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- Allwood, Carl Martin, 1952
(author)
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Culture, language, identity and the properties of a useful culture concept for the indigenous psychologies.
- 2014
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In: Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective. - 2471-9560. ; 3:10, s. 30-33
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Journal article (other academic/artistic)abstract
- Cultures are expressed in language and the mapping relation between language and culture is argued to be one-to-many. Accordingly, a language such as Spanish can be used to express many different cultures, including contents that are in explicit contradiction. By attending to the diversity in understanding in a society social interventions can be better tailored to specific groups of people in that society. Thus, a culture concept that emphasizes the diversity in the understanding of people in the indigenous psychology (IP) researcher’s society is likely to be helpful for social interventions in different groups of that society. This, in contrast to a culture concept that focuses mostly on whatever understanding is shared and inherited from previous generations in the society. I also argue that it should be recognized that members of a culture have different conceptions of their culture’s identity and that these conceptions are changing as they are constructed over time.
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| 3. |
- Allwood, Carl Martin, 1952
(author)
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On the issue of an appropriate culture concept for the indigenous psychologies and on the limits of philosophy.
- 2014
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In: Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective. - 2471-9560. ; 3:3, s. 41-48
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Journal article (other academic/artistic)abstract
- In this rejoinder to Prof. Hwang in our debate about a suitable culture concept for the Indigenous psychologies (IPs) I argue that a culture concept that attends to the distribution of different kinds of understanding among the members of a society is more likely to be useful for the IPs, which strive to produce knowledge that is easily applicable to the context of the people where the research results are to be applied. I also, for various reasons, question the desirability of Prof. Hwang’s ambition to ground all IPs on one specific philosophical approach. One reason for this is that this would contradict a central part of the IPs general research program, namely that they should be based on the cultural understanding of the society that the specific IPs relates to. Furthermore, I, more in general, question the realism of attempting to construct one final, single philosophical ground for empirical research, given the complex and conceptually unbounded nature of reality.
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| 4. |
- Allwood, Carl Martin, 1952
(author)
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On the virtues of an empirically oriented culture concept and on the limitations of too general and abstract characterizations of understanding.
- 2013
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In: Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective. - 2471-9560. ; 2:11, s. 54-61
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Journal article (other academic/artistic)abstract
- In this ongoing debate on how culture should be best understood and on what would be a suitable culture concept for the Indigenous psychologies (IPs), Prof. Hwang argues that cultures should be described in terms of deep-structures and that such a culture concept would help the IPs to produce knowledge that is easily applicable to their own societies. In contrast, I argue that a more empirically oriented concept of culture would be more useful in general, and for the IPs in particular, since it is more likely to better mirror the reality it aims to predict. Hwang seems to equate deep-structures with generative mechanisms, but obviously there can be other types of generative mechanisms than deep-structures as this concept is used by Hwang, including mechanisms involving less deep structures or even shallow structures. The problem with Prof. Hwang’s approach to culture and science is that it is very general and abstract. By this it risks being somewhat simplistic. In general, it attempts to explain too much and thereby may explain, or predict, very little. This is also evident in his classification of me as a naïve empiricist.
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| 6. |
- Allwood, Carl Martin, 1952
(author)
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What type of culture concept will help the indigenous Psychologies and why? An answer to Hwang
- 2014
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In: Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective. - 2471-9560. ; 3:7, s. 44-49
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Journal article (other academic/artistic)abstract
- In this response I conclude that the Indigenous Psychologies (IPs) would be best served by a culture concept that supports attention to the full-fledged understanding of the members of the IP researcher’s society. In contrast, Prof. Hwang’s culture concept emphasizes the importance of the language used by the society’s members and also of the older traditional parts of the members’ understanding. I argue that this type of culture concept is not very well fitted to be useful for the IPs and, moreover, that it may not be very helpful for producing results that will help achieve the goal of a more universal, or at least a more comprehensive psychology. However, Prof. Hwang’s culture concept may have other uses and be helpful for other purposes.
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| 7. |
- Persson, Johannes
(author)
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Social laws should be conceived as a special case of mechanisms : A reply to Daniel Little
- 2012
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In: Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective. - 2471-9560. ; 1:7, s. 12-14
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Journal article (other academic/artistic)abstract
- I am grateful to Daniel Little for his insightful reply to my recent article in Social Epistemology (2012, 105-114) about what appears to be a flaw in Jon Elster’s conception of mechanisms. I agree with much of what Little says, but want to amplify a different underlying problem with Elster’s conception (fourth point below) than Little suggests in his reply (third point below). This underlying problem connects nicely with a passage in Little’s reply, which he thinks unconnected with the point on which I focus.
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| 8. |
- Persson, Johannes
(author)
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Social mechanisms and explaining how : A reply to Kimberly Chuang
- 2012
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In: Social Epistemology Review and Reply Collective. - 2471-9560. ; 1:9, s. 37-41
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Journal article (other academic/artistic)abstract
- Kimberly Chuang’s detailed and very helpful reply to my article (2012a) concerns Jon Elster’s struggle to develop a mechanistic account that sheds light on explanation in social science. I argue that a problem exists with Elster’s current conception of mechanistic explanation in social contexts. Chuang (2012) defends Elster’s conception against my critique. I still believe I have identified a problem with Elster’s conception. In this reply I want to recapitulate briefly Elster’s idea, as I understand it, and then use some of Chuang’s critical points to advance the position I advocate.
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