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| 2. |
- Björklund, Fredrik, et al.
(author)
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Recent Work on Motivational Internalism
- 2012
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In: Analysis. - Oxford, UK : Oxford University Press (OUP). - 0003-2638 .- 1467-8284. ; 72:1, s. 124-137
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Research review (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Reviews recent work on motivational internalism.
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| 3. |
- Björnsson, Gunnar, 1969, et al.
(author)
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Enoch’s Defense of Robust Meta-Ethical Realism
- 2016
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In: Journal of Moral Philosophy. - : Brill. - 1740-4681 .- 1745-5243. ; 13:1, s. 101-112
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Taking Morality Seriously is David Enoch's book-length defense of meta-ethical and meta-normative non-naturalist realism. After describing Enoch's position and outlining the argumentative strategy of the book, we engage in a critical discussion of what we take to be particularly problematic central passages. We focus on Enoch's two original positive arguments for non-naturalist realism, one argument building on first order moral implications of different meta-ethical positions, the other attending to the rational commitment to normative facts inherent in practical deliberation. We also pay special attention to Enoch's handling of two types of objections to non-naturalist realism, objections having to do with the possibility of moral knowledge and with moral disagreement.
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| 4. |
- Björnsson, Gunnar, 1969-, et al.
(author)
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Internalists Beware – We Might all be Amoralists!
- 2013
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In: Australasian Journal of Philosophy. - : Informa UK Limited. - 0004-8402 .- 1471-6828. ; 91:1, s. 1-14
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Standard motivational internalism is the claim that by a priori or conceptual necessity, a psychological state is a moral opinion only if it is suitably related to moral motivation. Many philosophers, the authors of this paper included, have assumed that this claim is supported by intuitions to the effect that amoralists—people not suitably related to such motivation—lack moral opinions proper. In this paper we argue that this assumption is mistaken, seeming plausible only because defenders of standard internalism have failed to consider the possibility that our own actual moral practice as a whole is one where moral opinions fail to motivate in the relevant way. To show this, we present a cynical hypothesis according to which the tendency for people to act in accordance with their moral opinions ultimately stems from a desire to appear moral. This hypothesis is most likely false, but we argue, on both intuitive and methodological grounds, that it is conceptually possible that it correctly describes our actual moral opinions. If correct, this refutes standard motivational internalism. Further, we propose an explanation of why many have seemingly internalist intuitions. Such intuitions, we argue, stem from the fact that standard amoralist cases allow (or even suggest) that we apprehend the putative moral opinions of amoralists as radically different from how we understand actual paradigmatic moral opinions. Given this, it is reasonable to understand them as not being moral opinions proper. However, since these intuitions rest on substantial a posteriori assumptions about actual moral opinions, they provide no substantial a priori constraints on theories of moral judgment.
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| 5. |
- Björnsson, Gunnar, 1969, et al.
(author)
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Motivational internalism and folk intuitions
- 2015
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In: Philosophical Psychology. - : Informa UK Limited. - 1465-394X .- 0951-5089. ; 28:5, s. 715-734
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Motivational internalism postulates a necessary connection between moral judgments and motivation. In arguing for and against internalism, metaethicists traditionally appeal to intuitions about cases, but crucial cases often yield conflicting intuitions. One way to try to make progress, possibly uncovering theoretical bias and revealing whether people have conceptions of moral judgments required for noncognitivist accounts of moral disagreement, is to investigate non-philosophers’ willingness to attribute moral judgments. A pioneering study by Shaun Nichols seemed to undermine internalism, as a large majority of subjects were willing to attribute moral understanding to an agent lacking moral motivation. However, our attempts to replicate this study yielded quite different results, and we identified a number of problems with Nichols’ experimental paradigm. The results from a series of surveys designed to rule out these problems (a) show that people are more willing to attribute moral understanding than moral belief to agents lacking moral motivation, (b) suggest that a majority of subjects operate with some internalist conceptions of moral belief, and (c) are compatible with the hypothesis that an overwhelming majority of subjects do this. The results also seem to suggest that if metaethicists’ intuitions are theoretically biased, this bias is more prominent among externalists.
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| 6. |
- Eriksson, John, 1973, et al.
(author)
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Non-Cognitivism and the Classification Account of Moral Uncertainty
- 2016
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In: Australasian Journal of Philosophy. - : Informa UK Limited. - 0004-8402 .- 1471-6828. ; 94:4, s. 719-735
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- It has been objected to moral non-cognitivism that it cannot account for fundamental moral uncertainty. A person is derivatively uncertain about whether an act is, say, morally wrong, when her certainty is at bottom due to uncertainty about whether the act has certain non-moral, descriptive, properties, which she takes to be wrong-making. She is fundamentally morally uncertain when her uncertainty directly concerns whether the properties of the act are wrong-making. In this paper we advance a new reply to the objection to non-cognitivism, immune to the problems afflicting earlier replies. First, we argue that fundamental moral uncertainty is best understood as classificatory uncertainty, since (i) the psychological factors behind fundamental moral uncertainty are analogous to the factors behind fundamental uncertainty regarding descriptive, non-moral, matters, and (ii) fundamental descriptive uncertainty is naturally understood as classificatory uncertainty. We call this the classification account of moral uncertainty. Second, we argue that it is congenial with non-cognitivism, given certain plausible assumptions about the psychology of moral judgment formation.
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| 7. |
- Francén Olinder, Ragnar, 1977
(author)
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Some Varieties of Metaethical Relativism
- 2016
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In: Philosophy Compass. - : Wiley. - 1747-9991. ; 11:10, s. 529-540
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- This opinionated survey article discusses a relativist view in metaethics that we can call Appraiser-standard Relativism. According to this view, the truth value of moral judgments varies depending on the moral standard (the norms or values, etc.) of the appraiser – that is, someone who makes or assesses the judgments. On this view, when two persons judge that, say, lying is always morally wrong; one of the judgments might be true and the other false. The paper presents various forms of this view, contrasts it against other forms of moral relativism, and shortly describes the main arguments for it. It considers the two most pressing objections – from disagreement and from counterintuitivity – and discusses how different forms of Appraiser-standard Relativism are affected by, or can be seen as responses to, these objections. Lastly, it discusses whether Appraiser-standard Relativism rules out moral realism, the view that there are objective moral truths. © 2016 The Author(s) Philosophy Compass © 2016 John Wiley & Sons Ltd
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| 8. |
- Francén, Ragnar, 1977
(author)
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Att kunna skilja mellan rätt och fel
- 2009
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In: Tillräknelighet. - Lund : Studentlitteratur. - 9789144055466 ; , s. 157-180
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Book chapter (other academic/artistic)abstract
- I många länder kan en personer klassas som otillräkneliga om de vid gärningstillfället bedöms ha saknat förmåga att förstå att det hon gjorde var fel. Men detta kriterium på otillräknelighet saknas i det liggande förslaget till hur svensk lagstiftning kring tillräknelighet ska utformas. I det här kapitlet diskuterar jag hur kriteriet kan förstås och om någon variant av det ändå bör ingå i svensk lagstiftning.
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| 9. |
- Francén, Ragnar, 1977
(author)
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COMMENT ON ERLER: SPEAKER RELATIVISM AND SEMANTIC INTUITIONS
- 2009
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In: Praxis. - 1756-1019. ; 2:1, s. 30-44
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Metaethical relativists sometimes use an interesting analogy with relativism in physics to defend their view. In this article I comment on Erler’s discussion of this analogy and take the discussion further into methodological matters that it raises. I argue that Erler misplaces the analogy in the dialectic between relativists and absolutists: the analogy cannot be dismissed by simply pointing to the fact that we have absolutist intuitions – this is exactly the kind of objection the analogy is supposed to be a defence against. To decide if the analogy works we need to answer the following two questions: (i) Why does it work to say that people refer to relative physical properties (like simultaneity, mass and motion) even though they intend to speak about absolute physical properties? And (ii) does the answer carry over to the moral case? I argue for a specific answer to (i), and argue that it gives us reason to answer (ii) in the negative – so the analogy does not hold. However, looking at the issue more closely also raises questions about a fundamental assumption in metaethical discussion: perhaps we cannot assume that one single analysis holds for everyone’s moral judgments.
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| 10. |
- Francén, Ragnar, 1977
(author)
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Finding Wrong
- 2023
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In: Mind. - : Oxford University Press (OUP). - 0026-4423 .- 1460-2113. ; 132:526, s. 493-504
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)
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