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- Ahlbom Persson, Tove, et al.
(author)
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“Gimme Shelter”: The Role of Democracy and Institutional Quality in Disaster Preparedness
- 2017
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In: Political research quarterly. - : SAGE Publications. - 1065-9129 .- 1938-274X. ; 70:4, s. 833-847
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Natural disasters cause suffering for millions of people around the globe every year, and as climate change unfolds, the likelihood of natural catastrophes is increasing. While weather shocks such as earthquakes, tornadoes, and floods are beyond our control, the governments’ capacity to protect populations largely determines the degree of human suffering in disasters. Democracies, with freedom of speech, broad public participation, and representation, are believed to protect their populations better than nondemocratic regimes. However, democratic institutions are insufficient for securing protection from disasters in contexts of corruption, poor planning, and public administration incompetence. We argue that the effect of democracy on the extent of human suffering in disasters is contingent on the ability of governments to implement their tasks or the quality of implementing institutions. We test this interaction hypothesis using time-series cross-sectional data from the Varieties of Democracy project, the Quality of Government dataset, and the Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters. The results show that more democracy is associated with fewer people being affected by natural disasters only in settings where institutional quality is high. When institutional quality is low, more people seem to suffer in democracies than in authoritarian states.
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- Boräng, Frida, 1977, et al.
(author)
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In Light of Democracy and Corruption: Institutional Determinants of Electricity Provision
- 2021
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In: The Energy Journal. - : International Association for Energy Economics (IAEE). - 0195-6574 .- 1944-9089. ; 42:2
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Long-lasting democratic institutions have been found to matter for the universal provision of reliable electricity. In this article we revisit this finding, suggesting that the effect of democracy on electricity provision is moderated by the quality of institutions shaping the implementation of public policies. We test the hypothesis positing the interaction effect between democracy and corruption using cross-national data on the share of population living in unlit areas. The results show that democracy is associated with a higher electrification rate only in low-corrupt contexts. When corruption is widespread, democratic experience is not correlated with higher rates of electrification. These findings suggest that the effect of democratic institutions is conditional on the quality of the institutions that shape policy implementation.
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| 5. |
- Boräng, Frida, 1977, et al.
(author)
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Political determinants of electricity provision in small island developing states
- 2016
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In: Energy Policy. - : Elsevier BV. - 0301-4215 .- 1873-6777. ; 98, s. 725-734
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- This paper approaches provision of affordable and reliable electricity in Small Island Developing States (SIDS) as a case of public good provision. It aims to contribute to our understanding of how regime type and the quality of implementing institutions within political systems affect the prerequisites for successful electrification in SIDS. More specifically, we analyse the independent and interdependent effects of level of democracy and control of corruption on per capita household electricity consumption in SIDS, using data from 34 SIDS over the period 1996-2009. The results show that although the independent effects of level of democracy and control of corruption are sensitive to model specification, these two factors do have an interdependent impact on per capita household electricity consumption: democratization has positive effects on provision of electricity to the general population only when there is a certain level of corruption control in place. The results imply a) that it is important for policy actors to acknowledge the interaction between regime type and the quality of implementing institutions, and b) when planning electrification projects in SIDS, it is necessary to have information about the social and political context in order to design the most effective projects. (C) 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
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| 6. |
- Carlitz, Ruth D, et al.
(author)
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Local interest group activity and environmental degradation in authoritarian regimes
- 2021
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In: World Development. - : Elsevier BV. - 0305-750X .- 1873-5991. ; 142
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- An extensive literature shows that democracies tend to do a better job of protecting the environment than autocracies. Much less work has been done to explain the considerable variation in environmental quality within many authoritarian settings. We help fill this gap with an empirical study of Vietnam – one of the world’s most stable authoritarian regimes as well as one of the most environmentally vulnerable. We focus on the relationship between interest group activity and environmental outcomes (air and water quality) at the district level. While the participation of more actors in civic and political life has the potential to improve outcomes by enhancing scrutiny of government, interest groups may also promote economic interests to the detriment of environmental protection. Our analysis shows that districts characterized by higher levels of local interest group activity tend to have lower air and water quality. This result is consistent across a range of model specifications and estimation strategies. These findings imply that organization of local interests may be detrimental to environmental quality in authoritarian settings and that effective mobilization of actors who would benefit from high environmental quality (i.e., citizens) may be overshadowed by those of pro-business interests. As such, our findings highlight the limits of popular participation related to environmental protection in authoritarian regimes – particularly those that base their legitimacy on economic development.
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- Jagers, Sverker C., 1967, et al.
(author)
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Paradise Islands? Island States and the provision of environmental goods
- 2016
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In: Sustainability. - : MDPI AG. - 2071-1050. ; 8:3
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Island states have been shown to outperform continental states on a number of large-scale coordination-related outcomes, such as levels of democracy and institutional quality. The argument developed and tested in this article contends that the same kind of logic may apply to islands’ environmental performance, too. However, the empirical analysis shows mixed results. Among the 105 environmental outcomes that we analyzed, being an island only has a positive impact on 20 of them. For example, island states tend to outcompete continental states with respect to several indicators related to water quality but not in aspects related to biodiversity, protected areas, or environmental regulations. In addition, the causal factors previously suggested to make islands outperform continental states in terms of coordination have weak explanatory power in predicting islands’ environmental performance. We conclude the paper by discussing how these interesting findings can be further explored.
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| 10. |
- Laegreid, Ole Martin, et al.
(author)
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Are Carbon Dioxide Emissions Decoupled from GDP Growth in Well-functioning Democracies?
- 2017
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Other publication (other academic/artistic)abstract
- Empirical studies of the relationship between GDP per capita and country-level CO2 emissions tend to focus on the direct effect of per capita GDP growth, rarely taking political institutions into consideration. This paper introduces theoretical insights from environmental political science research, which suggests that CO2 emissions models would gain explanatory leverage if moderators gauging political institutions were considered. We test these theories by estimating the potentially moderating effects of democracy, corruption, veto points and players, and civil society activity. Our results suggest a positive and linear per capita GDP-CO2 relationship, which is barely affected by any variations in political and institutional factors. The only significant moderator in our analysis is bicameralism in democratic, low corrupt countries, which generates a stronger effect of per capita GDP growth at low levels of GDP per capita. Our analysis thus lends rigor to studies in environmental economics that find a positive and linear per capita GDP-CO2 relationship, and does not provide support for theories common in environmental political science research.
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