| 1. |
- Bengtsson, Jan, 1949
(author)
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Embodied Experience in Educational Practice and Research
- 2013
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In: Studies in Philosophy and Education. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0039-3746 .- 1573-191X. ; 32:1, s. 39-53
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- The intention of this article is to make an educational analysis of Merleau-Ponty's theory of experience in order to see what it implicates for educational practice as well as educational research. In this way, we can attain an understanding what embodied experience might mean both in schools and other educational settings and in researching educational activities. The analysis will take its point of departure in Merleau-Ponty's analysis and criticism of empiricist and neokantian theories of experience. This will be followed up by an introduction of some central concepts in Merleau-Ponty's own understanding of experience with emphasis on their relevance for educational analysis. This way of presenting the theory of embodied experience has the advantage of being able to indicate the difference it makes in the field of theories of experience.
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| 3. |
- Bergdahl, Lovisa, 1971-, et al.
(author)
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Time for Values : Responding Educationally to the Call from the Past
- 2018
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In: Studies in Philosophy and Education. - : Springer. - 0039-3746 .- 1573-191X. ; 37:4, s. 367-382
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- This paper rethinks the fostering task of the teacher in a time when it, paradoxically, has tended to become marginalized and privatized despite its public urgency. Following post-holocaust thinkers such as Hannah Arendt and Zygmunt Bauman, the position explored here is radical in the sense that it takes ‘the crisis of traditions’ and the erosion of a common moral ground or value basis seriously, and it is conservative in the sense that it insists on responding educationally to the call from the past by returning to (a) the moral character of our existence and (b) our own embeddedness in the incompleteness of living traditions. The argument is that there is a difference between educating for common values—which entails a belief in pre-existing commonalities—and making values common in and through education. The latter, we argue, entails an aspiration for continuously creating new commonalities and for cultivating the ability to act and judge as a thinking moral agent in specific, lived and worldly cases. In this sense, the fostering task of the teacher is to create commonality of what is not (yet) common, turning the liberal democratic values of the past into contested objects of study.
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| 4. |
- Bergström, Ylva
(author)
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The Universal Right to Education : Freedom, Equality and Fraternity
- 2010
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In: Studies in Philosophy and Education. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0039-3746 .- 1573-191X. ; 29:2, s. 167-182
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- The overall aim of the article is to analyse how the universal right to education have been built, legitimized and used. And more specifically ask who is addressed by the universal right to education, and who is given access to rights and to education. The first part of the article focus on the history of declarations, the notion of the universal right to education, emphasizing differences in matters of detail-for example, the meaning of 'compulsory', 'children's rights' or 'parents' rights'aEuro"and critically examining the right of the child and the right of the parent in terms of tensions between 'social rights' and 'private autonomy rights'. Despite differences in detail, the iterations of the universal right to education do share to the full in the idea of education as such. In the second part the attempt to scrutinize the underlying assumptions legitimizing the consensus on education, focusing again on the notion of the child. In conclusion I argue that a certain notion of what it is to be a human being is inscribed within the circle of access to rights and education. These notions of what it means to be a child, a parent, a citizen or a member of the 'human family' are notions of enlightenment and humanity and, to my understanding, aspects of how democracy is configured around freedom, equality and fraternity.
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| 5. |
- Biesta, Gert
(author)
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Why ‘what works’ still won’t work : From evidence-based education to value-based education
- 2010
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In: Studies in Philosophy and Education. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0039-3746 .- 1573-191X. ; 29:5, s. 491-503
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- The idea that professional practices such as education should be based upon or at least be informed by evidence continues to capture the imagination of many politicians, policy makers, practitioners and researchers. There is growing evidence of the influence of this line of thought. At the same time there is a growing body of work that has raised fundamental questions about the feasibility of the idea of evidence-based or evidence-informed practice. In this paper I make a further contribution to this discussion through an analysis of a number of assumptions that inform the discussion. I focus on the epistemological, ontological and praxeological dimensions of the discussion and in each domain identify a deficit. In the epistemological domain there is a knowledge deficit, in the ontological domain an effectiveness or efficacy deficit and in the practice domain an application deficit. Taken together these deficits not only raise some important questions about the very idea of evidence-based practice but also highlight the role of normativity, power and values. Against this background I outline the case for the idea of value-based education as an alternative for evidence-based education. As I am generally concerned about the expectations policy makers hold about what evidence can and should achieve in professional practices such as education, my contribution is primarily meant to provide educators and other professionals with arguments that can help them to resist unwarranted expectations about the role of evidence in their practices and even more so of unwarranted interventions in their practices.
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| 8. |
- Dahlbeck, Johan
(author)
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A Spinozistic Model of Moral Education
- 2017
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In: Studies in Philosophy and Education. - : Springer. - 0039-3746 .- 1573-191X. ; 36:5, s. 533-550
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Spinoza’s claim that self-preservation is the foundation of virtue makes for the point of departure of this philosophical investigation into what a Spinozistic model of moral education might look like. It is argued that Spinoza’s metaphysics places constraints on moral education insofar as an educational account would be affected by Spinoza’s denial of the objectivity of moral knowledge, his denial of the existence of free will, and of moral responsibility. This article discusses these challenges in some detail, seeking to construe a credible account of moral education based on the insight that self-preservation is not at odds with benevolence, but that the self-preservation of the teacher is instead conditioned by the intellectual deliberation of the students. However, it is also concluded that while benevolence retains an important place in Spinoza’s ethics, his causal determinism poses a severe threat to a convincing account of moral education insofar as moral education is commonly understood to involve an effort to influence the actions of students relative to some desirable goal.
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| 9. |
- Dahlbeck, Johan
(author)
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On Following Commands : A Philosophical Inquiry Into the Governing Values of Swedish Early Childhood Education
- 2014
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In: Studies in Philosophy and Education. - : Springer. - 0039-3746 .- 1573-191X. ; 33:5, s. 527-544
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- In this article I will investigate a perceived tension in Swedish early childhood education (ECE) policy between reevaluating certain foundational claims on the one hand and following universal moral commands on the other. I ask the question; how is it that certain commonly held assumptions are being debunked and others left undisturbed in this particular context? To this end, I look at some of the preconditions of framing the edu- cational practice by universal moral commands so as to make visible some of its under- lying ontological assumptions. Correspondingly, I look at some necessary epistemological and ontological prerequisites for understanding knowledge formation as essentially rela- tional, such as it is construed in the policy documents concerned. I connect this with a broader trend in educational philosophy and theory, one where the destabilizing of a Cartesian notion of subjectivity has opened up for more relational conceptions of sub- jectivity. Next, I will take a closer look at some key passages from the policy documents where the appeal to moral universalism runs parallel with an appeal to a relational ontology. Having done so, I point to some epistemological problems with combining these two conflicting approaches on a policy level. To conclude, I formulate some final thoughts regarding how one might begin to resolve this tension within the discourse of Swedish ECE by coming to terms with what kind of ontological and epistemological foundation to rely upon. I do this by trying out the notion of a pedagogy of dosage.
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| 10. |
- Dahlbeck, Johan
(author)
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Spinoza on ingenium and exemplarity : Some consequences for educational theory
- 2021
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In: Studies in Philosophy and Education. - : Springer. - 0039-3746 .- 1573-191X. ; 40, s. 1-21
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- This article turns to the neglected pedagogical concept of ingenium in order to address some shortcomings of the admiration-emulation model of Linda Zabzebski’s influential exemplarist moral theory. I will start by introducing the problem of the admiration-emulation model by way of a fictional example. I will then briefly outline the concept of ingenium such as it appears in a Renaissance context, looking particularly at the pedagogical writings of Juan Luis Vives (1492/3–1540). This will set the stage for the next part, look- ing at how early modern philosopher Benedict Spinoza (1632–1677) adopts a Vivesian notion of ingenium, adjusting it so as to fit into the setting of his political theory. Next, I will turn to Spinoza’s use of the concept of ingenium in relation to his portrayal of exemplary persons, offering a pedagogical model of moral exemplarism that can counter same of the perceived problems of the admiration-emulation model as it highlights the necessary fallibility of efficient exemplars as well as acknowledges the socio-political dimension of emotions. Finally, I will lay out some preliminary consequences for educational theory, hoping to offer a way of reconciling moral exemplarism with a more realistic pedagogical and psychological framework.
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