| 1. |
- Alger, Ingela, et al.
(författare)
-
A generalization of Hamilton's rule-Love others how much?
- 2012
-
Ingår i: Journal of Theoretical Biology. - : Elsevier BV. - 0022-5193 .- 1095-8541. ; 299, s. 42-54
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- According to Hamilton's (1964a, b) rule, a costly action will be undertaken if its fitness cost to the actor falls short of the discounted benefit to the recipient, where the discount factor is Wright's index of relatedness between the two. We propose a generalization of this rule, and show that if evolution operates at the level of behavior rules, rather than directly at the level of actions, evolution will select behavior rules that induce a degree of cooperation that may differ from that predicted by Hamilton's rule as applied to actions. In social dilemmas there will be less (more) cooperation than under Hamilton's rule if the actions are strategic substitutes (complements). Our approach is based on natural selection, defined in terms of personal (direct) fitness, and applies to a wide range of pairwise interactions.
|
|
| 2. |
|
|
| 3. |
|
|
| 4. |
- Alger, Ingela, et al.
(författare)
-
Kinship, incentives, and evolution
- 2010
-
Ingår i: The American Economic Review. - : American Economic Association. - 0002-8282 .- 1944-7981. ; 100:4, s. 1725-1758
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We analyze how family ties affect incentives, with focus on the strategic interaction between two mutually altruistic siblings. The siblings exert effort to produce output under uncertainty, and they may transfer output to each other. With equally altruistic siblings, their equilibrium effort is nonmonotonic in the common degree of altruism, and it depends on the harshness of the environment. We define a notion of local evolutionary stability of degrees of sibling altruism and show that this degree is lower than the kinship-relatedness factor. Numerical simulations show how family ties vary with the environment, and how this affects economic outcomes.
|
|
| 5. |
- Andersson, Ola, et al.
(författare)
-
Robustness to strategic uncertainty
- 2014
-
Ingår i: Games and Economic Behavior. - : Elsevier BV. - 0899-8256 .- 1090-2473. ; 85:1, s. 272-288
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We introduce a criterion for robustness to strategic uncertainty in games with continuum strategy sets. We model a player's uncertainty about another player's strategy as an atomless probability distribution over that player's strategy set. We call a strategy profile robust to strategic uncertainty if it is the limit, as uncertainty vanishes, of some sequence of strategy profiles in which every player's strategy is optimal under his or her uncertainty about the others. When payoff functions are continuous we show that our criterion is a refinement of Nash equilibrium and we also give sufficient conditions for existence of a robust strategy profile. In addition, we apply the criterion to Bertrand games with convex costs, a class of games with discontinuous payoff functions and a continuum of Nash equilibria. We show that it then selects a unique Nash equilibrium, in agreement with some recent experimental findings.
|
|
| 6. |
- Huck, Steffen, et al.
(författare)
-
Social norms and economic incentives in firms
- 2012
-
Ingår i: Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization. - : Elsevier BV. - 0167-2681 .- 1879-1751. ; 83:2, s. 173-185
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- This paper studies the interplay between economic incentives and social norms in firms. We introduce a general framework to model social norms arguing that norms stem from agents' desire for, or peer pressure towards, social efficiency. In a simple model of team production we examine the interplay of three types of contracts with social norms. We show that one and the same norm can be output-increasing, neutral, or output-decreasing depending on the contract. Multiplicity of equilibria and crowding out effects of steeper incentives can arise.
|
|
| 7. |
- Laslier, Jean Francois, et al.
(författare)
-
An incentive-compatible condorcet jury theorem
- 2013
-
Ingår i: Scandinavian Journal of Economics. - : Wiley: 24 months. - 1467-9442 .- 0347-0520. ; 115:1, s. 84-108
-
Tidskriftsartikel (refereegranskat)abstract
- We consider a group of individuals who face a binary collective decision. Each group member holds some private information, and all agree about what decision should be taken in each state of nature. However, the state is unknown, and members can differ in their valuations of the two types of mistakes that might occur, and in their prior beliefs about the true state. For a slightly randomized majority rule, we show that informative voting by all voters is the unique Nash equilibrium, that this equilibrium is strict, and that the Condorcet asymptotic efficiency result holds in this setting.
|
|
| 8. |
|
|
| 9. |
- Mattsson, Lars-Göran, et al.
(författare)
-
Extreme values, invariance and choice probabilities
- 2011
-
Konferensbidrag (refereegranskat)abstract
- Consider a finite set of alternatives, and an associatedcollection of random variables representing some given relevant property of eachalternative, such as its utility, cost or reliability. Suppose that there is a processthat selects exactly one of these alternatives, an alternative with an extreme(maximal or minimal) value. In economics, discrete-choice analysis based onrandom utility theory is the most well-known modelling approach to such aprocess. Among practitioners, it is widely believed that in order to analyze suchsituations, one needs to resort to particular parametric forms of the underlyingprobability distributions of the random variables. We show that this is notso. Indeed, parametric forms impose unnecessary theoretical and empiricalconstraints and may hide more general properties. For the special case ofstatistical independence, we further provide a characterization of the invarianceproperty that all random variables, representing the relevant property of thealternatives, have the same distribution, conditional upon being chosen.
|
|
| 10. |
- Mattsson, Lars-Göran, et al.
(författare)
-
Extreme values, invariance and choice probabilities
- 2011
-
Rapport (övrigt vetenskapligt/konstnärligt)abstract
- Since the pioneering work of McFadden (1974), discretechoice random-utility models have become work horses in many areas in economics.In these models, the random variables enter additively or multiplicatively, and the noise distributions take a particular parametric form. We show that the same qualitative results, with closed-form choice probabilities, can be obtained for a wide class of distributions without such specifications. This class generalizes the statistically independent distributions where any two c.d.f.:s are powers of each others to a class that allows for statistical dependence, in a way analogous to how GEV distributions generalize Gumbel distributions. We show that this generalization is sufficient, and under statistical independence also necessary, for the following invariance property: all conditional random variables, when conditioning upon a certain alternative having been chosen, are identically distributed. In our general framework, proofs become simpler, more direct and transparent, well-known results are obtained as special cases, and one can characterize the Gumbel, Fréchet and Weibull distributions.
|
|
