Cutting Across the Diagonal Line: Coordinated Purges and Coup Reactions in Authoritarian Ruling Parties

• Purges are used by dictators to eliminate internal threats and prolong survival. However, when do purges backfire and lead to coups? Some autocrats purge both elite and masses in a single sequence, which we define as `coordinated' purges. However, despite their intent, this political repression can lead insiders to react through defensive counter-coups. To test this theory, we compile a new panel data on elite and mass membership in autocracies between 1917-2020. We find that coordinated purges account for over 60\% of the entire sample of purges. Implementing survival, matching, and reweighting analyses, we show that coordinated purges increase coup attempts against the dictator. Furthermore, we corroborate the mechanism by using the illustrative case of Syria between 1963-1966 to demonstrate the motivations and response to coordinated purging. These findings suggest that coordinated purges are used by dictators to rapidly eliminate entire opposing factions of regime insiders, yet they frequently backfire.

Subject headings

SAMHÄLLSVETENSKAP  -- Statsvetenskap (hsv//swe)

SOCIAL SCIENCES  -- Political Science (hsv//eng)

Keyword

Autocracy

Political Institutions

Ruling Parties

Repression

Coups

Publication and Content Type

vet (subject category)

ovr (subject category)