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CEO Age, Risk Incen...
CEO Age, Risk Incentives, and Hedging Strategy
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- Croci, Ettore (author)
- Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Rome
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- del Guidice, Alfonso (author)
- Catholic University of the Sacred Heart, Rome
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- Jankensgård, Håkan (author)
- Lund University,Lunds universitet,Företagsekonomiska institutionen,Ekonomihögskolan,Department of Business Administration,Lund University School of Economics and Management, LUSEM
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(creator_code:org_t)
- 2017-01-26
- 2017
- English.
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In: Financial Management. - : Wiley. - 0046-3892. ; , s. 687-716
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Abstract
Subject headings
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- We test if managerial preferences explain how firms hedge using hand-collected data on derivative portfolios in the oil and gas industry. How firms hedge involves choosing between linear contracts and put options, and deciding whether to finance these hedging positions with cash-on-hand or by selling call options. The likelihood of being a hedger increases with CEO age, and near-retirement CEOs prefer linear hedging instruments. The predictions of the managerial risk incentives-theory of hedging strategy, according to which managers with convex compensation schemes would avoid hedging strategies that cap upside potential, find no support in the data.
Subject headings
- SAMHÄLLSVETENSKAP -- Ekonomi och näringsliv -- Företagsekonomi (hsv//swe)
- SOCIAL SCIENCES -- Economics and Business -- Business Administration (hsv//eng)
Keyword
- Vega
- executive compensation
- hedging
- options
- CEO age
Publication and Content Type
- art (subject category)
- ref (subject category)
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