| 1. |
- Bravo, L, et al.
(author)
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- 2021
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swepub:Mat__t
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| 2. |
- Tabiri, S, et al.
(author)
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- 2021
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swepub:Mat__t
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| 3. |
- Ahlenius, Henrik, 1973-
(author)
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Moral Lessons from Psychology : Contemporary Themes in Psychological Research and their Relevance for Ethical Theory
- 2020
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Doctoral thesis (other academic/artistic)abstract
- The thesis investigates the implications for moral philosophy of research in psychology. In addition to an introduction and concluding remarks, the thesis consists of four chapters, each exploring various more specific challenges or inputs to moral philosophy from cognitive, social, personality, developmental, and evolutionary psychology. Chapter 1 explores and clarifies the issue of whether or not morality is innate. The chapter’s general conclusion is that evolution has equipped us with a basic suite of emotions that shape our moral judgments in important ways. Chapter 2 presents and investigates the challenge presented to deontological ethics by Joshua Greene’s so-called dual process theory. The chapter partly agrees with his conclusion that the dual process view neutralizes some common criticisms against utilitarianism founded on deontological intuitions, but also points to avenues left to explore for deontologists. Chapter 3 focuses on Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer’s suggestion that utilitarianism is less vulnerable to so-called evolutionary debunking than other moral theories. The chapter is by and large critical of their attempt. In the final chapter 4, attention is directed at the issue of whether or not social psychology has shown that people lack stable character traits, and hence that the virtue ethical view is premised on false or tenuous assumptions. Though this so-called situationist challenge at one time seemed like a serious threat to virtue ethics, the chapter argues for a moderate position, pointing to the fragility of much of the empirical research invoked to substantiate this challenge while also suggesting revisions to the virtue ethical view as such.
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| 4. |
- Althini, Sanna, et al.
(author)
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Normal Nigrostriatal Innervation but Dopamine Dysfunction in Mice Carrying Hypomorphic Tyrosine Hydroxylase Alleles
- 2003
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In: Journal of Neuroscience Research. - : Wiley. - 0360-4012 .- 1097-4547. ; 72:4, s. 444-453
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- We investigated the use of the mouse tyrosine hydroxylase (TH) gene to drive knock-in constructs in catecholaminergic neurons. Two targeting constructs representing truncated forms of either of the BMP receptors ALK-2 or BMPR-II preceded by an internal ribosome entry site (IRES) were introduced into the 3' untranslated region of TH. An frt-flanked neomycin-resistance (neo(r)) cassette was placed in the 3' end of the targeting constructs. Mice homozygous for the knock-in alleles showed various degrees of hypokinetic behavior, depending mainly on whether the neo(r) cassette was removed. In situ hybridization and immunohistochemistry showed that TH mRNA and protein were variously down-regulated in these mouse strains. Reduced levels of dopamine and noradrenalin were found in several brain areas. However, number and morphology of neurons in substantia nigra and their projections to striatum appeared normal in the neo(r)-positive TH hypomorphic mice as examined by markers for L-aromatic amino acid decarboxylase and the dopamine transporter. Elimination of the neo(r) cassette from the knock-in alleles partially restored TH and dopamine levels. The present neo(r)-positive TH hypomorphic mice show that nigrostriatal innervation develops independently of TH and should find use as a model for conditions of reduced catecholamine synthesis, as seen in, for example, L-dihydroxyphenylalanine-responsive dystonia/infantile parkinsonism.
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| 5. |
- Arrhenius, Gustaf, 1966-, et al.
(author)
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The Value of Existence
- 2015
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In: Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. - New York : Oxford University Press. - 9780199959303 ; , s. 424-444
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Book chapter (peer-reviewed)
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| 6. |
- Arrhenius, Gustaf, 1966-, et al.
(author)
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Value Superiority
- 2015
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In: Oxford Handbook of Value Theory. - New York : Oxford University Press. - 9780199959303 ; , s. 225-248
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Book chapter (peer-reviewed)
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| 7. |
- Bakka, Conrad, 1988-
(author)
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Debunking Debunked? : Challenges, Prospects, and the Threat of Self-Defeat
- 2023
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Doctoral thesis (other academic/artistic)abstract
- Metaethical debunking arguments often conclude that no moral belief is epistemically justified. Early versions of such arguments largely relied on metaphors and analogies and left the epistemology of debunking underspecified. Debunkers have since come to take on substantial and broad-ranging epistemological commitments. The plausibility of metaethical debunking has thereby become entangled in thorny epistemological issues. In this thesis, I provide a critical yet sympathetic evaluation of the prospects and challenges facing such arguments in light of this development. In doing so, I address the following central question: how could genealogical information undermine the epistemic justification of moral beliefs? In Part I, I begin answering the central question by extracting explicit and implicit epistemic principles from three popular debunking arguments. These arguments, due to Gilbert Harman, Richard Joyce, and Sharon Street, generate principles concerning ontological parsimony, explanatory dispensability, epistemic insensitivity, lack of epistemic safety, unexplained reliability, epistemic coincidences, and explanatory constraints on rational belief. Having set out the principles tasked with explaining how genealogical information undermines, Part II of the thesis seeks to evaluate whether debunking arguments built on them succeed. To this end, I consider two types of challenges faced by such arguments. First, there are strategies that attempt to block global moral debunking arguments. I argue that one popular such strategy, the so-called ‘third-factor strategy’, has been misunderstood. When understood correctly, it is of no help in answering debunking arguments. I then flesh out an alternative and more promising strategy for blocking such arguments. I then turn to internal challenges facing debunkers, particularly those who rely on ‘explanationist’ principles. I argue that explanationist debunking arguments, as well as most others, fall prey to one or more of four internal challenges: the implausibility of first-order epistemic principles, the threat of overgeneralization, the threat of self-defeat, and the need for costly metaepistemic commitments.I conclude that current debunking arguments fail to establish that no moral belief is justified. By analyzing why existing arguments fail, I develop two conditions of adequacy that debunkers must satisfy in order to navigate the internal challenges successfully. I end by suggesting future directions that debunkers should pursue to rehabilitate the prospects for global moral debunking arguments.
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| 8. |
- Broekman, Maarten J. E., et al.
(author)
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Evaluating expert-based habitat suitability information of terrestrial mammals with GPS-tracking data
- 2022
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In: Global Ecology and Biogeography. - : Wiley. - 1466-822X .- 1466-8238. ; 31:8, s. 1526-1541
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Aim: Macroecological studies that require habitat suitability data for many species often derive this information from expert opinion. However, expert-based information is inherently subjective and thus prone to errors. The increasing availability of GPS tracking data offers opportunities to evaluate and supplement expert-based information with detailed empirical evidence. Here, we compared expert-based habitat suitability information from the International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN) with habitat suitability information derived from GPS-tracking data of 1,498 individuals from 49 mammal species.Location: Worldwide.Time period: 1998-2021.Major taxa studied: Forty-nine terrestrial mammal species.Methods: Using GPS data, we estimated two measures of habitat suitability for each individual animal: proportional habitat use (proportion of GPS locations within a habitat type), and selection ratio (habitat use relative to its availability). For each individual we then evaluated whether the GPS-based habitat suitability measures were in agreement with the IUCN data. To that end, we calculated the probability that the ranking of empirical habitat suitability measures was in agreement with IUCN's classification into suitable, marginal and unsuitable habitat types.Results: IUCN habitat suitability data were in accordance with the GPS data (> 95% probability of agreement) for 33 out of 49 species based on proportional habitat use estimates and for 25 out of 49 species based on selection ratios. In addition, 37 and 34 species had a > 50% probability of agreement based on proportional habitat use and selection ratios, respectively.Main conclusions: We show how GPS-tracking data can be used to evaluate IUCN habitat suitability data. Our findings indicate that for the majority of species included in this study, it is appropriate to use IUCN habitat suitability data in macroecological studies. Furthermore, we show that GPS-tracking data can be used to identify and prioritize species and habitat types for re-evaluation of IUCN habitat suitability data.
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| 9. |
- Bykvist, Krister, et al.
(author)
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Expressivism and Moral Certitude
- 2009
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In: The Philosophical Quarterly. - : Oxford University Press (OUP). - 0031-8094 .- 1467-9213. ; 59:235, s. 202-215
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Michael Smith has recently argued that non-cognitivists are unable to accommodate crucialstructural features of moral belief, and in particular that non-cognitivists have trouble accounting forsubjects’ certitude with respect to their moral beliefs. James Lenman and Michael Ridge haveindependently constructed ‘ecumenical’ versions of non-cognitivism, intended to block this objection.We argue that these responses do not work. If ecumenical non-cognitivism, a hybrid view whichincorporates both non-cognitivist and cognitivist elements, fails to meet Smith’s challenge, it isunlikely that ‘purer’ and more familiar versions of non-cognitivism will succeed.
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| 10. |
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