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- Bengson, John, et al.
(author)
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The Projectability Challenge to Moral Naturalism
- 2020
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In: Journal of Moral Philosophy. - : BRILL. - 1740-4681 .- 1745-5243. ; 17:5, s. 471-498
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- The Projectability Challenge states that a metaethical view must explain how ordinary agents can, on the basis of moral experience and reflection, accurately and justifiably apply moral concepts to novel situations. In this paper, we argue for two primary claims. First, paradigm nonnaturalism can satisfactorily answer the projectability challenge. Second, it is unclear whether there is a version of moral naturalism that can satisfactorily answer the challenge. The conclusion we draw is that there is an important respect in which nonnaturalism holds an advantage over its most prominent naturalist rivals. The conclusion is interesting if only because it is widely assumed that naturalism has an easier time handling thorny problems in moral epistemology. We argue that there is at least one such problem of which this assumption is not true.
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| 3. |
- Björnsson, Gunnar, 1969, et al.
(author)
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Enoch’s Defense of Robust Meta-Ethical Realism
- 2016
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In: Journal of Moral Philosophy. - : Brill. - 1740-4681 .- 1745-5243. ; 13:1, s. 101-112
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Taking Morality Seriously is David Enoch's book-length defense of meta-ethical and meta-normative non-naturalist realism. After describing Enoch's position and outlining the argumentative strategy of the book, we engage in a critical discussion of what we take to be particularly problematic central passages. We focus on Enoch's two original positive arguments for non-naturalist realism, one argument building on first order moral implications of different meta-ethical positions, the other attending to the rational commitment to normative facts inherent in practical deliberation. We also pay special attention to Enoch's handling of two types of objections to non-naturalist realism, objections having to do with the possibility of moral knowledge and with moral disagreement.
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| 4. |
- Eklund, Matti, 1974-
(author)
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Thickness and Evaluation
- 2017
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In: Journal of Moral Philosophy. - : Brill. - 1740-4681 .- 1745-5243. ; 14:1, s. 89-104
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Research review (peer-reviewed)abstract
- This is a review essay devoted to Pekka Vayrynen's The Rude, the Lewd and the Nasty. Vayrynen's book, concerned with thick terms and thick concepts, argues for a pragmatic view on the evaluativeness associated with these terms and concepts. The essay raises a number of critical questions regarding what Vayrynen's arguments for his view actually show. It deals with, for example, thick properties, the fact-value distinction, what it is for terms and concepts to be (semantically) evaluative, and whether Vayrynen's arguments generalize to thin evaluative concepts.
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| 5. |
- Frowe, Helen, 1981-
(author)
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Defending Defensive Killing : Reply to Barry, McMahan, Ferzan, Renzo and Haque
- 2018
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In: Journal of Moral Philosophy. - : Brill. - 1740-4681 .- 1745-5243. ; 15:6, s. 750-766
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Journal article (other academic/artistic)abstract
- This article responds to objections to the account of permissible harming developed in Defensive Killing, as raised by Christian Barry, Jeff McMahan, Kimberly Ferzan, Massimo Renzo and Adil Ahmad Haque. Each paper deserves much more attention than I can give it here. I focus on Barry’s important observations regarding the liability to defensive harm of those who fail to rescue. In response to McMahan, I grant some of McMahan’s objections to my rejection of the moral equivalence of threats and bystanders, but reject his analysis of my Shield cases. I welcome much of Ferzan’s development of my account of ‘futile’ defence, but offer some concerns regarding her own view of when honour can be appropriately defended. I argue that Renzo’s objections to my account of bloodless invasions are unpersuasive, and identify some problems with Renzo’s own view. Finally, I defend my account of civilian liability against Adil Haque’s critique.
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| 6. |
- Frowe, Helen, 1981-
(author)
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Jeff McMahan, Killing In War, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009
- 2013
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In: Journal of Moral Philosophy. - : Brill. - 1740-4681 .- 1745-5243. ; 10:1, s. 112-115
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Review (other academic/artistic)abstract
- Killing in War is based upon McMahan’s 2007 Uehiro Lectures, but draws on the substantial body of work on the ethics of war that McMahan has produced over the last decade or so. In this sense, it was a classic before it was written, representing as it does the most sustained, persuasive, and influential attack to date on the ‘ortho-dox’ Walzerian view of just war. It is, undoubtedly, compulsory reading for anyone working in this field, and consolidates McMahan’s position as the most important just war theorist of the last forty years.
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| 8. |
- Hattiangadi, Anandi
(author)
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Non-Reductive Realism, Primitivism, and the Reduction Argument : Commentary on Bart Streumer, Unbelievable Errors
- 2019
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In: Journal of Moral Philosophy. - : Brill. - 1740-4681 .- 1745-5243. ; 16:6, s. 697-706
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- In Unbelievable Errors, Bart Streumer defends the error theory by rejecting all competitors to it. My aim here is to defend one brand of realism from Streumer's objections: primitivim. The primitivist holds that there exist sui generis normative properties that do not supervene on any descriptive properties. It is argued that Streumer's objections to primitivism can be met.
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| 9. |
- Hecht, Lisa, 1988-
(author)
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Activating the Right to Be Rescued
- 2023
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In: Journal of Moral Philosophy. - : Brill. - 1740-4681 .- 1745-5243. ; 20:5-6, s. 415-438
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- When a person finds herself in peril her right to be rescued is activated and a rescue duty is imposed on those who are in a position to help. In this article, I argue that the activation of the right to be rescued needs to be suitably constrained so that the rescuee is prevented from arbitrarily controlling the normative situation between herself and potential rescuers. Such control would be in conflict with the moral equality of persons. I argue that the activation of the right to be rescued should be conditional on the person having a justification for the action that caused her peril. One implication of my view is that the right to be rescued cannot fulfill the function that Jonathan Quong ascribes it. The right to be rescued turns out to be an unsuitable ground for the necessity condition which constrains the permissible use of defensive force.
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