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The similarity-upda...
The similarity-updating model of probability judgment and belief revision
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- Albrecht, Rebecca (författare)
- Univ Basel, Dept Psychol, Missionsstr 62a, CH-4055 Basel, Switzerland.
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- Jenny, Mirjam A. (författare)
- Department of Psychology, University of Basel.;Robert Koch Inst, Sci Commun, Berlin, Germany.;Univ Potsdam, Harding Ctr Risk Literacy, Potsdam, Germany.
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- Nilsson, Håkan, 1976- (författare)
- Uppsala universitet,Institutionen för psykologi
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- Rieskamp, Jörg (författare)
- Department of Psychology, University of Basel.
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Univ Basel, Dept Psychol, Missionsstr 62a, CH-4055 Basel, Switzerland Department of Psychology, University of Basel.;Robert Koch Inst, Sci Commun, Berlin, Germany.;Univ Potsdam, Harding Ctr Risk Literacy, Potsdam, Germany. (creator_code:org_t)
- 2021-11
- 2021
- Engelska.
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Ingår i: Psychological review. - : American Psychological Association (APA). - 0033-295X .- 1939-1471. ; 128:6, s. 1088-1111
- Relaterad länk:
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https://urn.kb.se/re...
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https://doi.org/10.1...
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Abstract
Ämnesord
Stäng
- People often take nondiagnostic information into account when revising their beliefs. A probability judgment decreases due to nondiagnostic information represents the well-established "dilution effect" observed in many domains. Surprisingly, the opposite of the dilution effect called the "confirmation effect" has also been observed frequently. The present work provides a unified cognitive model that allows both effects to be explained simultaneously. The suggested similarity-updating model incorporates two psychological components: first, a similarity-based judgment inspired by categorization research, and second, a weighting-andadding process with an adjustment following a similarity-based confirmation mechanism. Four experimental studies demonstrate the model's predictive accuracy for probability judgments and belief revision. The participants received a sample of information from one of two options and had to judge from which option the information came. The similarity-updating model predicts that the probability judgment is a function of the similarity of the sample to the options. When one is presented with a new sample, the previous probability judgment is updated with a second probability judgment by taking a weighted average of the two and adjusting the result according to a similarity-based confirmation. The model describes people's probability judgments well and outcompetes a Bayesian cognitive model and an alternative probability-theory-plus-noise model. The similarity-updating model accounts for several qualitative findings, namely, dilution effects, confirmation effects, order effects, and the finding that probability judgments are invariant to sample size. In sum, the similarity-updating model provides a plausible account of human probability judgment and belief revision.
Ämnesord
- SAMHÄLLSVETENSKAP -- Psykologi (hsv//swe)
- SOCIAL SCIENCES -- Psychology (hsv//eng)
Nyckelord
- General Psychology
Publikations- och innehållstyp
- ref (ämneskategori)
- art (ämneskategori)
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