Power Games in Networks : A Case of New Mercantilist Network Organizing

• This paper investigates essential aspects of business networks in highly concentrated supplier and retail markets. In particular it discusses the interface between industrial supply network organization and end-consumer markets where a certain type of organization exists: the retail supermarket-organization. We argue that certain kinds of power dynamics emerge when retailers interact with producers in supply networks, which is pertinent due to the implications for the actual development of networked economies. This paper analyses this interplay in order to understand more of the mechanisms and the structures of the power games that impact business network dynamics. We identify three power games; the access to market game, the latitude game, and the price dumping game. We furthermore analyse the mechanisms and the transaction patterns that are implicit in these power games. Jointly, these indicate a development towards a neo-mercantilist economy where access to and participation in market supply may in fact be ―taxed‖ by powerful actors in certain network positions. These outcomes point at aspects of networked economies in highly concentrated economies that represent particular challenges to both market practitioners and policy makers

Subject headings

SAMHÄLLSVETENSKAP  -- Ekonomi och näringsliv -- Företagsekonomi (hsv//swe)

SOCIAL SCIENCES  -- Economics and Business -- Business Administration (hsv//eng)

Keyword

Power

Network Organizing

Interaction

Dynamics

Concentration

Food and Agriculture

Business Studies

Företagsekonomi

Publication and Content Type

ref (subject category)

kon (subject category)