SwePub
Sök i LIBRIS databas

  Extended search

onr:"swepub:oai:gup.ub.gu.se/253608"
 

Search: onr:"swepub:oai:gup.ub.gu.se/253608" > Unintended Effects ...

  • 1 of 1
  • Previous record
  • Next record
  •    To hitlist

Unintended Effects of Targeting an Environmental Rebate

Alpizar, Francisco, 1974 (author)
Gothenburg University,Göteborgs universitet,Institutionen för nationalekonomi med statistik, Enheten för miljöekonomi,Department of Economics, Environmental Economics Unit,Research Program in Economics and Environment for Development, CATIE, Turrialba, Costa Rica
Nordén, Anna, 1981 (author)
Gothenburg University,Göteborgs universitet,Institutionen för nationalekonomi med statistik,Department of Economics,Department of Economics, University of Gothenburg, Göteborg, Sweden
Pfaff, A. (author)
Sanford School of Public Policy, Duke University, Durham, NC, United States
show more...
Robalino, J. (author)
Research Program in Economics and Environment for Development, CATIE, Turrialba, Costa Rica
Stralia, V. P. (author)
show less...
 (creator_code:org_t)
2015-11-23
2017
English.
In: Environmental & Resource Economics. - : Springer Science and Business Media LLC. - 0924-6460 .- 1573-1502. ; 67:1, s. 181-202
  • Journal article (peer-reviewed)
Abstract Subject headings
Close  
  • When designing schemes such as conditional cash transfers or payments for ecosystem services, the choice of whom to select and whom to exclude is critical. We incentivize and measure actual contributions to an environmental public good to ascertain whether being excluded from a rebate can affect contributions and, if so, whether the rationale for exclusion influences such effects. Treatments, i.e., three rules that determine who is selected and excluded, are randomly assigned. Two of the rules base exclusion on subjects' initial contributions. The third is based upon location and the rationales are always explained. The rule that targets the rebate to low initial contributors, who have more potential to raise contributions, is the only rule that raised contributions by those selected. Yet by design, that same rule excludes the subjects who contributed the most initially. They respond by reducing their contributions even though their income and prices are unchanged.

Subject headings

SAMHÄLLSVETENSKAP  -- Ekonomi och näringsliv -- Nationalekonomi (hsv//swe)
SOCIAL SCIENCES  -- Economics and Business -- Economics (hsv//eng)
LANTBRUKSVETENSKAPER  -- Lantbruksvetenskap, skogsbruk och fiske -- Jordbruksvetenskap (hsv//swe)
AGRICULTURAL SCIENCES  -- Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries -- Agricultural Science (hsv//eng)

Keyword

Behavioral economics
Field experiment
Forest conservation
Public goods
Selective rebates
COSTA-RICA
INTRINSIC MOTIVATION
CONTRACT DESIGN
SERVICES
PAYMENTS
FAIRNESS
INCENTIVES
BEHAVIOR
DEFORESTATION
COOPERATION
Behavioral economics

Publication and Content Type

ref (subject category)
art (subject category)

Find in a library

To the university's database

  • 1 of 1
  • Previous record
  • Next record
  •    To hitlist

Search outside SwePub

Kungliga biblioteket hanterar dina personuppgifter i enlighet med EU:s dataskyddsförordning (2018), GDPR. Läs mer om hur det funkar här.
Så här hanterar KB dina uppgifter vid användning av denna tjänst.

 
pil uppåt Close

Copy and save the link in order to return to this view