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Träfflista för sökning "WFRF:(Svensson Lars Gunnar) "

Search: WFRF:(Svensson Lars Gunnar)

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  • Andersson, Tommy, et al. (author)
  • Gale's Fixed Tax for Exchanging Houses
  • 2018
  • Other publication (other academic/artistic)abstract
    • We consider the taxation of exchanges among a set of agents where each agent owns one object. Agents may have different valuations for the objects and they need to pay taxes for exchanges. Using basic properties, we show that if pairwise (or some) exchanges of objects are allowed, then all exchanges (in any possible manner) must be feasible. Furthermore, whenever any agent exchanges his object, he pays the same fixed tax (a lump sum payment which is identical for all agents) independently of which object he consumes. Gale's top trading cycles algorithm finds the final allocation using the agents' valuations adjusted with the fixed tax. Our mechanisms are in stark contrast to Clarke-Groves taxation schemes or the max-med schemes proposed by Sprumont (2013).
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  • Andersson, Tommy, et al. (author)
  • Gale's Fixed Tax for Exchanging Houses
  • 2022
  • In: Mathematics of Operations Research. - : Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (INFORMS). - 0364-765X .- 1526-5471. ; 47:4, s. 3110-3128
  • Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
    • We consider taxation of exchanges among a set of agents in which each agent owns one object. Agents may have different valuations for the objects, and they need to pay taxes for exchanges. We show that, if a rule satisfies individual rationality, strategy-proofness, constrained efficiency, weak anonymity, and weak consistency, then it is either the no-trade rule or a fixed-tax core rule. For the latter rules, whenever any agent exchanges an object, the agent pays the same fixed tax (a lump sum payment that is identical for all agents) independently of which object the agent consumes. Gale’s top trading cycles algorithm finds the final assignment using the agents’ valuations adjusted with the fixed tax if the induced preferences are strict.
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  • Andersson, Tommy, et al. (author)
  • Non-Manipulable House Exchange under (Minimum) Equilibrium Prices
  • 2020
  • Other publication (other academic/artistic)abstract
    • We consider a market with indivisible objects, called houses, and money. On this market, each house is initially owned (or rented) by some agent and each agent demands precisely one house. The problem is to identify the complete set of direct allocation mechanisms that can be used to reallocate the houses among the agents. The focus is on price mechanisms, i.e., mappings of preference profiles to price equilibria, that are strategy-proof and satisfy an individual rationality condition. We prove that the only mechanism that satisfies these conditions is a price mechanism with a minimal equilibrium price vector. The result is not true in full preference domain. Instead, we identify a smaller domain, that contains almost all profiles, where the result holds.
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  • Andersson, Tommy, et al. (author)
  • Transferring Ownership of Public Housing to Existing Tenants: A Market Design Approach
  • 2015
  • Other publication (other academic/artistic)abstract
    • This paper explores a housing market with an existing tenant in each house and where the existing tenants initially rent their houses. The idea is to identify equilibrium prices for the housing market given the prerequisite that a tenant can buy any house on the housing market, including the one that he currently is possessing, or continue renting the house he currently is occupying. The main contribution is the identification of an individually rational, equilibrium selecting, and group non-manipulable price mechanism in a restricted preference domain that contains almost all preference profiles. In this restricted domain, the identified mechanism is the equilibrium selecting mechanism that transfers the maximum number of ownerships to the existing tenants. We also argue that the theoretical model represents an extension and an improvement of the U.K. Housing Act 1980 whose main objective is to transfer the ownership of the houses to the existing tenants.
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  • Andersson, Tommy, et al. (author)
  • Transferring Ownership of Public Housing to Existing Tenants : A Market Design Approach
  • 2016
  • In: Journal of Economic Theory. - : Elsevier BV. - 0022-0531. ; 165, s. 643-671
  • Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
    • This paper explores a housing market with an existing tenant in each house and where the existing tenants initially rent their houses. The idea is to identify equilibrium prices for the housing market given the prerequisite that a tenant can buy any house on the housing market, including the one that he is currently possessing, or continue renting the house he is currently occupying. The main contribution is the identification of an individually rational, equilibrium selecting, and group non-manipulable price mechanism in a restricted preference domain that contains almost all preference profiles. In this restricted domain, the identified mechanism is the minimum price equilibrium selecting mechanism that transfers the maximum number of ownerships to the existing tenants. We also relate the theoretical model and the main findings to the U.K. Housing Act 1980 whose main objective is to transfer ownerships of houses to existing tenants.
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  • Result 1-10 of 234
Type of publication
journal article (181)
conference paper (29)
other publication (16)
reports (4)
research review (2)
book (1)
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licentiate thesis (1)
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Type of content
peer-reviewed (191)
other academic/artistic (38)
pop. science, debate, etc. (5)
Author/Editor
Johansson, Lars-Gunn ... (126)
Svensson, Jan-Erik, ... (125)
Halvarsson, Mats, 19 ... (61)
Svensson, Lars-Gunna ... (56)
Jonsson, Torbjörn, 1 ... (27)
Esmaily, Mohsen, 198 ... (26)
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Andersson, Tommy (19)
Pettersson, Jesper, ... (18)
Liu, Fang, 1975 (16)
Hellström, Kristina ... (14)
Båth, Magnus, 1974 (13)
Månsson, Lars Gunnar ... (13)
Håkansson, Markus (13)
Mortazavi Seyedeh, N ... (13)
Pettersson, Carolina ... (13)
Canovic, Sead, 1979 (12)
Asteman, Henrik, 197 ... (11)
Svensson, Sune (11)
Shahabi Navid, Mehrd ... (10)
Folkeson, Nicklas, 1 ... (9)
Ehlers, Lars (8)
Svalkvist, Angelica (8)
Panas, Itai, 1959 (7)
Froitzheim, Jan, 198 ... (7)
Cao, Yu, 1969 (7)
Niklasson, Annika, 1 ... (7)
Götlind, Helena, 197 ... (6)
Liske, Jesper, 1978 (6)
Pujilaksono, Bagas, ... (6)
Olsson, Mikael (6)
Zachrisson, Sara (6)
Israelsson, Niklas, ... (6)
Weibull, Jörgen W. (5)
Nyborg, Lars, 1958 (5)
Geers, Christine, 19 ... (5)
Svensson, Jan-Erik (5)
Engkvist, Josefin, 1 ... (5)
Johansson, Lars-Gunn ... (5)
Skog, Erik, 1950 (5)
Ingemarsson, Linda, ... (5)
Engström, Gunnar (4)
Lind, Lars (4)
Sattari, Mohammad, 1 ... (4)
Helander, T. (4)
Larsson, Erik, 1983 (4)
Svensson, Gunnar (4)
Wessen, Magnus (4)
Engkvist, Josefin (4)
Canovic, Sead (4)
Birbilis, N. (4)
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University
Chalmers University of Technology (127)
Lund University (64)
University of Gothenburg (29)
Högskolan Dalarna (10)
Uppsala University (8)
Stockholm University (8)
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Royal Institute of Technology (7)
Linköping University (5)
Jönköping University (5)
Karolinska Institutet (4)
Malmö University (3)
RISE (3)
Umeå University (2)
Kristianstad University College (1)
University of Skövde (1)
Karlstad University (1)
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Language
English (218)
Swedish (13)
Undefined language (3)
Research subject (UKÄ/SCB)
Engineering and Technology (104)
Natural sciences (75)
Social Sciences (55)
Medical and Health Sciences (27)
Humanities (3)

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