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Search: WFRF:(Sörenson Karl 1978 )

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1.
  • Liwång, Hans, et al. (author)
  • Ship security challenges in high-risk areas : manageable or insurmountable?
  • 2015
  • In: WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs (JoMA). - : Springer Berlin/Heidelberg. - 1651-436X .- 1654-1642. ; 14:2, s. 201-217
  • Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
    • Piracy can lead to risks so high that they, according to the International Maritime Organization, are tolerable only if risk reduction is not practicable or is disproportionate to the benefits achieved. Therefore, there is a need for reducing ship security risks in relation to antagonistic threats such as piracy. The aim of this study is to identify challenges for ship operators when developing their ship security management. Furthermore, this study also investigates two central aspects in the analysis: understanding the threat and understanding how a security threat affects the crew and operation of the ship. It is clear from the analysis that the importance of subjective aspects beyond a ship operators’ direct control is high. This seems to be the fact for all aspects of the risk management process. The situation is also dynamic as the security risk, as well as the risk perception, can change dramatically even though there are no actual operational changes. As a result, the ship security management process is highly iterative and depends on situations on board as well as conditions out of the ship operator’s control. In order to make ship security manageable, the risk management has to put particular focus on methodological understanding, relevant system understanding and well-defined risk acceptance criteria as well as on including all levels of the organization in the risk reduction implementation and on a continuous monitoring.
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3.
  • Sörenson, Karl, 1978- (author)
  • A Misfit model : irrational deterrence and bounded rationality
  • 2023
  • In: Theory and Decision. - : Springer Nature. - 0040-5833 .- 1573-7187. ; 94:4, s. 575-591
  • Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
    • Contemporary theories of deterrence place a strong emphasis on coherency between model and theory. Schelling’s contention of irrational threats for successful deterrence abandons the rationality assumption to explain how a player can deter, thereby departing from the standard game theoretic solution concepts. It is a misfit model in relation to a deterrence theory and, therefore, excluded. The article defends and remodels Schelling’s intuition by employing the level-k model. It is shown that an unsophisticated player that randomizes over its strategies brings about an advantageous outcome. The model also shows that the belief that a player randomizes has the same deterrent effect, as an actual stochastic choice, like Schelling suggested. While this means Schelling’s idea can be saved, it is still problematic how we should view contributions of bounded rationality in relation to current deterrence theory. The article suggests that separating the purpose of a model in conjunction with allowing other scientific ideals than model-theory coherence permits a broader and philosophically sounder approach. 
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4.
  • Sörenson, Karl, 1978- (author)
  • Comparable Deterrence : Target, Criteria and Purpose
  • 2017
  • In: Defence Studies. - : Informa UK Limited. - 1470-2436 .- 1743-9698. ; 17:2, s. 198-213
  • Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
    • The last decade has seen several advances in the study of deterrence. These advances have sparked some strong disagreements regarding interpretation of the models and what their contributions signify. This paper appraises the discussions from a model theoretic perspective. It is argued that when comparing rivalling models three aspects; (i) target, (ii) criteria and (iii) type of purpose should be taken into account in order to make a proper appraisal. Informed by these aspects it is evident that the three deterrence models analysed address different aspects, in different ways and to different ends. From this perspective, the so-called Perfect Deterrence model must be recognised as a clear advancement in the research field. Model comparison will always be context relative and a plurality of models should be viewed favourably.
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5.
  • Sörenson, Karl, 1978- (author)
  • Deterrence Games for the 21st Century : Representation, Theory and Evidence
  • 2022
  • Doctoral thesis (other academic/artistic)abstract
    • Deterrence is the backbone of military strategy. Dissuading an opponent from taking a specific action by threat of violence is the definition of deterrence. From the outset of the Cold War there has been a strong link between the study of deterrence and game theoretic analysis. There are compelling epistemic reasons for studying deterrence as a game. By doing so, the strategic interaction between actors is placed at the centre of the analysis, mapping the possible outcomes and revealing the strategies available to the actors. Discussions about various models’ appropriateness and model comparison therefore play a central role in deterrence research; from underlying assumptions and deterrence representation to theory and evidence. This dissertation treats aspects of all of these topics. Article I, “Prospects of Deterrence – Deterrence Theory – Representation and Evidence”, analyses the relationship between model and theory and what happens to a deterrence theory when the rationality assumption is switched to a prospect theoretical utility function. Article II, “A Misfit Model – Bounded Rationality and Deterrence Representation”, defends and remodels Schelling’s idea of irrational threats for effective deterrence. Article III, “Comparable Deterrence – Target, Criteria and Purpose”, treats the issue of how one can compare game theoretic models with one another and proposes a meta-model for how this can be done. Article IV, “Deterring the Dauntless – Appraising the Effects of Naval Deterrence against the Somali Piracy”, estimates whether and to what extent Somali piracy was deterred by the naval intervention.
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6.
  • Sörenson, Karl, 1978- (author)
  • Deterring the Dauntless : Appraising the effects of naval deterrence against the Somali piracy
  • 2018
  • In: WMU Journal of Maritime Affairs (JoMA). - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1651-436X .- 1654-1642. ; 17:1, s. 31-48
  • Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
    • This article considers whether the Somali pirates were deterred by the naval task forces between the years 2009 and 2013. By disaggregating data and using previously unpublished records regarding the naval operations, two areas of operations are identified as potential periods of deterrence. The article uses a model of asymmetric deterrence to study the outcomes and equilibria of the navy-pirate interaction. It is found that the naval operations eventually did deter the Somali pirates in the Gulf of Aden, but that this objective was not met in the Somali Basin. It is concluded that the operational focus on the Gulf of Aden coupled with the fact that the area is relatively smaller than the Somali Basin enabled the naval credibility, thus effectively denying the pirates access to the sea. Conversely, limited attention by the naval units and the long Somali southern coast with its open waters impeded naval control in the Somali Basin. In connection to these findings some conclusions regarding naval deterrence are discussed.
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8.
  • Sörenson, Karl, 1978- (author)
  • In Search of Lost Deterrence – Two essays on deterrence and the models employed to study the phenomenon
  • 2019
  • Licentiate thesis (other academic/artistic)abstract
    • To deter is central for strategic thinking. Some of the more astute observations regarding the dynamics of deterrence were made during the Cold War by game theorists. This set the stage for how deterrence has come to be studied. A strong methodological element like the research on deterrence’s reliance on game theory requires examination in order to understand what sort of knowledge it actually yields. What sort of knowledge does one acquire when deterrence is viewed through game theoretic models? How do they inform us about the phenomenon of deterrence? To understand the nature of a phenomenon through models requires idealization, which in turn presupposes assumptions. This licentiate thesis investigates the type of knowledge we attain when approaching deterrence from a game theoretic perspective. The two articles presented address two separate but related issues. The first article reviews a debate regarding which deterrence model best capture the phenomena of deterrence, i.e. how models can be compared to one and other. The article presents a framework for comparing models and then appraises how these different deterrence models inform us about deterrence. The second article uses one of the more central deterrence models in order to evaluate how and to what extent the naval operation Atalanta managed to deter the Somali piracy.
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9.
  • Sörenson, Karl, 1978-, et al. (author)
  • Irregular Warfare and Tactical Changes : The Case of Somali Piracy
  • 2014
  • In: Terrorism and Political Violence. - : Informa UK Limited. - 0954-6553 .- 1556-1836. ; 26:3, s. 399-418
  • Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
    • The aim of this article is to analyze the tactical behavior of Somali pirates, international naval forces, and the shipping community operating in the Gulf of Aden and the Somali Basin. To what extent has tactical behavior changed over time and can this process be understood in more theoretical terms? Our theoretical framework centers around some concepts often used in naval doctrine, discussing tactical change in terms of command and control, force, mobility, protection, intelligence, and endurance. We also evaluate this change using two tactical concepts—tactical adaptation and tactical development. The empirical data is based on statistics from the International Criminal Court-International Maritime Bureau and the EU NAVFOR Operation Atalanta, as well as interviews. We conclude that Somali piracy has unquestionably adapted their tactics to circumstances, while naval forces have increased their capacity to capture pirates and shipping to avoid pirates.
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10.
  • Sörenson, Karl, 1978- (author)
  • Prospects of Deterrence : Deterrence Theory, Representation and Evidence
  • 2021
  • Other publication (other academic/artistic)abstract
    • Game theoretic analysis of deterrence have been criticized for not capturing how actors realistically behave. It is alleged that prospect theoretical re-modelling provides a better foundation for a deterrence theory. The article analyzes how the strategies change when a prospect theoretical function is applied to a central deterrence game. While the probability distributions changes it cannot alter the general dynamics. When considered together with previous research it shows that prospect theory neither can or should replace standard assumptions when constructing a deterrence theory. However, viewed as a compliment prospect theory expands the modelling and opens up for important new aspects. 
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