| 1. |
- Hadenius, Axel, et al.
(author)
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Democracy and State Capacity: Exploring a J-shaped Relationship
- 2008
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In: Governance. - : Wiley. - 1468-0491 .- 0952-1895. ; 21:1, s. 1-24
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- In this article we probe the effect of democratization on the state's administrative capacity. Using time-series cross-section data, we find a curvilinear (J-shaped) relationship between the two traits. The effect of democracy on state capacity is negative at low values of democracy, nonexistent at median values, and strongly positive at high democracy levels. This is confirmed under demanding statistical tests. The curvilinear relationship is due, we argue, to the combined effect of two forms of steering and control; one exercised from above, the other from below. In strongly authoritarian states, a satisfactory measure of control from above can at times be accomplished. Control from below is best achieved when democratic institutions are fully installed and are accompanied by a broad array of societal resources. Looking at two resource measures, press circulation and electoral participation, we find that these, combined with democracy, enhance state administrative capacity.
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| 2. |
- Persson, Anna, 1977, et al.
(author)
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Why Anticorruption Reforms Fail - Systemic Corruption as a Collective Action Problem
- 2013
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In: Governance-an International Journal of Policy Administration and Institutions. - : Wiley. - 0952-1895 .- 1468-0491. ; 26:3, s. 449-471
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- With an increased awareness of the detrimental effects of corruption on development, strategies to fight it are now a top priority in policy circles. Yet, in countries ridden with systemic corruption, few successes have resulted from the investment. On the basis of an interview study conducted in Kenya and Uganda—two arguably typically thoroughly corrupt countries—we argue that part of an explanation to why anticorruption reforms in countries plagued by widespread corruption fail is that they are based on a theoretical mischaracterization of the problem of systemic corruption. More specifically, the analysis reveals that while contemporary anticorruption reforms are based on a conceptualization of corruption as a principal–agent problem, in thoroughly corrupt settings, corruption rather resembles a collective action problem. This, in turn, leads to a breakdown of any anticorruption reform that builds on the principal–agent framework, taking the existence of noncorruptible so-called principals for granted.
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| 3. |
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| 4. |
- Szulecki, Kacper, et al.
(author)
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Explaining Variation in the Effectiveness of Transnational Energy Partnerships
- 2011
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In: Governance. - : Wiley. - 1468-0491 .- 0952-1895. ; 24:4, s. 713-736
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- This article analyzes the effectiveness of transnational multi-stakeholder partnerships for sustainable development-also known as "Type II outcomes" of the 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development-in the sustainable energy sector. We combine quantitative and qualitative research. Quantitatively, we use a database of 340 partnerships, including 46 partnerships that focus on energy. Our qualitative analysis includes case studies of five partnerships that appear as the most effective and five that are operational but only with modest degrees of effectiveness. We study two competing hypotheses. The first, rooted in institutionalism, assumes that variation in effectiveness is related to organizational structures and procedures. The competing hypothesis emphasizes the power of actors and expects partnerships that involve key business actors and powerful Northern states to perform better. We conclude that the level of institutionalization is most important in explaining effectiveness, while powerful partners and the type of internal organization may further enhance effectiveness.
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| 5. |
- Casula Vifell, Åsa, et al.
(author)
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More Knowledge, Better Government? : Consequences of Knowledge-Based Decision Making in Swedish Pharmaceutical Benefits
- 2011
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In: Governance. An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions. - : Wiley. - 0952-1895 .- 1468-0491. ; 24:1, s. 85-110
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Using an example from the health-care sector, we illustrate consequences of implementing knowledge-based decision making relating to the exercise of political control. The Swedish Pharmaceutical Benefits Board decides the subsidization status of prescription pharmaceuticals. Building on a study of the agency's work, we explore the effects of institutional arrangements stemming from rationalistic demands for knowledgeable and justifiable outcomes related to political structures for control. Knowledge about the medical and economic effects of pharmaceuticals is routinely ambiguous. This makes it necessary to negotiate "decision-able" knowledge rather than to merely collect it. This touches on matters of broader political consequence, which the formal model for governing the administration does not take into account. This masks decisions as neutral administrative choices. A further conclusion concerns the lack of mechanisms for repoliticizing politically salient issues that have been delegated to administrative bodies.
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| 6. |
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| 7. |
- Hysing, Erik, 1977-
(author)
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From government to governance? : a comparison of environmental governing in Swedish forestry and transport
- 2009
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In: Governance. An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions. - : Wiley-Blackwell. - 0952-1895 .- 1468-0491. ; 22:4, s. 647-672
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- From government to governance is a grand story line about the changing role of the state, which has had a great impact upon researchers and practitioners. This article is an empirical assessment of this story line. Three critical dimensions are elaborated into indicators of government and governance: governing styles and instruments, public–private relationships, and policy levels. These indicators are used to assess the role of the state in environmental governing using Swedish forestry and transport as examples. The results show that the story line is too simple; the role of the state is not changing in a unidirectional way. Instead, the comparison shows that environmental governing within the two policy areas is characterized by both government and governance modes of governing, thus questioning the usefulness of the story line as a guideline when framing empirical studies or political decisions.
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| 8. |
- Kato, Junko, et al.
(author)
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Government partisanship and managing the economy: Japan and Sweden in comparative perspective
- 2006
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In: GOVERNANCE-AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY AND ADMINISTRATION. - : Wiley. - 0952-1895. ; 19:1
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- It is generally taken for granted that countries governed by leftist governments expand social policies and have an affinity for active fiscal policy that implies higher tolerance of deficit-ridden budgets. In contrast, conservative governments are taken to be less likely to favor welfare expansion, especially when it has negative fiscal consequences. We challenge this conventional wisdom by comparing the reactions of the Swedish and Japanese governments to economic crises during the 1990s. The puzzle is that the Social Democratic governments in Sweden were able to reduce ballooning budget deficits and thus bring the economy back into balance, while still having one of the largest public sectors in the developed world. In contrast, the conservative Liberal Democratic Party governments in Japan have been unable to redress their deficit problems despite having one of the smallest public sectors among the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development countries. We argue that this can be explained by taking into consideration that governments' tax and spending policies are influenced by bureaucratic structures and institutionally driven public beliefs. By comparing Japan and Sweden, we show how political parties actively seek to make their policy stances permanent by structuring taxation and expenditure policies to create institutionalized support for their policy preferences.
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| 9. |
- Stern, Eric
(author)
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Crisis Navigation : Lessons from History for the Crisis Manager in Chief
- 2009
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In: Governance. An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions. - Hoboken, NJ, USA : Wiley-Blackwell. - 0952-1895 .- 1468-0491. ; 22:2, s. 189-202
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- As fundamental tests of presidential leadership and organizational capacity, crises can make or break an administration. This article presents a conceptual analysis of what makes any crisis situation challenging to deal with, and it develops a set of analytical steps that can help crisis managers diagnose particular crisis situations they might face. The proposed crisis navigation framework brings together case research studies and theories of organizational processes, so that those assuming responsibility for steering the government and society through crises-including the Obama administration-have a useful point of entry into the growing crisis management literature.
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| 10. |
- Svensson, Torsten, 1954-, et al.
(author)
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Managing the Bank-System Crisis in Coordinated Market Economies : Institutions and Blame Avoidance Strategies in Sweden and Japan
- 2006
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In: Governance: An International Journal of Policy, Administration and Institutions. - Malden : Wiley-Blackwell. - 0952-1895. ; 19:1, s. 43-74
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Sweden and Japan represent two different positions regarding policy-making facing similar crises of the bank systems. The Swedish public policy was encompassing, far-reaching and quick. The Japanese government hesitated for many years to take over bad loans, before they implemented policies of a more limited scope. Why?In short, different institutional settings lead the main actors into different paths of reactions in order to avoid blame. In the Japanese case, the very close relationship between private banks and the Ministry of Finance, in combination with the lesser degree of widespread perceptions of a system-crisis, made it more urgent as well as possible to conceal the actual state of affairs for the politicians. Confronted with the threat of losing power over the financial administration to a new agency, the ministry postponed the reforms in order to conceal the deep financial problems. The institutional setting was different in Sweden. The deregulation had separated the government from the administration of banks. Among the public deteriorating economic conditions were easily connected to the banks. This brought about political unity. It was possible to put the blame on the banks and take the credit for the efforts to tide up the mess without losing credibility.
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