Forgiving and Ceasing to Blame

• This chapter argues that we forgive for reasons and that not just any rea- son is a reason to forgive. A complete account of forgiveness must explain which reasons are reasons to forgive and which are not and the aim of this chapter is to offer such an explanation. I suggest that distinguishing between forgiving and ceas- ing to blame for the wrong kind of reasons helps to solve some perennial problems about forgiveness. And I argue that the only reason to forgive is an apparent change of heart on the part of the offender about their offence and the quality of will behind it. At the same time, ceasing to blame for the wrong kind of reason is not necessarily a bad thing to do. No less than forgiving, it can be a valuable and important way of responding to the moral conflicts that shape our shared moral lives.

Ämnesord

HUMANIORA  -- Filosofi, etik och religion -- Filosofi (hsv//swe)

HUMANITIES  -- Philosophy, Ethics and Religion -- Philosophy (hsv//eng)

HUMANIORA  -- Filosofi, etik och religion (hsv//swe)

HUMANITIES  -- Philosophy, Ethics and Religion (hsv//eng)

HUMANIORA  -- Filosofi, etik och religion -- Etik (hsv//swe)

HUMANITIES  -- Philosophy, Ethics and Religion -- Ethics (hsv//eng)

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