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- Brännmark, Johan
(author)
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Ethical Theories and the Transparency Condition
- 2009
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In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1386-2820 .- 1572-8447. ; 12:5, s. 449-462
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Following John Rawls, writers like Bernard Williams and Christine Korsgaard have suggested that a transparency condition should be put on ethical theories. The exact nature of such a condition and its implications is however not anything on which there is any consensus. It is argued here that the ultimate rationale of transparency conditions is epistemic rather than substantively moral, but also that it clearly connects to substantive concerns about moral psychology. Finally, it is argued that once a satisfactory form of the transparency condition is formulated, then, at least among the main contenders within ethical theory, it speaks in favor of a broadly Aristotelian approach to ethical theorizing.
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- Brännmark, Johan
(author)
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From virtue to decency
- 2006
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In: Metaphilosophy. - : Wiley. - 1467-9973 .- 0026-1068. ; 37:5, s. 589-604
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- In her work on virtue ethics Rosalind Hursthouse has formulated an Aristotelian criterion of rightness that understands rightness in terms of what the virtuous person would do. It is argued here that this kind of criterion does not allow enough room for the category of the supererogatory and that right and wrong should rather be understood in terms of the characteristic behavior of decent persons. Furthermore, it is suggested that this kind of approach has the added advantage of allowing one to make sense of the centrality of negative precepts in commonsense morality.
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- Brännmark, Johan
(author)
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Goodness, Values, Reasons
- 2009
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In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 1386-2820 .- 1572-8447. ; 12:4, s. 329-343
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- Contemporary value theory has been characterized by a renewed interest in the analysis of concepts like "good" or "valuable", the most prominent pattern of analysis in recent years being the socalled buck-passing or fitting-attitude analysis which reduces goodness to a matter of having properties that provide reasons for pro-attitudes. Here I argue that such analyses are best understood as metaphysical rather than linguistic and that while the buck-passing analysis has some virtues, it still fails to provide a suitably wide-ranging pattern of analysis for conceptualizing evaluative properties. Instead, a better alternative can be found in a metaphysical version of the Geachean view that goodness is always attributive and never predicative, namely that goodness is always a matter of relative placement in certain kinds of comparison classes. It is then suggested that the good and the valuable need to be separated from each other and that the latter is a species of the former.
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