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Moral Lessons from Psychology : Contemporary Themes in Psychological Research and their Relevance for Ethical Theory

Ahlenius, Henrik, 1973- (author)
Stockholms universitet,Filosofiska institutionen
Olson, Jonas, Professor (thesis advisor)
Stockholms universitet,Filosofiska institutionen
Svensson, Frans, Associate Professor (thesis advisor)
Institutionen för filosofi, lingvistik, vetenskapsteori, Göteborgs universitet
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Kauppinen, Antti, Professor (opponent)
Helsingfors universitet, University of Helsinki, Finland
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 (creator_code:org_t)
ISBN 9789179113544
Stockholm : Department of Philosophy, Stockholm University, 2020
English 162 s.
  • Doctoral thesis (other academic/artistic)
Abstract Subject headings
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  • The thesis investigates the implications for moral philosophy of research in psychology. In addition to an introduction and concluding remarks, the thesis consists of four chapters, each exploring various more specific challenges or inputs to moral philosophy from cognitive, social, personality, developmental, and evolutionary psychology. Chapter 1 explores and clarifies the issue of whether or not morality is innate. The chapter’s general conclusion is that evolution has equipped us with a basic suite of emotions that shape our moral judgments in important ways. Chapter 2 presents and investigates the challenge presented to deontological ethics by Joshua Greene’s so-called dual process theory. The chapter partly agrees with his conclusion that the dual process view neutralizes some common criticisms against utilitarianism founded on deontological intuitions, but also points to avenues left to explore for deontologists. Chapter 3 focuses on Katarzyna de Lazari-Radek and Peter Singer’s suggestion that utilitarianism is less vulnerable to so-called evolutionary debunking than other moral theories. The chapter is by and large critical of their attempt. In the final chapter 4, attention is directed at the issue of whether or not social psychology has shown that people lack stable character traits, and hence that the virtue ethical view is premised on false or tenuous assumptions. Though this so-called situationist challenge at one time seemed like a serious threat to virtue ethics, the chapter argues for a moderate position, pointing to the fragility of much of the empirical research invoked to substantiate this challenge while also suggesting revisions to the virtue ethical view as such.

Subject headings

HUMANIORA  -- Filosofi, etik och religion -- Etik (hsv//swe)
HUMANITIES  -- Philosophy, Ethics and Religion -- Ethics (hsv//eng)
HUMANIORA  -- Filosofi, etik och religion -- Filosofi (hsv//swe)
HUMANITIES  -- Philosophy, Ethics and Religion -- Philosophy (hsv//eng)
SAMHÄLLSVETENSKAP  -- Psykologi -- Psykologi (hsv//swe)
SOCIAL SCIENCES  -- Psychology -- Psychology (hsv//eng)
NATURVETENSKAP  -- Biologi -- Evolutionsbiologi (hsv//swe)
NATURAL SCIENCES  -- Biological Sciences -- Evolutionary Biology (hsv//eng)

Keyword

consequentialism
deontology
emotion
ethics
evolution
innate
moral judgment
moral philosophy
psychology
utilitarianism
virtue
praktisk filosofi
Practical Philosophy

Publication and Content Type

vet (subject category)
dok (subject category)

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