| 1. |
- Bouwmeester, Sjoerd, et al.
(author)
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Registered Replication Report : Rand, Greene, and Nowak (2012)
- 2017
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In: Perspectives on Psychological Science. - : SAGE Publications. - 1745-6916 .- 1745-6924. ; 12:3, s. 527-542
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- In an anonymous 4-person economic game, participants contributed more money to a common project (i.e., cooperated) when required to decide quickly than when forced to delay their decision (Rand, Greene & Nowak, 2012), a pattern consistent with the social heuristics hypothesis proposed by Rand and colleagues. The results of studies using time pressure have been mixed, with some replication attempts observing similar patterns (e.g., Rand et al., 2014) and others observing null effects (e.g., Tinghög et al., 2013; Verkoeijen & Bouwmeester, 2014). This Registered Replication Report (RRR) assessed the size and variability of the effect of time pressure on cooperative decisions by combining 21 separate, preregistered replications of the critical conditions from Study 7 of the original article (Rand et al., 2012). The primary planned analysis used data from all participants who were randomly assigned to conditions and who met the protocol inclusion criteria (an intent-to-treat approach that included the 65.9% of participants in the time-pressure condition and 7.5% in the forced-delay condition who did not adhere to the time constraints), and we observed a difference in contributions of −0.37 percentage points compared with an 8.6 percentage point difference calculated from the original data. Analyzing the data as the original article did, including data only for participants who complied with the time constraints, the RRR observed a 10.37 percentage point difference in contributions compared with a 15.31 percentage point difference in the original study. In combination, the results of the intent-to-treat analysis and the compliant-only analysis are consistent with the presence of selection biases and the absence of a causal effect of time pressure on cooperation.
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| 2. |
- Kocher, Martin G., et al.
(author)
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Strong, Bold, and Kind: Self-Control and Cooperation in Social Dilemmas
- 2012
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Reports (other academic/artistic)abstract
- We develop a model relating self-control, risk preferences and conflict identification to cooperation patterns in social dilemmas. We subject our model to data from an experimental public goods game and a risk experiment, and we measure conflict identification and self-control. As predicted, we find a robust association between self-control and higher levels of cooperation, and the association is weaker for more risk-averse individuals. Free riders differ from other contributor types only in their tendency not to have identified a self-control conflict in the first place. Our model accounts for the data at least as well as do other models.
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| 3. |
- Martinsson, Peter, 1969, et al.
(author)
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Reconciling pro-social vs. selfish behavior: On the role of self-control
- 2012
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In: Judgment and Decision Making. - 1930-2975. ; 7:3, s. 304-315
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- We test in the context of a dictator game the proposition that individuals may experience a self-control conflict between the temptation to act selfishly and the better judgment to act pro-socially. We manipulated the likelihood that individuals would identify self-control conflict, and we measured their trait ability to implement self-control strategies. Our analysis reveals a positive and significant correlation between trait self-control and pro-social behavior in the treatment where we expected a relatively high likelihood of conflict identification-but not in the treatment where we expected a low likelihood. The magnitude of the effect is of economic significance. We conclude that subtle cues might prove sufficient to alter individuals' perception of allocation opportunities, thereby prompting individuals to draw on their own cognitive resources to act pro-socially.
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| 4. |
- Myrseth, K. O. R., et al.
(author)
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A theory of self-control and naivete: The blights of willpower and blessings of temptation
- 2013
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In: Journal of Economic Psychology. - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-4870. ; 34, s. 8-19
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- We model self-control conflict as an agent's stochastic struggle against a visceral influence that impels the agent to act sub-optimally. The agent holds costly pre-commitment technology to avoid the conflict altogether and may decide whether to procure pre-commitment or to confront the visceral influence. We examine naive expectations for the strength of the visceral influence; naive expectations lead the agent to exaggerate the expected utility of resisting temptation and so mistakenly forego pre-commitment. Contrary to accepted wisdom, our analysis reveals conditions under which higher will-power-and lower visceral influence-reduces welfare. Our analysis, therefore, calls into question policy measures that influence willpower and visceral influences.
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| 5. |
- Myrseth, K. O. R., et al.
(author)
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Depletion Influences Restraint, But Does It Influence Conflict Identification? Expanding on Osgood and Muraven (2015)
- 2015
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In: Basic and Applied Social Psychology. - : Informa UK Limited. - 0197-3533 .- 1532-4834. ; 37:5, s. 292-293
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- In their 2015 article, Osgood and Muraven showed that cognitive depletion reduces prosocial behaviors but not prosocial attitudes. We expand on the authors' interpretation by relating their results to recent theorizing on the relationship between prosocial behavior and self-control. This framework distinguishes between the proclivity to identify self-control conflict and the capacity to exercise restraint. Osgood and Muraven's findings can be interpreted as evidence that cognitive depletion in social contexts fails to influence a necessary condition for identifying self-control conflict. However, the results do not yet allow us to conclude that depletion influences capacity to exercise restraint. Further work is needed to understand the mechanisms by which cognitive depletion influences prosocial behavior.
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| 6. |
- Myrseth, K. O. R., et al.
(author)
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Less cognitive conflict does not imply choice of the default option: Commentary on Kieslich and Hilbig (2014)
- 2015
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In: Judgment and Decision Making. - 1930-2975. ; 10:3, s. 277-279
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Kieslich and Hilbig (2014) employ a mouse-tracking technique to measure decision conflict in social dilemmas. They report that defectors exhibit more conflict than do cooperators. They infer that cooperation thus is the reflexive, default behavior. We argue, however, that their analysis fails to discriminate between reflexive versus cognitively controlled behavioral responses. This is because cognitive conflict can emanate from resisting impulse successfully-or unsuccessfully.
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| 7. |
- Myrseth, K.O.R., et al.
(author)
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Naïve and Capricious: Stumbling into the ring of self-control conflict
- 2011
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Reports (other academic/artistic)abstract
- We model self-control conflict as a stochastic struggle of an agent against a visceral influence, which impels the agent to act sub-optimally. The agent holds costly pre-commitment technology to avoid the conflict altogether and may decide whether to procure pre-commitment or to confront the visceral influence. We examine naïve expectations for the strength of the visceral influence; underestimating the visceral influence may lead the agent to exaggerate the expected utility of resisting temptation, and so mistakenly forego pre-commitment. Our analysis reveals conditions under which higher willpower—and lower visceral influence—reduces welfare. We further demonstrate that lowering risk aversion could reduce welfare. The aforementioned results call into question certain policy measures aimed at helping people improve their own behavior.
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| 8. |
- Myrseth, K.O.R., et al.
(author)
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Skråsikkerhetens kvad
- 2013
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In: Aftenposten. - 0804-3116. ; :2013-10-03
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Journal article (other academic/artistic)
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| 9. |
- Myrseth, K.O.R., et al.
(author)
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Tangible Temptation in the Social Dilemma: Cash, cooperation, and self-control
- 2013
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Reports (other academic/artistic)abstract
- The social dilemma may contain, within the individual, a self-control conflict between urges to act selfishly and better judgment to cooperate. Examining the argument from the perspective of temptation, we pair the public good game with treatments that vary the degree to which money is abstract (merely numbers on-screen) or tangible (tokens or cash). We also include psychometric measures of self-control and impulsivity. Consistent with our hypothesis, we find in the treatments that render money more tangible a stronger positive association between cooperation and self-control—and a stronger negative association between cooperation and impulsivity. Our results shed light on the conditions under which self-control matters for cooperation.
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