On A Posteriori Analysis in Epistemology

• Recently, Hilary Kornblith (2006, 2002) has argued that epistemological analysis is a substantially a posteriori investigation. In the present talk, I will argue two things. First, I will argue that Kornblith’s claim is, in fact, not contingent upon the further and, admittedly, controversial assumption that all objects of epistemological investigation are natural kinds. Second, I will argue that, contrary to what Kornblith seems to assume, this methodological contention does not imply that there is no need for attending to our epistemic concepts in epistemology. Understanding the make-up of our concepts and, in particular, the purposes they fill, is neces-sary for a proper acknowledgement of epistemology’s role in certain cases of conceptual improvement.

Subject headings

HUMANIORA  -- Filosofi, etik och religion -- Filosofi (hsv//swe)

HUMANITIES  -- Philosophy, Ethics and Religion -- Philosophy (hsv//eng)

HUMANIORA  -- Historia och arkeologi (hsv//swe)

HUMANITIES  -- History and Archaeology (hsv//eng)

Keyword

Epistemology

Empirical Method

Natural Kinds

Artifactual Kinds

Semantics

Methodology

Publication and Content Type

vet (subject category)

kon (subject category)