| 1. |
- Düpont, Nils, et al.
(author)
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A global perspective on party organizations. Validating the Varieties of Party Identity and Organization Dataset (V-Party)
- 2022
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In: Electoral Studies. - : Elsevier BV. - 0261-3794. ; 75
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Party organization is a central concept in comparative politics. Yet, data on party organizational features is sparse, scattered and available for a limited set of countries and parties. To advance global research on party organizations, we present the Varieties of Party Identity and Organization Dataset (V-Party) – the most comprehensive dataset to date, including a wide range of information about organizational features and party stances of more than 1900 parties in 168 countries between 1970 and 2019. In this paper, we focus particular attention on new measures that relate to parties' territorial reach, ties to social organizations, candidate nomination procedures, personalization, and internal cohesion. We validate these new measures using Adcock and Collier's (2001) three-pronged validation approach, looking at content, criterion and construct validity, to showcase and emphasize the potential of V-Party.
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| 2. |
- Kavasoglu, Yaman Berker, 1990
(author)
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Autocratic Ruling Parties During Regime Transitions: Investigating the Democratizing Effect of Strong Ruling Parties
- 2020
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In: SSRN Electronic Journal. - Göteborg : Göteborgs universitet. - 1556-5068.
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Other publication (other academic/artistic)abstract
- This study examines the role of autocratic ruling party strength in democratic transitions. While the impact of ruling party strength on regime stability is extensively studied, we know much less about when and why ruling party strength can facilitate democratization during regime transitions. Proceeding from recent studies that suggest autocratic incumbents often choose to democratize from a position of strength rather than weakness, I discuss how specific attributes strong ruling party organizations wield can provide autocratic incumbents with incentives and capabilities to lead democratization in the context of regime change. Using an original data on organizational characteristics of 161 autocratic ruling parties between 1970 and 2015, I provide the first set of systematic empirical evidence supporting the argument that ruling party organizational features that promote regime durability can simultaneously facilitate the implementation of substantial democratizing reforms by regime elites in a top-down fashion to preempt political opposition.
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| 3. |
- Kavasoglu, Yaman Berker, 1990
(author)
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Autocratic ruling parties during regime transitions: Investigating the democratizing effect of strong ruling parties
- 2022
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In: Party Politics. - : SAGE Publications. - 1354-0688 .- 1460-3683. ; 28:2, s. 377-388
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- This study examines the role of autocratic ruling party strength in democratic transitions. While the impact of ruling party strength on regime stability is extensively studied, we know much less about how ruling party strength influences prospects for democratization during regime transitions. Proceeding from recent studies that suggest autocratic incumbents often choose to democratize from a position of strength rather than weakness, I discuss how specific attributes strong ruling party organizations wield can provide autocratic incumbents with incentives and capabilities to lead democratization in the context of regime change. Using original data on organizational characteristics of 161 autocratic ruling parties between 1970 and 2015, I provide the first set of systematic empirical evidence supporting the argument that ruling party organizational features that promote regime durability can simultaneously facilitate the implementation of substantial democratizing reforms by regime elites in a top-down fashion to preempt political opposition.
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| 4. |
- Kavasoglu, Yaman Berker, 1990
(author)
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Opposition Parties and Elite Co-optation in Electoral Autocracies
- 2021
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Other publication (other academic/artistic)abstract
- Autocratic incumbents often attempt to co-opt select opposition party leaders to minimize threats to their rule. While the literature identifies co-optation of opposition party leaders as an important survival strategy of autocrats in electoral autocracies, we lack a systematic examination of why some opposition party leaders are co-opted but not others. This article argues that opposition party co-optation is shaped by both inter-and intra-party dynamics. Using a novel data set on opposition party organizations in electoral autocracies between 1970 and 2019, I show that opposition parties with high mobilizational capacity and those that devolve internal decision-making authority from the party leadership to lower cadres are less likely to be co-opted, especially when they are ideological distant from autocratic incumbents. I contend that opposition parties’ organizational characteristics and their ideological positioning in an autocratic party system significantly alter the strategic calculus of the incumbent regime and opposition party elites in deciding whether or not to cooperate with one another. Hence, autocratic incumbents’ ability to control opposition parties through co-optation is shaped not only by the commonly highlighted factors such as resource availability, institutional manipulation or repression, but also as a result of the relatively less well-understood factors such as opposition party organizational features and party positions.
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| 5. |
- Kavasoglu, Yaman Berker, 1990
(author)
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Opposition party organizational features, ideological orientations, and elite co-optation in electoral autocracies.
- 2022
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In: Democratization. - : Informa UK Limited. - 1351-0347 .- 1743-890X. ; 29:4, s. 634-654
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Autocrats often attempt to co-opt select opposition party leaders to remain in power. While the literature identifies co-optation of opposition party leaders as an important survival strategy of autocrats, we lack a systematic examination of why some opposition party leaders are co-opted but not others. This article argues that opposition party co-optation is shaped by both inter- and intra-party dynamics. Using a novel data set on opposition party organizations in electoral autocracies between 1970 and 2019, I show that opposition parties with high mobilizational capacity and those that devolve internal decision-making authority from the party leadership to lower cadres are less likely to be co-opted, especially when they are ideological distant from autocratic incumbents. I contend that opposition parties’ organizational characteristics and their ideological positioning in an autocratic party system significantly alter the strategic calculus of the incumbent regime and opposition party elites in deciding whether or not to cooperate with one another. Hence, autocratic incumbents’ ability to control opposition parties through cooptation is shaped not only by the commonly highlighted factors such as resource availability, institutional manipulation or repression, but also as a result of the relatively less well-understood factors such as opposition party organizational features and party positions.
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| 6. |
- Kavasoglu, Yaman Berker, 1990
(author)
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Party Organizations and the Dynamics of Autocratic Rule: Co-optation, Repression, and Regime Change
- 2022
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Doctoral thesis (other academic/artistic)abstract
- This dissertation is about political parties in autocracies. The recent institutionalist turn in comparative authoritarianism has renewed attention to the role of political parties by highlighting the strategic value of these institutions for autocratic leaders. Scholars suggest that political parties in autocracies enable autocrats to credibly commit to sharing power with or channeling state benefits to political elites and the masses, thereby helping autocrats to mitigate potential elite and mass dissent. Yet, research largely overlooks the issue that not all political parties have organizational features that can help autocrats achieve these objectives. Despite important advancements in the literature, scholars of autocracy have so far paid insufficient attention to the variation in explicit organizational features of political parties. By introducing the most comprehensive data set on party organizations covering more than 600 parties from 134 autocracies between 1970 and 2019, this dissertation addresses this gap. In individual articles, I theorize that the variation in party organizational features shapes autocrats’ incentives and abilities to co-opt support, violently repress opponents, and institute democratizing reforms to maintain themselves in power. Taken together, individual articles demonstrate the importance of focusing on the organizational features of parties to fully understand how parties shape substantial political outcomes in autocracies.
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