When Do Potential Functions Exist in Heterogeneous Routing Games?

• We study a heterogeneous routing game in which vehicles might belong to more than one type. The type determines the cost of traveling along an edge as a function of the flow of various types of vehicles over that edge. We relax the assumptions needed for the existence of a Nash equilibrium in this heterogeneous routing game. We extend the available results to present necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a potential function. We characterize a set of tolls that guarantee the existence of a potential function when only two types of users are participating in the game. We present an upper bound for the price of anarchy (i.e., the worst-case ratio of the social cost calculated for a Nash equilibrium over the social cost for a socially optimal flow) for the case in which only two types of players are participating in a game with affine edge cost functions. A heterogeneous routing game with vehicle platooning incentives is used as an example throughout the article to clarify the concepts and to validate the results.

Ämnesord

TEKNIK OCH TEKNOLOGIER  -- Elektroteknik och elektronik -- Reglerteknik (hsv//swe)

ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY  -- Electrical Engineering, Electronic Engineering, Information Engineering -- Control Engineering (hsv//eng)

TEKNIK OCH TEKNOLOGIER  -- Samhällsbyggnadsteknik -- Transportteknik och logistik (hsv//swe)

ENGINEERING AND TECHNOLOGY  -- Civil Engineering -- Transport Systems and Logistics (hsv//eng)

Nyckelord

Heterogeneous Routing Game

Nash Equilibrium

Potential Functions

Optimization

Publikations- och innehållstyp

vet (ämneskategori)

rap (ämneskategori)