Offense-Defense Balance, War Duration, and the Security Dilemma

• The systemic offense-defense theory argues that the security dilemma and the risk of war become doubly severe in offense-dominant eras in the state system. However, the theory assumes in support of its main argument that wars are shorter when offense has the advantage. This article empirically tests the expected connection between the systemic offense-defense balance and war duration. A statistical analysis of wars 1817-1992 disconfirms the theory's expectations. The article then draws different conclusions about the severity of the security dilemma when offense is dominant: both arms racing and the fear of aggression that the security dilemma thrives on should be less severe than offense-defense theorists assume.

Subject headings

SAMHÄLLSVETENSKAP  -- Statsvetenskap -- Statsvetenskap (hsv//swe)

SOCIAL SCIENCES  -- Political Science -- Political Science (hsv//eng)

Keyword

war duration

offense-defense balance

security dilemma

international-relations theory

cooperation

peace

cult

well r

1991

american political science review

v85

p1303

x wtr

1970

annals of the american academy of political and social science

v392

p1

Publication and Content Type

ref (subject category)

art (subject category)