| 1. |
- Park, Gyunghoon, et al.
(author)
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Stealthy Adversaries Against Uncertain Cyber-Physical Systems : Threat of Robust Zero-Dynamics Attack
- 2019
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In: IEEE Transactions on Automatic Control. - : IEEE-INST ELECTRICAL ELECTRONICS ENGINEERS INC. - 0018-9286 .- 1558-2523. ; 64:12, s. 4907-4919
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- In this paper, we address the problem of constructing a robust stealthy attack that compromises uncertain cyber-physical systems having unstable zeros. We first interpret the (non-robust) conventional zero-dynamics attack based on Byrnes-Isidori normal form, and then present a new robust zero-dynamics attack for uncertain plants. Different from the conventional strategy, our key idea is to isolate the real zero-dynamics from the plants input-output relation and to replace it with an auxiliary nominal zero-dynamics. As a result, this alternative attack does not require the exact model knowledge anymore. The price to pay for the robustness is to utilize the input and output signals of the system (i.e., disclosure resources). It is shown that a disturbance observer can be employed to realize the new attack philosophy when there is a lack of model knowledge. Simulation results with a hydro-turbine power system are presented to verify the attack performance and robustness.
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| 2. |
- Park, Gyunghoon, et al.
(author)
-
When Adversary Encounters Uncertain Cyber-physical Systems : Robust Zero-dynamics Attack with Disclosure Resources
- 2016
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In: 2016 IEEE 55th Conference on Decision and Control, CDC 2016. - : Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE). - 9781509018376 ; , s. 5085-5090
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Conference paper (peer-reviewed)abstract
- In this paper we address the problem of designing a robust stealthy attack for adversaries to compromise an uncertain cyber-physical system without being detected. We first re-interpret the zero-dynamics attack based on the normal form representation. Then, a new alternative zero dynamics attack is presented for uncertain systems. This alternative employs a disturbance observer and does not require exact system knowledge in order to remain stealthy. The proposed robust zero-dynamics attack needs a nominal model of the system and, in addition, utilizes the input and output signals of the system. The proposed attack illustrates how the adversary is able to use disclosure resources instead of exact model knowledge. A simulation result with a hydro-turbine power system is presented to verify the attack performance.
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