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- Lindahl, Lars, et al.
(author)
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Conflict of legal norms: definition and varieties
- 2015
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In: Logic in the theory and practice of lawmaking. - Cham : Springer International Publishing. - 9783319195759 ; , s. 49-95
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Book chapter (peer-reviewed)abstract
- As emphasized by Jeremy Bentham and the analytical school, logical consistency is a requirement for rational legislation. For understanding consistency between norms, a logical scrutiny of normative conflicts is needed. In our paper, a framework for the fine structure of such conflicts is introduced and explained. “Normative conflict” is defined relative the framework and different types of conflict distinguished. The framework consists of a formal language in which norms of a legal system can be represented, accompanied by a set of logical rules and general principles. These rules and principles are such that their application to sentences describing the contents of a legal system discloses conflicts within legal systems. Important elements in legislation are capacitative norms, relating to legal power, or “legal competence,” to achieve a valid legal result by an act–in–the–law (for example a promise, a conveyance, or a judicial decision). The analysis encompasses conflicts between deontic norms relating to obligations and permissions, on one hand, and norms relating to legal power, on the other. The analysis is applicable both to conflicts within a national legal system and to supranational normative conflicts, for example conflicts between national law and EU law.
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| 2. |
- Lindahl, Lars, et al.
(author)
-
Legal Power: The Basic Definition
- 2017
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In: Ratio Juris. - : Wiley. - 0952-1917. ; 30:2, s. 158-185
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Journal article (peer-reviewed)abstract
- The concept of legal power (often called legal competence) is important in the law since, with regard to actions having legal effect, the “exercise of legal power” delimits those actions for which manifestation of intention to achieve a legal effect is essential for the effect to ensue. The paper proposes a definition that captures this feature of legal power and marks it off rom “direct effect,” as well as from permissibility and practical ability to achieve the legal effect. This analysis of power is limited to the “immediate” legal power of a physical person characterized by the powerholder achieving a legal result by the power-holder’s own behaviour (not by representatives acting on behalf of the power-holder). It is argued that in the literature on power the concept of legal power is frequently construed in such a way that it becomes either too broad or too narrow.
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