1. |
- Bouwmeester, S, et al.
(author)
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Registered Replication Report: Rand, Greene, and Nowak (2012) : Multilab direct replication of: Study 7 from Rand, D. G., Greene, J. D., & Nowak, M. A. (2012) Spontaneous giving and calculated greed. Nature, 489, 427–430.
- 2017
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In: Perspectives on Psychological Science. - : Sage Publications. - 1745-6916 .- 1745-6924. ; 12:3, s. 527-542
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- In an anonymous 4-person economic game, participants contributed more money to a common project (i.e., cooperated) when required to decide quickly than when forced to delay their decision (Rand, Greene & Nowak, 2012), a pattern consistent with the social heuristics hypothesis proposed by Rand and colleagues. The results of studies using time pressure have been mixed, with some replication attempts observing similar patterns (e.g., Rand et al., 2014) and others observing null effects (e.g., Tinghög et al., 2013; Verkoeijen & Bouwmeester, 2014). This Registered Replication Report (RRR) assessed the size and variability of the effect of time pressure on cooperative decisions by combining 21 separate, preregistered replications of the critical conditions from Study 7 of the original article (Rand et al., 2012). The primary planned analysis used data from all participants who were randomly assigned to conditions and who met the protocol inclusion criteria (an intent-to-treat approach that included the 65.9% of participants in the time-pressure condition and 7.5% in the forced-delay condition who did not adhere to the time constraints), and we observed a difference in contributions of −0.37 percentage points compared with an 8.6 percentage point difference calculated from the original data. Analyzing the data as the original article did, including data only for participants who complied with the time constraints, the RRR observed a 10.37 percentage point difference in contributions compared with a 15.31 percentage point difference in the original study. In combination, the results of the intent-to-treat analysis and the compliant-only analysis are consistent with the presence of selection biases and the absence of a causal effect of time pressure on cooperation.
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2. |
- Bouwmeester, Sjoerd, et al.
(author)
-
Registered Replication Report : Rand, Greene, and Nowak (2012)
- 2017
-
In: Perspectives on Psychological Science. - : SAGE Publications. - 1745-6916 .- 1745-6924. ; 12:3, s. 527-542
-
Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- In an anonymous 4-person economic game, participants contributed more money to a common project (i.e., cooperated) when required to decide quickly than when forced to delay their decision (Rand, Greene & Nowak, 2012), a pattern consistent with the social heuristics hypothesis proposed by Rand and colleagues. The results of studies using time pressure have been mixed, with some replication attempts observing similar patterns (e.g., Rand et al., 2014) and others observing null effects (e.g., Tinghög et al., 2013; Verkoeijen & Bouwmeester, 2014). This Registered Replication Report (RRR) assessed the size and variability of the effect of time pressure on cooperative decisions by combining 21 separate, preregistered replications of the critical conditions from Study 7 of the original article (Rand et al., 2012). The primary planned analysis used data from all participants who were randomly assigned to conditions and who met the protocol inclusion criteria (an intent-to-treat approach that included the 65.9% of participants in the time-pressure condition and 7.5% in the forced-delay condition who did not adhere to the time constraints), and we observed a difference in contributions of −0.37 percentage points compared with an 8.6 percentage point difference calculated from the original data. Analyzing the data as the original article did, including data only for participants who complied with the time constraints, the RRR observed a 10.37 percentage point difference in contributions compared with a 15.31 percentage point difference in the original study. In combination, the results of the intent-to-treat analysis and the compliant-only analysis are consistent with the presence of selection biases and the absence of a causal effect of time pressure on cooperation.
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3. |
- Journeau, C., et al.
(author)
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European Research on the Corium issues within the SARNET network of excellence
- 2008
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In: International Conference on Advances in Nuclear Power Plants, ICAPP 2008. - 9781605607870 ; , s. 1172-1181
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Conference paper (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Within SARNET, the corium topic covers all the behaviors of corium from early phase of core degradation to in or ex-vessel corium recovery with the exception of corium interaction with water, direct containment heating and fission product release. The corium topic regroups in three work packages the critical mass of competence required to improve significantly the corium behavior knowledge. The spirit of the SARNET networking is to share the knowledge, the facilities and the simulation tools for severe accidents, so to reach a better efficiency and to rationalize the R&D effort at European level. Extensive benchmarking has been launched in most of the areas of research. These benchmarks were mainly dedicated to the recalculation of experiments, while, in the next periods, a larger focus will be given to integral experiments or reactor applications. Eventually, all the knowledge will be accumulated in the ASTEC severe accident simulation code through physical model improvements and extension of validation database. This paper summarizes the progress that has been achieved in the frame of the networking activities. A special focus is placed on the melt pool and debris coolability and corium-concrete interaction, in which, the effects due to multidimensional geometries and heterogeneities has been shown, during SARNET, to play a crucial role and for which further research is still needed.
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