Search: onr:"swepub:oai:DiVA.org:uu-108633" >
Optimal unemploymen...
Optimal unemployment insurance with monitoring and sanctions
-
- Boone, Jan (author)
- Tilburg University, CentER, IZA and CEPR
-
- Fredriksson, Peter (author)
- Uppsala universitet,Nationalekonomiska institutionen
-
- Holmlund, Bertil (author)
- Uppsala universitet,Nationalekonomiska institutionen
-
show more...
-
- van Ours, Jan C. (author)
- Tilburg University, CentER, IZA and CEPR
-
show less...
-
(creator_code:org_t)
- 2007-04-05
- 2007
- English.
-
In: Economic Journal. - : Oxford University Press (OUP). - 0013-0133 .- 1468-0297. ; 117:518, s. 399-421
- Related links:
-
https://econpapers.r...
-
show more...
-
https://urn.kb.se/re...
-
https://doi.org/10.1...
-
show less...
Abstract
Subject headings
Close
- This article analyses the design of optimal unemployment insurance in a search equilibrium framework where search effort among the unemployed is not perfectly observable. We examine to what extent the optimal policy involves monitoring of search effort and benefit sanctions if observed search is deemed insufficient. We find that introducing monitoring and sanctions represents a welfare improvement for reasonable estimates of monitoring costs; this conclusion holds both relative to a system featuring indefinite payments of benefits and a system with a time limit on unemployment benefit receipt.
Subject headings
- SAMHÄLLSVETENSKAP -- Ekonomi och näringsliv -- Nationalekonomi (hsv//swe)
- SOCIAL SCIENCES -- Economics and Business -- Economics (hsv//eng)
Keyword
- Economics
- Nationalekonomi
- Nationalekonomi
- Economics
Publication and Content Type
- ref (subject category)
- art (subject category)
Find in a library
To the university's database