| 1. |
- Abreu Zavaleta, Martin, 1989-
(author)
-
Disagreement Lost
- 2021
-
In: Synthese. - : Springer. - 0039-7857 .- 1573-0964. ; 199:1-2, s. 1899-1932
-
Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- This paper develops a puzzle about non-merely-verbal disputes. At first sight, it would seem that a dispute over the truth of an utterance is not merely verbal only if there is a proposition that the parties to the dispute take the utterance under dispute to express, which one of the parties accepts and the other rejects. Yet, as I argue, it is extremely rare for ordinary disputes over an utterance’s truth to satisfy this condition, in which case non-merely verbal disputes are extremely rare. After examining various responses to the puzzle, I outline a solution using the framework of truthmaker semantics.
|
|
| 2. |
- Almäng, Jan
(author)
-
Twin Earth and perceptual content
- 2021
-
In: Synthese. - : Springer. - 0039-7857 .- 1573-0964. ; 198, s. 6089-6109
-
Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- This paper presents a framework for analysing perceptual Twin Earth thought experiments. Visual content normally has an analogue character, and it is argued in this paper that this sets certain constraints on the extent to which Twin Earth thought experiments can be successful. The argumentation in the paper is developed by using examples from visual spatial content. It is argued that visual spatial content can only be "twin-earthed" in a very limited way. Whereas the metrics of space can be twin-earthed, visual experience has a structure that means that it can only be the vehicle for representing entities with geometrical structures.
|
|
| 3. |
- Andersson, Henrik, et al.
(author)
-
Classifying comparability problems in a way that matters
- 2022
-
In: Synthese. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0039-7857 .- 1573-0964. ; 200:4
-
Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- How should one understand comparisons in which neither of two alternatives is at least as good as the other? Much recent literature on comparability problems focuses on what the appropriate explanation of the phenomenon is. Is it due to vagueness or the possibility of non-conventional comparative relations such as parity? This paper argues that the discussions on how to best explain comparability problems has reached an impasse at which it is hard to make any progress. To advance the discussion we suggest a new classification of comparability problems that focuses on the problems they cause for practical reasoning.
|
|
| 4. |
- Andersson, Henrik, et al.
(author)
-
Classifying comparability problems in a way that matters
- 2022
-
In: Synthese. - : Springer. - 0039-7857 .- 1573-0964. ; 200
-
Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- How should one understand comparisons in which neither of two alternatives is at least as good as the other? Much recent literature on comparability problems focuses on what the appropriate explanation of the phenomenon is. Is it due to vagueness or the possibility of non-conventional comparative relations such as parity? This paper argues that the discussions on how to best explain comparability problems has reached an impasse at which it is hard to make any progress. To advance the discussion we suggest a new classification of comparability problems that focuses on the problems they cause for practical reasoning.
|
|
| 5. |
- Angere, Staffan
(author)
-
Identity and intensionality in Univalent Foundations and philosophy
- 2021
-
In: Synthese. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0039-7857 .- 1573-0964. ; 198:S5, s. 1177-1217
-
Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- The Univalent Foundations project constitutes what is arguably the most serious challenge to set-theoretic foundations of mathematics since intuitionism. Like intuitionism, it differs both in its philosophical motivations and its mathematical-logical apparatus. In this paper we will focus on one such difference: Univalent Foundations’ reliance on an intensional rather than extensional logic, through its use of intensional Martin-Löf type theory. To this, UF adds what may be regarded as certain extensionality principles, although it is not immediately clear how these principles are to be interpreted philosophically. In fact, this framework gives an interesting example of a kind of border case between intensional and extensional mathematics. Our main purpose will be the philosophical investigation of this system, and the relation of the concepts of intensionality it satisfies to more traditional philosophical or logical concepts such as those of Carnap and Quine.
|
|
| 6. |
- Angere, Staffan
(author)
-
The defeasible nature of coherentist justification
- 2007
-
In: Synthese. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0039-7857 .- 1573-0964. ; 157:3, s. 321-335
-
Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- The impossibility results of Bovens and Hartmann (2003, Bayesian epistemology. Oxford: Clarendon Press) and Olsson (2005, Against coherence: Truth, probability and justification. Oxford: Oxford University Press.) show that the link between coherence and probability is not as strong as some have supposed. This paper is an attempt to bring out a way in which coherence reasoning nevertheless can be justified, based on the idea that, even if it does not provide an infallible guide to probability, it can give us an indication thereof. It is further shown that this actually is the case, for several of the coherence measures discussed in the literature so far. We also discuss how this affects the possibility to use coherence as a means of epistemic justification.
|
|
| 7. |
- Backes, Marvin
(author)
-
Can groups be genuine believers? : The argument from interpretationism
- 2021
-
In: Synthese. - : Springer Nature. - 0039-7857 .- 1573-0964. ; 199:3-4, s. 10311-10329
-
Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- In ordinary discourse we often attribute beliefs not just to individuals but also to groups. But can groups really have genuine beliefs? This paper considers but ultimately rejects one of the main arguments in support of the claim that groups can be genuine believers - the Argument From Interpretationism - and concludes that we have good reasons to be sceptical about the existence of group beliefs. According to the Argument From Interpretationism, roughly speaking, groups qualify as genuine believers because we can interpret (or predict) their behaviour in much the same way that we can interpret (or predict) the behaviour of individuals. While this argument may seem initially attractive, I argue that it is ultimately unsuccessful. In particular, I argue that the argument is unsuccessful even if one is generally sympathetic towards interpretationism. The reason for this, as we will see, is that a number of problems arise when we try to apply the interpretationist strategy - originally formulated with individual subjects in mind - to plural subjects or groups. In showing why the Argument From Interpretationism fails, the paper also brings into focus some more general constraints on the scope and applicability of interpretationism.
|
|
| 8. |
- Bergman, Karl, 1985-, et al.
(author)
-
The force of fictional discourse
- 2022
-
In: Synthese. - : Springer. - 0039-7857 .- 1573-0964. ; 200:6
-
Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Consider the opening sentence of Tolkien's The Hobbit: (1) In a hole in the ground there lived a hobbit. By writing this sentence, Tolkien is making a fictional statement. There are two influential views of the nature of such statements. On the pretense view, fictional discourse amounts to pretend assertions. Since the author is not really asserting, but merely pretending, a statement such as Tolkien's is devoid of illocutionary force altogether. By contrast, on the alternative make-believe view, fictional discourse prescribes that the reader make-believe the content of the statement. In this paper, we argue that neither of these views is satisfactory. They both fail to distinguish the linguistic act of creating the fiction, for instance Tolkien writing the sentence above, from the linguistic act of reciting it, such as reading The Hobbit out loud for your children. As an alternative to these views, we propose that the essential feature of the author's speech act is its productive character, that it makes some state of affairs obtain in the fiction. Tolkien's statement, we argue, has the illocutionary force of a declaration.
|
|
| 9. |
- Besson, Corine, et al.
(author)
-
Can truth relativism account for the indeterminacy of future contingents?
- 2022
-
In: Synthese. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0039-7857 .- 1573-0964. ; 200:3
-
Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- John MacFarlane has recently argued that his brand of truth relativism provides the best solution to the puzzle of future contingents: assertions about the future that express propositions that are metaphysically neither necessary nor impossible. In this paper, we show that even if we grant all of the metaphysical, semantic and pragmatic assumptions in terms of which MacFarlane sets and aims to solve the puzzle, his truth relativism is not apt to solve the problem of future contingents. We argue that the theory fails to vindicate the intuition that future contingent propositions are neither true nor false, leaving the theory open to a charge of Reductio. We show that these problems cannot be answered while preserving the core tenets of truth relativism.
|
|
| 10. |
- Bird, Alexander, et al.
(author)
-
Introduction
- 2006
-
In: Synthese. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0039-7857 .- 1573-0964. ; 149:3, s. 445-450
-
Research review (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Abstract in Undetermined This volume contains essays by five British philosophers and one Swedish philosopher working in metaphysics and in particular metaphysics as it relates to the philosophy of science. These philosophers are the core of a tight network of European philosophers of science and metaphysicians and their essays have evolved as a result of workshops in Lund, Edinburgh, and Athens.
|
|
