
- 2023
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Ingår i: Svensk författningspolitik. - Lund : Studentlitteratur.
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Bokkapitel (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)
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- Amatller, Guillem, et al.
(författare)
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The telegraph and turnout: Evidence from Sweden
- 2024
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Ingår i: ELECTORAL STUDIES. - 0261-3794 .- 1873-6890. ; 90
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This research note uses district -level panel data from 1870s Sweden to estimate the effect of the electric telegraph on electoral turnout. We argue that the telegraph contributed to higher turnout since it connected local communities to a national communication network, making people more aware of election campaigns and national political issues and more motivated to vote. Previous studies of the turnout effects of new telecommunication technologies have examined the radio, television, and the internet, with mixed results. Unlike these later technologies, the telegraph was almost exclusively used to transmit information, not entertainment, and it did not replace an existing telecommunication technology. Our empirical findings suggest that the telegraph had a positive effect on turnout, but only in areas with local newspapers that could benefit from the speedy access to national news.
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- Andersson, Per F., et al.
(författare)
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Crises, investments, and political institutions
- 2018
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Ingår i: Journal of Theoretical Politics. - : SAGE Publications. - 0951-6298 .- 1460-3667. ; 30:4, s. 410-430
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Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- On the basis of a game-theoretic model, this paper argues that governments typically manage crises more effectively in systems where political power is concentrated in a single party, but they are more likely to make investments in future welfare in systems where political power is shared among several parties. The paper makes two contributions. First of all, it shows that both crisis-management failures and investment failures can be explained by a common mechanism: an inter-temporal commitment problem that arises from the inability of political agents to commit to future policy choices. Second, it shows that power-sharing institutions are often associated with more effective government than power-concentration institutions, in contrast to much of the normative literature in comparative politics, in which power-sharing institutions are often justified on other grounds, such as representativeness, responsiveness, or social cohesion. In a world where crises dominate, power-concentration institutions typically perform better; in a world where investment problems dominate, power-sharing institutions typically perform better.
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- Brambor, Thomas, et al.
(författare)
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The Lay of the Land: Information Capacity and the Modern State
- 2016
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Annan publikation (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Relying on three new indicators of the information capacity of states, this paper provides new evidence on the ability of states to collect and process information about the territories and populations that they govern. The three indicators are (a) the availability of a reliable census, (b) the establishment of a permanent government agency tasked with processing statistical information about the territory and the population, and (c) the regular release of statistical yearbooks. We find, as expected, that there has been a secular increase in information capacity over time. We also investigate salient differences among countries from the early 1800s onward.
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