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- Ebert, D. D., et al.
(author)
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Does Internet-based guided-self-help for depression cause harm? An individual participant data meta-analysis on deterioration rates and its moderators in randomized controlled trials
- 2016
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In: Psychological Medicine. - : Cambridge University Press. - 0033-2917 .- 1469-8978. ; 46:13, s. 2679-2693
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Research review (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Almost nothing is known about the potential negative effects of Internet-based psychological treatments for depression. This study aims at investigating deterioration and its moderators within randomized trials on Internet-based guided self-help for adult depression, using an individual patient data meta-analyses (IPDMA) approach.Studies were identified through systematic searches (PubMed, PsycINFO, EMBASE, Cochrane Library). Deterioration in participants was defined as a significant symptom increase according to the reliable change index (i.e. 7.68 points in the CES-D; 7.63 points in the BDI). Two-step IPDMA procedures, with a random-effects model were used to pool data.A total of 18 studies (21 comparisons, 2079 participants) contributed data to the analysis. The risk for a reliable deterioration from baseline to post-treatment was significantly lower in the intervention v. control conditions (3.36 v. 7.60; relative risk 0.47, 95% confidence interval 0.29–0.75). Education moderated effects on deterioration, with patients with low education displaying a higher risk for deterioration than patients with higher education. Deterioration rates for patients with low education did not differ statistically significantly between intervention and control groups. The benefit–risk ratio for patients with low education indicated that 9.38 patients achieve a treatment response for each patient experiencing a symptom deterioration.Internet-based guided self-help is associated with a mean reduced risk for a symptom deterioration compared to controls. Treatment and symptom progress of patients with low education should be closely monitored, as some patients might face an increased risk for symptom deterioration. Future studies should examine predictors of deterioration in patients with low education.
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2. |
- Fischer, Carolyn, et al.
(author)
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The Legal and Economic Case for an Auction Reserve Price in the EU Emissions Trading System
- 2020
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In: The Columbia journal of European law. - 1076-6715. ; 26:2, s. 1-28
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- When it first launched in 2005, the European Union emissions trading system (EU ETS) expected to see carbon dioxide prices of around €30/ton and be a cornerstone of the EU's climate policy. The reality was a cascade of falling prices, a ballooning privately held emissions bank, and a decade of muted incentives for investment in the technology and innovation necessary to achieve long-term climate goals. The European Commission responded with various administrative measures, including postponing the introduction of allowances (“backloading”) and using a quantity-based criterion for regulating future allowance sales (“the market stability reserve”). While prices have now begun to recover, it is far from clear whether these measures are sufficient to adequately support the price of carbon dioxide into the future. In the meantime, governments outside the EU ETS have begun turning away from carbon pricing and adopting overlapping regulatory measures that reinforce low prices. Unfortunately, however, this further undermines confidence in market-based mechanisms for reducing greenhouse gas emissions. Other carbon markets have responded to such by introducing an auction reserve price that sets a minimum price in allowance auctions, thus avoiding the unexpectedly low price outcomes experienced in the EU ETS. Opponents of instituting such an auction reserve price in the EU ETS express two main concerns. First, they fear that a minimum auction price would interfere with the quantity-based nature of the market. Second, they argue that a reserve price would be tantamount to a tax, thus triggering a burdensome decision rule requiring unanimity among EU Member States that would be difficult to overcome. This Article reviews the economic and legal arguments for and against an auction reserve price. Our economic analysis concludes that an auction reserve price is necessary to accommodate overlapping policies and for the allowance market to operate efficiently. Our legal analysis concludes that, inasmuch as an auction reserve price is not a “provision primarily of a fiscal nature,” nor would it “significantly affect a Member State's choice between different energy sources,” no legal barriers stand in the way of the introduction of an auction reserve price into the EU ETS. We then describe two ways by which a reserve price could be introduced into this system.
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