| 1. |
- Besley, Timothy, et al.
(author)
-
Economic Approaches to Political Institutions
- 2008. - 2. ed
-
In: The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics. - Basingstoke, Hampshire : Palgrave Macmillan. - 9780333786765
-
Book chapter (other academic/artistic)abstract
- Political institutions affect the rules of the game in which politics is played. Economists now have theoretical approaches to explain the impact of institutions on policy, and empirical evidence to support the relevance of the theory. This article sketches a framework to inform discussions about how political institutions shape policy outcomes. It does so using four examples: majoritarian versus proportional elections; parliamentary versus presidential government; whether to impose term-limits on office holders; and the choice between direct and representative democracy. Each example illustrates how theory and data can be brought together to investigate a specific issue.
|
|
| 2. |
- Besley, Timothy, et al.
(author)
-
FRAGILE STATES AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY
- 2011
-
In: Journal of the European Economic Association. - : Oxford University Press (OUP). - 1542-4766 .- 1542-4774. ; 9:3, s. 371-398
-
Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- It is widely recognized that fragile states are key symptoms of under-development in many parts of the world. Such states are incapable of delivering basic services to their citizens and political violence is commonplace. As of yet, mainstream development economics has not dealt in any systematic way with such concerns and the implications for development assistance. This paper puts forward a framework for analyzing fragile states and applies it to a variety development policies in different types of states.
|
|
| 3. |
- Besley, Timothy, et al.
(author)
-
Gender Quotas and the Crisis of the Mediocre Man : Theory and Evidence from Sweden
- 2017
-
In: The American Economic Review. - : American Economic Association. - 0002-8282 .- 1944-7981. ; 107:8, s. 2204-2242
-
Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- We develop a model where party leaders choose the competence of politicians on the ballot to trade off electoral success against their own survival. The predicted correlation between the competence of party leaders and followers is strongly supported in Swedish data. We use a novel approach, based on register data for the earnings of the whole population, to measure the competence of all politicians in 7 parties, 290 municipalities, and 10 elections (for the period 1982-2014). We ask how competence was affected by a zipper quota, requiring local parties to alternate men and women on the ballot, implemented by the Social Democratic Party in 1993. Far from being at odds with meritocracy, this quota raised the competence of male politicians where it raised female representation the most. We argue that resignation of mediocre male leaders was a key driver of this effect.
|
|
| 4. |
- Besley, Timothy J., et al.
(author)
-
Incentives and the De Soto Effect
- 2012
-
In: Quarterly Journal of Economics. - : Oxford University Press (OUP). - 0033-5533 .- 1531-4650. ; 127:1, s. 237-282
-
Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- This paper explores the consequences of improving property rights to facilitate the use of fixed assets as collateral, popularly attributed to the influential policy advocate Hernando de Soto. We use an equilibrium model of a credit market with moral hazard to characterize the theoretical effects and also develop a quantitative analysis using data from Sri Lanka. We show that the effects are likely to be nonlinear and heterogeneous by wealth group. They also depend on the extent of competition between lenders. There can be significant increases in profits and reductions in interest rates when credit markets are competitive. However, since these are due to reductions in moral hazard, that is, increased effort, the welfare gains tend to be modest when cost of effort is taken into account. Allowing for an extensive margin where borrowers gain access to the credit market can make these effects larger depending on the underlying wealth distribution.
|
|
| 5. |
- Besley, Timothy, et al.
(author)
-
JEEA-FBBVA LECTURE 2017 : The Dynamics of Environmental Politics and Values
- 2019
-
In: Journal of the European Economic Association. - : Oxford University Press (OUP). - 1542-4766 .- 1542-4774. ; 17:4, s. 993-1024
-
Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- This paper develops a framework to study environmentalism as a cultural phenomenon, namely as reflecting a process of social identification with certain values. The model is used to explain how the shares of environmentalists and materialists in society can coevolve with taxes on emissions to protect society against damages caused by environmental degradation. These policies are determined by electoral competition. However, even though politicians internalize the welfare of those currently alive and pick utilitarian optimal policies, the dynamic equilibrium paths of policies and evolving values may not converge to the steady state with the highest level of long-run welfare.
|
|
| 6. |
|
|
| 7. |
- Besley, Timothy, et al.
(author)
-
Political Competition, Policy and Growth : Theory and Evidence from the US
- 2010
-
In: The Review of Economic Studies. - 0034-6527 .- 1467-937X. ; 77:4, s. 1329-1352
-
Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- This paper develops a simple model to analyse how a lack of political competition may lead to policies that hinder economic growth. We test the predictions of the model on panel data for the US states. In these data, we find robust evidence that lack of political competition in a state is associated with anti-growth policies: higher taxes, lower capital spending, and a reduced likelihood of using right-to-work laws. We also document a strong link between low political competition and low income growth.
|
|
| 8. |
- Besley, Timothy, et al.
(author)
-
Repression or Civil War?
- 2009
-
In: The American Economic Review. - : American Economic Association. - 0002-8282 .- 1944-7981. ; 99:2, s. 292-297
-
Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Perhaps the crowning achievement of mature democracies is the peaceful acceptance of the ballot box as the primary instrument for deciding who should hold power in society. We do not have to go far back in the history of most democratic states, however, to find a distinct role for political violence. Moreover, many inhabitants of the globe still remain at risk of falling prey to widespread violence in the struggle for political office. Forms of political violence differ a great deal. We focus on two important manifestations: repression and civil war distinguished by whether violence is one-sided or two-sided. We present a unified approach to studying these forms of political violence with common roots in poverty, natural resource rents, and weak political institutions. First, we lay out rudimentary model to analyze whether violence will occur and, if so, manifest itself as repression or civil war. Three regimes — peace, repression and civil war — emerge as alternative equilibrium outcomes in the interaction between an incumbent government and an opposition group. Moreover, the theory suggests a natural ordering of these regimes. We then construct empirical measures of repression and civil war, which we map into ordered variables as suggested by the theory. We investigate how the regime depends on economic and political variables, using an ordered logit model defined over the three regimes. Our estimation results indicate a strong correlation between low incomes, weak political institutions and both forms of political violence.
|
|
| 9. |
- Besley, Timothy, et al.
(author)
-
Resilient Leaders and Institutional Reform : Theory and Evidence
- 2016
-
In: Economica. - : Wiley. - 0013-0427 .- 1468-0335. ; 83:332, s. 584-623
-
Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Strengthening executive constraints is one of the key means of improving political governance. This paper argues that resilient leaders who face a lower probability of being replaced are less likely to reform institutions in the direction of constraining executive power. We test this idea empirically using data on leaders since 1875 using two proxies of resilience: whether a leader survives long enough to die in office, and whether recent natural disasters occur during the leader's tenure. We show that both are associated with lower rates of leader turnover and a lower probability of a transition to strong executive constraints. This effect is robust across a wide range of specifications. Moreover, in line with the theory, it is specific to strengthening executive constraints rather than generalized political reform.
|
|
| 10. |
- Besley, Timothy, et al.
(author)
-
State Capacity, Conflict, and Development
- 2010
-
In: Econometrica. - 0012-9682 .- 1468-0262. ; 78:1, s. 1-34
-
Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- The absence of state capacities to raise revenue and to support markets is a key factor in explaining the persistence of weak states. This paper reports on an ongoing project to investigate the incentive to invest in such capacities. The paper sets out a simple analytical structure in which state capacities are modeled as forward looking investments by government. The approach highlights some determinants of state building including the risk of external or internal conflict, the degree of political instability, and dependence on natural resources. Throughout, we link these state capacity investments to patterns of development and growth.
|
|
