When Samuelson met Veblen abroad : National and global public goods when social comparisons matter

• This paper derives Pareto efficient policy rules for the provision of national as well as global public goods in a two-country world, where each individual cares about relative consumption within as well as between countries. Furthermore, we compare these policy rules with those that follow from a non-cooperative Nash equilibrium. The results show that both global and national public goods are systematically under-provided in Nash equilibrium under such relative consumption concerns.

Ämnesord

SAMHÄLLSVETENSKAP  -- Ekonomi och näringsliv -- Nationalekonomi (hsv//swe)

SOCIAL SCIENCES  -- Economics and Business -- Economics (hsv//eng)

Nyckelord

Public goods

relative consumption

inter-jurisdictional comparison

status

positional goods

Economics

nationalekonomi

public goods

relative consumption

inter-jurisdictional comparison

status

positional goods

Publikations- och innehållstyp

vet (ämneskategori)

rap (ämneskategori)