| 1. |
- Nordenfelt, Lennart, 1945-
(author)
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On the Place of Fuzzy Health in Medical Theory
- 2000
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In: Journal of Medicine and Philosophy. - 0360-5310 .- 1744-5019. ; 25:5, s. 639-649
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- This commentary on Sadegh-Zadeh's article ‘Fuzzy health, illness and disease,’ has its focus on the philosophical background for applying fuzzy logic to medical theory. I concentrate on four issues. First, I contest some of Sadegh-Zadeh's statements on the present state of the theory of medicine, in particular with regard to assumptions ascribed to contemporary theorists. Second, I consider Sadegh-Zadeh's interesting idea that a person can have a disease to varying degrees, from not having it at all to having it completely. I argue that there are difficulties pertaining to the definition of particular diseases, which obstruct the application of this idea. The following two points concern medical semantics and principles for definition in general. I take issue with Sadegh-Zadeh's description of the correct procedure for definition. I also contest his unconditional proposal for a social definition of health, illness and disease.
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| 2. |
- Bergmark, Åke
(author)
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Market reforms in Swedish health care : normative reorientation and welfare state sustainability
- 2008
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In: Journal of Medicine and Philosophy. - : Oxford University Press (OUP). - 0360-5310 .- 1744-5019. ; 33:3, s. 241-61
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Although the impact of market reforms in Swedish health care stands out as not very far-reaching in an international comparison, it represents a route away from the features and basic values normally associated with the Swedish or Scandinavian model. Summarizing the development over the last decades, we may identify signs of sustainability as well as change. Popular support for public provision and a robust institutional structure make farreaching alterations of existing structures less feasible, although most visible changes this far-incremental though they may be-represent a change in which the normative foundations of the Swedish model are challenged.
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| 3. |
- Bornemark, Jonna, 1973-
(author)
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The Logic of Pregnancy
- 2023
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In: Journal of Medicine and Philosophy. - : Oxford University Press. - 0360-5310 .- 1744-5019. ; 48:2, s. 128-140
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- This article takes its point of departure in Bracha Ettinger's discussion on the "matrixial borderspace": the structure of the experience of "the womb," both from a "mother-pole" and a "fetus-pole". Ettinger describes this borderspace as a place of differentiation-in-co-emergence, separation-in-jointness, and distance-in-proximity. The question this article poses is what kind of logic this experience is an expression of, as there seems to be a discrepancy in relation to the classical Aristotelian logic of identity. As an alternative to classical Aristotelian logic, Nicholas of Cusa's logic of the non-aliud is explored as a paradigm more in line with Ettinger's description of pregnancy specifically and more generally, to an understanding of life as a co-poietic emergence of structures of pactivity and permeability.
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| 4. |
- Englander, Magnus
(author)
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Bioethics, Sociality, and Mental Illness
- 2023
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In: Journal of Medicine and Philosophy. - : Oxford University Press. - 0360-5310 .- 1744-5019. ; 48:2, s. 161-169
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- The phenomenology of bioethics is approached here in relation to the lived experience as it relates to the everyday lifeworld of persons suffering from mental illness. Taking a road less traveled, the purpose here is to elucidate ethical issues relating to sociality, using findings from qualitative phenomenological psychological research. Qualitative studies of schizophrenia and postpartum depression serve as examples. Layered throughout is the applied phenomenological argument pointing to the importance of returning to mundane intersubjectivity and the reversibility between mental illness, the existential context of suffering, and sociality.
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| 5. |
- Friberg-Fernros, Henrik, 1972
(author)
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On The Problem of Defending Basic Equality: Natural Law and The Substance View
- 2023
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In: Journal of Medicine and Philosophy. - 0360-5310. ; 48:6, s. 565-576
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- While most theorists agree with the claim that human beings have high and equal moral standing, there are strong disagreements about how to justify this claim. These disagreements arise because there are different ways of managing the difficulty of finding a basis for this claim, which is sufficiently substantial to do this justifying work, but not vary in degree in order to not give rise to inequality of moral considerability. The aim of this paper is to review previous attempts to address this difficulty and to demonstrate why they fail and then to defend another way of dealing with this challenge by applying two views: the substance view on the human person and the natural-law account of morality. My claim is that this approach has comparative advantages because it provides a binary and a normatively significant basis of justification for equality without being implausibly inclusive.
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| 6. |
- Friberg-Fernros, Henrik, 1972
(author)
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Taking Precautionary Concerns Seriously: A Defense of a Misused Anti-abortion Argument
- 2014
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In: Journal of Medicine and Philosophy. - : Oxford University Press (OUP). - 0360-5310 .- 1744-5019. ; 39:3, s. 228-247
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Abortion critics have argued that one should err on the side of life and prohibit abortion since the status of the fetus is uncertain. David Boonin has criticized this precautionary argument, but his criticism has been ignored. The aim is to elaborate on the precautionary argument by responding to Boonin's criticism. Boonin considers three versions of the precautionary argument-the disaster avoidance argument, the maximin argument, and the expected utility argument; yet all three are judged unsuccessful for the same reasons: they lead to unacceptable implications, they lead to conclusions that are too weak, and they undermine the integrity of moral reasoning. I respond to this criticism by arguing that one can avoid unacceptable implications by considering a criterion of realism, that the weaker conclusions are rather an advantage, and that the application of the precautionary principle makes room for considerations which maintain the integrity of moral reasoning. I also consider some criticism beyond Boonin's objections.
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| 7. |
- Furberg, Elisabeth, 1979-
(author)
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Advance Directives and Personal Identity: What Is the Problem?
- 2012
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In: The Journal of medicine and philosophy. - : Oxford University Press. - 0360-5310 .- 1744-5019. ; 37:1, s. 60-73
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- The personal identity problem expresses the worry that due to disrupted psychological continuity, one person’s advance directive could be used to determine the care of a different person. Even ethicists, who strongly question the possibility of the scenario depicted by the proponents of the personal identity problem, often consider it to be a very potent objection to the use of advance directives. Aiming to question this assumption, I, in this paper, discuss the personal identity problem’s relevance to the moral force of advance directives. By putting the personal identity argument in relation to two different normative frameworks, I aim to show that whether or not the personal identity problem is relevant to the moral force of advance directives, and further, in what way it is relevant, depends entirely on what normative reasons we have for respecting advance directives in the first place.
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| 8. |
- Gregg, Benjamin
(author)
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Political Bioethics
- 2022
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In: The Journal of Medicine and Philosophy. - 0360-5310. ; , s. 1-22
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- If bioethical questions cannot be resolved in a widely acceptable manner by rational argument, and if they can be regulated only on the basis of political decision-making, then bioethics belongs to the political sphere. The particular kind of politics practiced in any given society matters greatly: it will determine the kind of bioethical regulation, legislation, and public policy generated there. I propose approaching bioethical questions politically in terms of decisions that cannot be “correct” but that can be “procedurally legitimate.” Two procedures in particular can deliver legitimate bioethical decisions, once combined: expert bioethics committees and deliberative democracy. Bioethics so understood can exceed bioethics as a moral project or as a set of administrative principles to regulate medical practice; it can now aspire to a democratic project that involves ordinary citizens as far as reasonably possible. I advance this argument in four steps: (1) using the example of human germline gene editing, (2) I propose a general understanding of proceduralism, and (3) then combine two types and (4) conclude with a defense of majoritarian proceduralism. I develop this argument in terms of one example: germline gene editing.
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| 9. |
- Herlitz, Anders, 1981
(author)
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Committing to priorities: Incompleteness in macro-level health care allocation and its implications
- 2018
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In: Journal of Medicine and Philosophy (United Kingdom). - 0360-5310 .- 1744-5019. ; 43, s. 724-745
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- This article argues that values that apply to health care allocation entail the possibility of “spectrum arguments,” and that it is plausible that they often fail to determine a best alternative. In order to deal with this problem, a two-step process is suggested. First, we should identify the Strongly Uncovered Set that excludes all alternatives that are worse than some alternatives and not better in any relevant dimension from the set of eligible alternatives. Because the remaining set of alternatives often contain more than one element, we need some complementary method of selecting a unique alternative. In order to address this issue, I suggest that we must invoke caps on the values that are used to evaluate alternatives, and that these caps must be grounded in collective commitments.
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| 10. |
- Herlitz, Anders, 1981
(author)
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Toward a Hybrid Theory of How to Allocate Health-related Resources
- 2023
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In: Journal of Medicine and Philosophy. - 0360-5310. ; 48:4, s. 373-383
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- How should scarce health-related resources be allocated? This paper argues that values that apply to these decisions fail to always fully determine what we should do. Health maximization and allocation-according-to-need are suggested as two values that should be part of a general theory of how to allocate health-related resources. The "small improvement argument" is used to argue that it is implausible that one alternative is always better, worse, or equal to another alternative with respect to these values. Approaches that rely on these values are thus incomplete. To deal with this, it is suggested that we ought to use incomplete theories in a two-step process. Such a process first discards ineligible alternatives, and, second, uses reasons grounded in collective commitments to identify a unique, best alternative in the remaining set.
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