Agency Control or Autonomy? : Government Steering of Swedish Government Agencies 2003–2017

• A central claim of the NPM doctrine is that public sector organizations will deliver better quality and improve efficiency if managers are given more autonomy in managerial and operational decisions. At the same time the idea is to keep managers under close control, which has led to the introduction of result-control instruments. This balancing strategy is referred to as the paradox of autonomization. There is, however, still scarce knowledge on whether and how the proposed balancing techniques work. Using a unique database on Swedish government agencies this article aims to mitigate this deficiency (N=1752). A balancing strategy is mainly confirmed, since higher managerial and structural autonomy are balanced with more external results control by government. We show that governments’ attempts at more managerial approaches to public service provision in reality add new ex post controls without reducing the old ones. However, policy and financial autonomy are not balanced by increased results control—these dimensions diminish when controlling for budget size. This study is an answer to a general call for more objective measures for evaluating bureaucratic autonomy

Subject headings

SAMHÄLLSVETENSKAP  -- Statsvetenskap -- Studier av offentlig förvaltning (hsv//swe)

SOCIAL SCIENCES  -- Political Science -- Public Administration Studies (hsv//eng)

Keyword

government agencies

bureaucratic autonomy

political control

paradox of autonomization

performance management

Statskunskap

Political Science

Publication and Content Type

ref (subject category)

art (subject category)