| 1. |
- Andrighetto, Giulia, et al.
(author)
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Changes in social norms during the early stages of the COVID-19 pandemic across 43 countries
- 2024
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In: Nature Communications. - : NATURE PORTFOLIO. - 2041-1723. ; 15:1
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- The emergence of COVID-19 dramatically changed social behavior across societies and contexts. Here we study whether social norms also changed. Specifically, we study this question for cultural tightness (the degree to which societies generally have strong norms), specific social norms (e.g. stealing, hand washing), and norms about enforcement, using survey data from 30,431 respondents in 43 countries recorded before and in the early stages following the emergence of COVID-19. Using variation in disease intensity, we shed light on the mechanisms predicting changes in social norm measures. We find evidence that, after the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic, hand washing norms increased while tightness and punishing frequency slightly decreased but observe no evidence for a robust change in most other norms. Thus, at least in the short term, our findings suggest that cultures are largely stable to pandemic threats except in those norms, hand washing in this case, that are perceived to be directly relevant to dealing with the collective threat. Tightness-looseness theory predicts that social norms strengthen following threat. Here the authors test this and find that, after the emergence of the COVID-19 pandemic, hand washing norms increased, but no evidence was observed for a robust change in most other norms.
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| 2. |
- Andrighetto, Giulia, et al.
(author)
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Counter-Punishment, Communication, and Cooperation among Partners
- 2016
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In: Frontiers in Behavioral Neuroscience. - : Frontiers Media SA. - 1662-5153. ; 10
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- We study how communication affects cooperation in an experimental public goods environment with punishment and counter-punishment opportunities. Participants interacted over 30 rounds in fixed groups with fixed identifiers that allowed them to trace other group members' behavior over time. The two dimensions of communication we study are asking for a specific contribution level and having to express oneself when choosing to counter-punish. We conduct four experimental treatments, all involving a contribution stage, a punishment stage, and a counter-punishment stage in each round. In the first treatment communication is not possible at any of the stages. The second treatment allows participants to ask for a contribution level at the punishment stage and in the third treatment participants are required to send a message if they decide to counter-punish. The fourth combines the two communication channels of the second and third treatments. We find that the three treatments involving communication at any of the two relevant stages lead to significantly higher contributions than the baseline treatment. We find no difference between the three treatments with communication. We also relate our results to previous results from treatments without counter-punishment opportunities and do not find that the presence of counter-punishment leads to lower cooperation level. The overall pattern of results shows that given fixed identifiers the key factor is the presence of communication. Whenever communication is possible contributions and earnings are higher than when it is not, regardless of counter-punishment opportunities.
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| 3. |
- Calderoni, Francesco, et al.
(author)
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Recruitment into Organized Crime : An Agent-Based Approach Testing the Impact of Different Policies
- 2022
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In: Journal of quantitative criminology. - : SPRINGER/PLENUM PUBLISHERS. - 0748-4518 .- 1573-7799. ; 38:1, s. 197-237
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Objectives We test the effects of four policy scenarios on recruitment into organized crime. The policy scenarios target (i) organized crime leaders and (ii) facilitators for imprisonment, (iii) provide educational and welfare support to children and their mothers while separating them from organized-crime fathers, and (iv) increase educational and social support to at-risk schoolchildren. Methods We developed a novel agent-based model drawing on theories of peer effects (differential association, social learning), social embeddedness of organized crime, and the general theory of crime. Agents are simultaneously embedded in multiple social networks (household, kinship, school, work, friends, and co-offending) and possess heterogeneous individual attributes. Relational and individual attributes determine the probability of offending. Co-offending with organized crime members determines recruitment into the criminal group. All the main parameters are calibrated on data from Palermo or Sicily (Italy). We test the effect of the four policy scenarios against a baseline no-intervention scenario on the number of newly recruited and total organized crime members using Generalized Estimating Equations models. Results The simulations generate realistic outcomes, with relatively stable organized crime membership and crime rates. All simulated policy interventions reduce the total number of members, whereas all but primary socialization reduce newly recruited members. The intensity of the effects, however, varies across dependent variables and models. Conclusions Agent-based models effectively enable to develop theoretically driven and empirically calibrated simulations of organized crime. The simulations can fill the gaps in evaluation research in the field of organized crime and allow us to test different policies in different environmental contexts.
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| 4. |
- Payette, Nicolas, et al.
(author)
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Kickstarting Cooperation : Experience-Weighted Attraction Learning and Norm Conformity in a Step-Level Public Goods Game
- 2020
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In: Springer Proceedings in Complexity. - Cham : Springer. - 9783030341268 ; , s. 349-354
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Conference paper (peer-reviewed)abstract
- We present a version of the experience-weighted attraction (EWA) reinforcement learning model that integrates norm conformity into its utility function that we call “EWA+Norms.” We compare the behavior of this hybrid model to the standard EWA when applied to a step-level public good game in which groups of agents must reach a threshold level of cooperation to avoid the risk of catastrophe. We find that standard EWA is not sufficient for generating cooperation, but that EWA+Norms is. We aim to compare simulation results with human behavior in large-scale experiments that we are currently running.
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| 5. |
- Przepiorka, Wojtek, et al.
(author)
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How Norms Emerge from Conventions (and Change)
- 2022
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In: SOCIUS. - : SAGE PUBLICATIONS INC. - 2378-0231. ; 8:2
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Social norms regulate our behavior in a variety of mundane and far-reaching contexts, from tipping at the restaurant to social distancing during a pandemic. However, how social norms emerge, persist, and change is still poorly understood. Here the authors investigate experimentally whether spontaneously emerging behavioral regularities (i.e., conventions) gain normativity over time and, if so, whether their normative underpinning makes them resistant to changes in economic incentives. To track the coevolution of behavior and normativity, the authors use a set of measures to elicit participants' first- and second-order normative beliefs and their (dis)approval of other participants' behaviors. The authors find that even in the limited duration of their lab experiment, conventions gain normativity that makes these conventions resistant to change, especially if they promote egalitarian outcomes and the change in economic incentives is relatively small. These findings advance our understanding of how cognitive, social and economic mechanisms interact in bringing about social change.
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| 6. |
- Szekely, Aron, et al.
(author)
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Aggression, Conflict, and the Formation of Intimidating Group Reputation
- 2020
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In: Social psychology quarterly. - : SAGE PUBLICATIONS INC. - 0190-2725 .- 1939-8999. ; 83:1, s. 70-87
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- From inmates in prison gangs to soldiers in elite units, the intimidating reputation of groups often precedes its members. While individual reputation is known to affect people's aggressiveness, whether one's group reputation can similarly influence behavior in conflict situations is yet to be established. Using an economic game experiment, we isolate the effect of group reputation on aggression and conflict from that of individual reputation. We find that group reputation can increase the willingness to inflict costs on others but only when individuals are able to punish their fellow members. Even if internal discipline can sustain their shared reputation, more intimidating groups provide fewer benefits to their members in the short run. Using an agent-based simulation, we show that this might not be the case in the long run. Our findings yield insights into the effects of group reputation on aggression, conflict, and possible consequences for group survival.
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| 7. |
- Szekely, Aron, et al.
(author)
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Countering Protection Rackets Using Legal and Social Approaches : An Agent-Based Test
- 2018
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In: Complexity. - : Hindawi Limited. - 1076-2787 .- 1099-0526.
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Protection rackets cause economic and social damage across the world. States typically combat protection rackets using legal strategies that target the racketeers with legislation, strong sentencing, and increasing the presence and involvement of police officers. Nongovernmental organizations, conversely, focus on the rest of the population and counter protection rackets using a social approach. These organisations attempt to change the actions and social norms of community members with education, promotional campaigns, and discussions. We use an agent-based model, which draws on established theories of protection rackets and combines features of sociological and economic perspectives to modelling social interactions, to test the effects of legal and social approaches. We find that a legal approach is a necessary component of a policy approach, that social only approaches should not be used because they lead to large increases in violence, and that a combination of the two works best, although even this must be used carefully.
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| 8. |
- Szekely, Aron, et al.
(author)
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Evidence from a long-term experiment that collective risks change social norms and promote cooperation
- 2021
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In: Nature Communications. - : Nature Publishing Group. - 2041-1723. ; 12:1
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Social norms can help solve pressing societal challenges, from mitigating climate change toreducing the spread of infectious diseases. Despite their relevance, how norms shape cooperation among strangers remains insufficiently understood. Influential theories also suggest that the level of threat faced by different societies plays a key role in the strength ofthe norms that cultures evolve. Still little causal evidence has been collected. Here we deal with this dual challenge using a 30-day collective-risk social dilemma experiment to measure norm change in a controlled setting. We ask whether a looming risk of collective loss increases the strength of cooperative social norms that may avert it. We find that social norms predict cooperation, causally affect behavior, and that higher risk leads to stronger social norms that are more resistant to erosion when the risk changes. Taken together, our results demonstrate the causal effect of social norms in promoting cooperation and their role in making behavior resilient in the face of exogenous change.
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| 9. |
- Szekely, Aron, et al.
(author)
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Preferences for honesty can support cooperation
- 2023
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In: Journal of Behavioral Decision Making. - : WILEY. - 0894-3257 .- 1099-0771. ; 36:4
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Many collective action problems are inherently linked to honesty. By deciding to behave honestly, people contribute to solving the collective action problem. We use a laboratory experiment from two sites (n = 331 and n = 319) to test whether honest preferences can drive cooperation and whether these preferences can be differentially activated by framing. Subjects participate in an asymmetric information variant of the public goods game in one of two treatments that vary only in their wording: The Contribution Frame uses a standard public good game framing, while in the Honesty Frame, words aimed to trigger honesty are used. We measure subjects honesty in three ways using the (i) sender-receiver task, (ii) the die-roll task, and (iii) self-reported honesty levels and account for other-regarding preferences and social norms to disentangle key alternative motives. We find that all three measures of honesty preferences robustly predict contributions, as do other-regarding preferences and empirical expectations but not normative expectations. Additionally, honesty preferences predict contributions in the Honesty Frame but not in the Contribution Frame, although the difference between these is not consistently significant. Finally, we find no differences in average cooperation across the treatments.
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