1. |
- Axelsson, Karl
(author)
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Joseph Addison and General Education : Moral Didactics in Early Eighteenth-Century Britain
- 2009
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In: Estetika. - 0014-1291 .- 2571-0915. ; 46:2, s. 144-166
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Joseph Addison's (1672-1719) essays in The Spectator occupy contradictory positions in the history of aesthetics. While they are generally considered central to the institution of aesthetics as a scholarly discipline, their reception has throughout history entailed a strong questioning of their philosophical and scholarly importance. In the following paper, I consider this dual feature as regards reception, and set out to clarify how this has come about. A re-examination of the arguments advanced by Addison makes clear that his role is not that of a philosopher, but that of a public educator. As such he aims to raise the standard of general education of the British 'middling orders' in the early eighteenth century, and by using art for didactic purposes he seeks to contribute to the shaping of morally accomplished individuals.
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2. |
- Dammann, Guy, 1972-, et al.
(author)
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On The Moral Psychology and Normative Force Of Aesthetic Reasons
- 2017
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In: Estetika. - 0014-1291 .- 2571-0915. ; 54:1, s. 20-39
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- This paper investigates the way in which we adduce reasons in support of our aesthetic judgements. We examine the seemingly question-begging nature of that process, such that any aesthetic quality we adduce as a reason can be found compelling qua reason for a particular judgement if and only if that judgement is already assented to. We then analyse this phenomenon in the parallel contexts of gustatory taste and friendship, where the differences are understood to lie primarily with differences in the normative force of reasons held in support of gustatory judgements, aesthetic judgements, and personal friendships. While some question-begging obtains in all cases, in the latter we can begin to see that friendship can be justified with reference to its contribution to the good of ourselves. This is explored further in connection with the way in which examining our reasons for being friends with people is actually productive and generative of that friendship. Our conclusion is that while the giving of reasons for aesthetic judgements is still subject to a certain question-begging, those judgements acquire a powerful normative force in cultural contexts where it can be seen that assenting to them constitutes the realization of our good as individuals.
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3. |
- Flodin, Camilla
(author)
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Adorno Reframed
- 2014
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In: Estetika. - 0014-1291 .- 2571-0915. ; 51:1, s. 146-148
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Review (other academic/artistic)
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4. |
- Flodin, Camilla, 1977-
(author)
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Of Mice and Men : Adorno on Art and the Suffering of Animals
- 2011
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In: Estetika. - Prag : Institute of Art History, Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic. - 0014-1291 .- 2571-0915. ; :2, s. 139-156
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Theodor W. Adorno's criticism of human beings' domination of nature is a familiar topic to Adorno scholars. Its connection to the central relationship between art and nature in his aesthetics has, however, been less analysed. In the following paper, I claim that Adorno's discussion of art's truth content (Wahrheitsgehalt) is to be understood as art's ability to give voice to nature (both human and non-human) since it has been subjugated by the growth of civilization. I focus on repressed non-human nature and examine Adorno's interpretation of Eduard Mörike's poem 'Mausfallen-Sprüchlein' (Mousetrap rhyme). By giving voice to the repressed animal, Mörike's poem manages to point towards the possibility of a changed relationship between mice and men, between nature and humanity, which is necessary in order to achieve reconciliation amongst humans as well.
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5. |
- Johansson, Anders, 1968-
(author)
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The necessity of over-interpretation : Adorno, the essay and the gesture of aesthetic experience
- 2013
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In: Estetika. - Prag : Academia. - 0014-1291 .- 2571-0915. ; 50:2, s. 149-168
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- This article is a discussion of Theodor W. Adorno's comment, in the beginning of 'The Essay as Form', that interpretations of essays are over-interpretations. I argue that this statement is programmatic, and should be understood in the light of Adorno's essayistic ideal of configuration, his notion of truth, and his idea of the enigmatic character of art. In order to reveal how this over-interpreting appears in practice, I turn to Adorno's essay on Kafka. According to Adorno, the reader of Kafka is caught in an aporia: Kafka's work cannot be interpreted, yet every single sentence calls for interpretation. This paradox is related to the gestures and images in Kafka's work: like Walter Benjamin, Adorno means that they contain sedimented, forgotten experiences. Instead of interpreting these images, Adorno visualizes the experiences indirectly by presenting images of his own. His own essay becomes gestural.
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6. |
- Martínez Marín, Irene
(author)
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Non-Standard Emotions and Aesthetic Understanding
- 2020
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In: Estetika. - : Helsinki University Press. - 0014-1291 .- 2571-0915. ; 57:2, s. 135-149
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- For cognitivist accounts of aesthetic appreciation, appreciation requires an agent (1) to perceptually respond to the relevant aesthetic features of an object o on good evidential grounds, (2) to have an autonomous grasp of the reasons that make the claim about the aesthetic features of o true by pointing out the connection between non-aesthetic features and the aesthetic features of o, (3) to be able to provide an explanation of why those features contribute to the overall aesthetic value of o. In this framework, aesthetic emotions have traditionally been confined to the level of aesthetic perception (1) and dismissed from the process of reason-giving (2, 3). I argue that this dismissal is due, firstly, to a questionable perceptual reading of the connection between emotional experience and value, and, secondly, to a narrow focus on the basic emotions. My argument will reveal that the non-standard or ‘intellectual’ emotions, the emotions which are in fact most important to appreciation, can play a significant epistemic role in our appreciative practices. They can do this because they (a) help us to deliberately focus our attention and (b) place the appreciator in a state of second-order awareness of their mental states. I conclude the paper by showing how these two epistemic tools (a, b) can help the appreciator to meet the explanatory/justificatory conditions (2) and (3).
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7. |
- Page, Jeremy
(author)
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Aesthetic Understanding
- 2022
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In: Estetika. - : HELSINKI UNIV PRESS. - 0014-1291 .- 2571-0915. ; 59:1, s. 48-68
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Winner of the Fabian Dorsch ESA Essay Prize. In this paper, I introduce an account of aesthetic understanding. Recent discussions of aesthetic understanding have associated it with aesthetic justification and with understanding why, for example, a given object is aesthetically valuable. I introduce a notion of aesthetic understanding as a form of objectual understanding, which I refer to as 'appreciative understanding'. Appreciative understanding is related to and partly constituted by an agent's capacity to comprehend and experience an artwork holistically and to communicate effectively regarding its particular aesthetic character and value. I then argue for the understanding account of aesthetic judgement on which the paradigmatic form of aesthetic judgement is grounded on appreciative understanding. This argument partly consists in demonstrating how the understanding account can explain the autonomy of aesthetic judgement In closing, I explore the potential of the understanding account to explain the structure of our appreciative practices. That is, I put forward the view that our appreciative practices are structured so as to promote appreciative understanding.
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8. |
- Schellekens Dammann, Elisabeth, Professor, 1974-
(author)
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Failure as Omission : Missed Opportunities and Retroactive Aesthetic Judgements
- 2023
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In: Estetika. - : Helsinki University Press. - 0014-1291 .- 2571-0915. ; 60:2, s. 131-144
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- In this paper I distinguish between different kinds of failures of aesthetic judgements with a view to exploring a form of failure that involves the outright omission of aesthetic judgement. Such omissions come to pass when an object of attention could or ought to have been experienced and judged aesthetically but where such an experience or judgement simply failed to arise, and can be traced back to at least three kinds of reason: (1) lack of aesthetic quality; (2) lack of appropriate ontological status; and (3) lack of aesthetic prominence. I shall examine some aspects of this kind of failure and argue that a missed opportunity to experience an object of attention’s aesthetic character is a missed opportunity to engage with that object’s aesthetic potential where such potential, although not always accessible to us, can nonetheless retroactively be said to pertain to the object in a meaningful sense also under experientially unfavourable conditions. This warrants talk of rehabilitation to some degree.
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9. |
- Schellekens, Elisabeth, Professor, 1974-
(author)
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Psychologizing Aesthetic Attention
- 2019
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In: Estetika. - : Helsinki University Press. - 0014-1291 .- 2571-0915. ; 56:1, s. 110-117
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Research review (peer-reviewed)
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10. |
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