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Utilitarianism with...
Utilitarianism without Moral Aggregation
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- Gustafsson, Johan E., 1979 (författare)
- Gothenburg University,Göteborgs universitet,Institutionen för filosofi, lingvistik och vetenskapsteori,Department of Philosophy, Linguistics and Theory of Science
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(creator_code:org_t)
- 2021-10-07
- 2021
- Engelska.
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Ingår i: Canadian Journal of Philosophy. - : Cambridge University Press (CUP). - 0045-5091 .- 1911-0820. ; 51:4, s. 256-269
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Abstract
Ämnesord
Stäng
- Is an outcome where many people are saved and one person dies better than an outcome where the one is saved and the many die? According to the standard utilitarian justification, the former is better because it has a greater sum total of well-being. This justification involves a controversial form of moral aggregation, because it is based on a comparison between aggregates of different people's well-being. Still, an alternative justification-the Argument for Best Outcomes-does not involve moral aggregation. I extend the Argument for Best Outcomes to show that any utilitarian evaluation can be justified without moral aggregation.
Ämnesord
- HUMANIORA -- Filosofi, etik och religion -- Filosofi (hsv//swe)
- HUMANITIES -- Philosophy, Ethics and Religion -- Philosophy (hsv//eng)
Nyckelord
- Moral aggregation
- the Argument for Best Outcomes
- combining claims
- the
- number problem
- utilitarianism
- numbers
- logic
- Philosophy
Publikations- och innehållstyp
- ref (ämneskategori)
- art (ämneskategori)
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