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1.	Roorda, Jan-Willem, 1975, et al. (author) Iterated belief change in multi-agent systems 2002 In: Proceedings of the 1st International Joint Conference on: Autonomous Agents adn Multiagent Systems, Bologna, 15-19 July 2002. - New York, New York, USA : ACM Press. - 1581134800 ; , s. 889-896 Conference paper (peer-reviewed)abstract We give a model for iterated belief change in multi-agent systems. The formal tool we use for this is a combination of modal and dynamic logic. Two core notions in our model are the expansion of the knowledge and beliefs of an agent, and the processing of new information. An expansion has been defined as the change in the knowledge and beliefs of an agent when it decides to believe an incoming formula while holding on to its current propositional beliefs. To prevent our agents from forming inconsistent beliefs they do not expand with every piece of information they receive. Instead, our agents remember their original beliefs and every piece of information they receive. After every receipt of information they decide which (consistent) subset of the received information should be incorporated into their original beliefs. This procedure is called the processing of new information. We show that our model of belief update behaves in an intuitive way and that it is not sensitive to criticism on comparable models.

Roorda, Jan-Willem, 1975, et al. (author)
Iterated belief change in multi-agent systems
2002
In: Proceedings of the 1st International Joint Conference on: Autonomous Agents adn Multiagent Systems, Bologna, 15-19 July 2002. - New York, New York, USA : ACM Press. - 1581134800 ; , s. 889-896
Conference paper (peer-reviewed)abstract
- We give a model for iterated belief change in multi-agent systems. The formal tool we use for this is a combination of modal and dynamic logic. Two core notions in our model are the expansion of the knowledge and beliefs of an agent, and the processing of new information. An expansion has been defined as the change in the knowledge and beliefs of an agent when it decides to believe an incoming formula while holding on to its current propositional beliefs. To prevent our agents from forming inconsistent beliefs they do not expand with every piece of information they receive. Instead, our agents remember their original beliefs and every piece of information they receive. After every receipt of information they decide which (consistent) subset of the received information should be incorporated into their original beliefs. This procedure is called the processing of new information. We show that our model of belief update behaves in an intuitive way and that it is not sensitive to criticism on comparable models.

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