1. |
- Benaim, Michel, et al.
(author)
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Deterministic Approximation of Stochastic Evolution in Games
- 2003
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In: Econometrica. - : Wiley-Blackwell. - 1468-0262 .- 0012-9682. ; 71:3, s. 873-903
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- This paper provides deterministic approximation results for stochastic processes that arise when finite populations recurrently play finite games. The processes are Markov chains, and the approximation is defined in continuous time as a system of ordinary differential equations of the type studied in evolutionary game theory. We establish precise connections between the long-run behavior of the discrete stochastic process, for large populations, and its deterministic flow approximation. In particular, we provide probabilistic bounds on exit times from and visitation rates to neighborhoods of attractors to the deterministic flow. We sharpen these results in the special case of ergodic processes. Copyright Econometric Society, 2002.
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2. |
- Sargent, TJ, et al.
(author)
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Two questions about European unemployment
- 2008
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In: Econometrica. - : Econometric Society: Econometrica. - 1468-0262 .- 0012-9682. ; 76:1, s. 1-29
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)
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4. |
- Attanasio, Orazio, et al.
(author)
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(S)Cars and the Great Recession
- 2022
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In: Econometrica. - 0012-9682 .- 1468-0262. ; 90:5, s. 2319-2356
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- United States households' consumption expenditures and car purchases collapsed during the Great Recession and more so than income changes would have predicted. Using CEX data, we show that both the extensive and the intensive car spending margins contracted sharply in the Great Recession. We also document significant cross‐cohort differences in the impact of the Great Recession including a stronger reduction in car spending by younger cohorts. We draw inference on the sources of the Great Recession by investigating which shocks can explain household choices in a 60 period life‐cycle model with idiosyncratic and aggregate shocks fitted to aggregate and life‐cycle moments. We find that the Great Recession was caused by a combination of large aggregate income and wealth shocks, while cross‐cohort adjustment patterns imply a role for life‐cycle income profile shocks. We also find a role for car loan premia shocks in accounting for car spending and car loans.
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7. |
- Besley, Timothy, et al.
(author)
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State Capacity, Conflict, and Development
- 2010
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In: Econometrica. - 0012-9682 .- 1468-0262. ; 78:1, s. 1-34
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- The absence of state capacities to raise revenue and to support markets is a key factor in explaining the persistence of weak states. This paper reports on an ongoing project to investigate the incentive to invest in such capacities. The paper sets out a simple analytical structure in which state capacities are modeled as forward looking investments by government. The approach highlights some determinants of state building including the risk of external or internal conflict, the degree of political instability, and dependence on natural resources. Throughout, we link these state capacity investments to patterns of development and growth.
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8. |
- Boppart, Timo
(author)
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Structural Change and the Kaldor Facts in a Growth Model With Relative Price Effects and Non-Gorman Preferences
- 2014
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In: Econometrica. - 0012-9682 .- 1468-0262. ; 82:6, s. 2167-2196
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- U.S. data reveal three facts: (1) the share of goods in total expenditure declines at a constant rate over time, (2) the price of goods relative to services declines at a constant rate over time, and (3) poor households spend a larger fraction of their budget on goods than do rich households. I provide a macroeconomic model with non-Gorman preferences that rationalizes these facts, along with the aggregate Kaldor facts. The model is parsimonious and admits an analytical solution. Its functional form allows a decomposition of U.S. structural change into an income and substitution effect. Estimates from micro data show each of these effects to be of roughly equal importance.
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9. |
- Buhai, I. Sebastian, et al.
(author)
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RETURNS TO TENURE OR SENIORITY?
- 2014
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In: Econometrica. - 0012-9682 .- 1468-0262. ; 82:2, s. 705-730
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- This study documents two empirical facts using matched employer-employee data for Denmark and Portugal. First, workers who are hired last, are the first to leave the firm. Second, workers' wages rise with seniority, where seniority is defined as a worker's tenure relative to the tenure of his colleagues. Controlling for tenure, the probability of a worker leaving the firm decreases with seniority. The increase in expected seniority with tenure explains a large part of the negative duration dependence of the separation hazard. Conditional on ten years of tenure, the wage differential between the 10th and the 90th percentiles of the seniority distribution is 1.1-1.4 percentage points in Denmark and 2.3-3.4 in Portugal.
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10. |
- Collin-Dufresne, Pierre, et al.
(author)
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Activism, Strategic Trading, and Liquidity
- 2018
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In: Econometrica. - : Econometric Society: Econometrica. - 1468-0262 .- 0012-9682. ; 86:4, s. 1431-1463
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- We analyze dynamic trading by an activist investor who can expend costly effort to affect firm value. We obtain the equilibrium in closed form for a general activism technology, including both binary and continuous outcomes. Variation in parameters can produce either positive or negative relations between market liquidity and economic efficiency, depending on the activism technology and model parameters. Two results that contrast with the previous literature are that (a) the relationship between market liquidity and economic efficiency is independent of the activist's initial stake for a broad set of activism technologies, and (b) an increase in noise trading can reduce market liquidity because it increases uncertainty about the activist's trades (the activist trades in the opposite direction of noise traders) and thereby increases information asymmetry about the activist's intentions.
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